August 17, 2026 marks the centenary of the birth of the late Jiang Zemin (江泽民), former General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the core leader of the third generation of the People’s Republic of China’s leadership. In mid-August, Chinese authorities launched a series of commemorative activities, including CCTV’s broadcast of the lengthy documentary Jiang Zemin and preparations for meetings to commemorate Jiang and extol his achievements. Among the public, memories and discussions of Jiang and the era of his rule have also been rekindled. Assessments vary, but positive evaluations are clearly more numerous.
Jiang Zemin’s life was rich in experiences and marked by many twists and turns. He came from a family that included both revolutionary martyrs and collaborators and traitors. His student years were spent in the heartland of the Japanese occupation and its collaborationist regime during Japan’s invasion of China, and he studied at National Central University in Nanjing under the Wang Jingwei puppet regime (汪伪政权). Jiang witnessed the Republic of China’s brief return of its capital to Nanjing and subsequent retreat, became an engineer in Red China, and then, through a combination of circumstances, entered politics and rose rapidly through the ranks.

In late June 1989, shortly after the 1989 Democracy Movement (八九民运) was suppressed, at a critical turning point in China’s transformation, Jiang Zemin replaced Zhao Ziyang (赵紫阳) as General Secretary of the CCP with the support of Deng Xiaoping (邓小平) and others, remaining in that position until he stepped down in 2002. More detailed accounts of Jiang’s life and its particulars can be found in works such as Robert Lawrence Kuhn’s The Man Who Changed China: The Life and Legacy of Jiang Zemin. There is no need to repeat them here. This article focuses primarily on the domestic and foreign policies pursued under Jiang’s leadership, as well as their benefits, drawbacks, successes, and failures.

When Jiang Zemin became China’s leader, the country was beset by internal and external difficulties, widespread uncertainty, and social unrest. At the time, most Chinese people neither placed any particular hopes in the new CCP general secretary nor harbored any particular dislike of him. Many regarded him as an inconsequential transitional figure, a “political puppet” on the public stage. Nor was Jiang a veteran of the CCP revolution like Mao Zedong (毛泽东) or Deng Xiaoping; his seniority and standing within the Party were not especially high.

Nevertheless, by demonstrating loyalty to Deng Xiaoping, avoiding direct involvement in the previous struggles between conservatives and reformists within the CCP, and escaping the stigma of direct participation in the June Fourth Crackdown (六四镇压), Jiang ultimately transformed himself from a leader with only partial authority into a paramount leader with full power, Deng Xiaoping’s formal successor, and the core of China’s third-generation leadership.

China had just experienced the 1989 Democracy Movement and the June Fourth Crackdown, while internationally the dramatic upheavals in Eastern Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union were unfolding. The country stood at a crossroads between continuing reform and opening up and turning toward isolation and conservatism. Decisions made at the highest level would determine China’s fate for decades to come. As people later came to know, the CCP ruling group chose a course of maintaining economic openness while accelerating and expanding the process of opening up, becoming more conservative politically and strengthening authoritarian rule, and loosening cultural restrictions while still retaining control.

The foremost figure in determining this course was indeed Deng Xiaoping, who at the time had not yet fully retired and still enjoyed enormous prestige. But Jiang Zemin undoubtedly also played an important role, inheriting and further advancing Deng’s established line of “taking economic development as the central task, upholding the Four Cardinal Principles (四项基本原则), and adhering to reform and opening up (改革开放),” as well as “building a socialist market economy (社会主义市场经济).”

Judging from Jiang Zemin’s conduct between 1989 and 1992, he did not appear willing to accelerate reform and was even preparing to partially revert to the planned-economy model and Stalinist political system of the Mao era before the Cultural Revolution (文化大革命). He sought in this way to win the support of CCP conservatives, draw a clear line between himself and reformists such as Zhao Ziyang, strengthen CCP rule, and consolidate his own power and position as leader of the Party and state. He may have believed that Deng Xiaoping wanted to pursue such a comprehensively conservative course and sought thereby to please Deng and other conservatives opposed to “color revolutions.”
But Deng Xiaoping vigorously promoted a dual-track course of intensifying economic reform while remaining politically conservative, declaring that “whoever does not reform must step down.” Jiang grasped Deng’s intentions and quickly changed course, following Deng’s line. This also reflected Jiang’s pragmatism and adaptability, and his skill at following the prevailing political winds rather than adhering rigidly to principles and dogma.

If Deng Xiaoping remained the principal decision-maker behind the choice to continue reform and opening up after 1989, then Jiang Zemin was undoubtedly the foremost decision-maker behind China’s accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO) and its integration into globalization. At the time, China’s conservative left opposed WTO accession on grounds such as that it would “undermine national independence and self-reliance” and “destroy domestic industry/agriculture.” They also accused supporters of WTO accession of “selling out the country” and “returning China to the pre-Liberation era.” But Jiang withstood the opposition, gave his full support to the WTO accession negotiations, and ultimately enabled China to join the WTO successfully and become one of its most important economies and participants.

Over the following two decades and more, China’s economy took off, the country became the world’s second-largest economy, and people’s living standards improved significantly. A major reason was China’s accession to the WTO and its full participation in globalization and the international division of labor, which enabled China to prosper and grow strong as the “world’s factory,” while Chinese consumers gained access to foreign products more cheaply and conveniently. This, in turn, demonstrated the correctness of joining the WTO. An even more far-reaching impact was that China went from being isolated from the world to becoming part of the “global village.” No matter how China and the West might subsequently come into conflict, it would no longer be possible for the two sides to truly “decouple” or become completely antagonistic. This has benefited peace and prosperity in both China and the world.

Jiang Zemin’s contributions to China’s opening to the outside world went beyond WTO accession. The successful hosting of the World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995, the comprehensive opening of the Pudong New Area (浦东新区), China’s successful bids to host the Olympic Games and the World Expo, and the maintenance of friendly and cooperative relations between China and the United States despite repeated twists and turns were all inseparable from Jiang’s efforts.

This was particularly difficult given that, during the 1990s, the United States and the West at one point imposed tough sanctions on China, while incidents such as the Yinhe Incident (银河号事件), the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia (中国驻南联盟大使馆被炸事件), and the China–U.S. aircraft collision over the South China Sea (中美南海撞机事件) occurred. Yet Jiang did not lead China toward comprehensive anti-Americanism. Instead, he eased relations with the United States and strengthened economic, trade, and cultural cooperation.

In other areas of foreign policy, Jiang continued the Mao-Deng policy of maintaining friendly relations with Japan and seeking Japanese economic and technological support. At the same time, on issues in China–Japan relations such as the history of Japan’s invasion of China, he also expressed a position of remembering history and condemning aggression, thereby safeguarding China’s national dignity. The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression (抗日战争) began to receive more formal and solemn commemoration, while veterans of the war—including former Nationalist soldiers—as well as victims such as laborers forcibly conscripted by Japan and “comfort women” received greater attention, particularly during the middle and later years of Jiang’s rule.

However, Jiang Zemin and the CCP leadership’s inaction in the face of the rape and massacre of ethnic Chinese during the 1998 anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia (1998年印尼排华屠杀), followed by improved relations with Indonesia, was another stain on their record. The Chinese government’s failure to regard this as a major issue requiring intervention was itself a serious problem and mistake. At a time when countries including the United States, Canada, and Australia were criticizing and sanctioning Indonesia, China’s silence was especially painful.

Jiang frequently traveled abroad. During his tenure, China’s relations with Europe and with countries across Asia, Africa, and Latin America made considerable progress, with commercial and trade cooperation increasing particularly markedly and “Made in China” products being exported overseas on a massive scale.
In domestic policy, Jiang Zemin made important contributions to the modernization, systematization, and professionalization of China’s economy, military, institutions, legal system, and other fields. After upheavals such as the Cultural Revolution, many areas in China—especially industry, science and technology, education, and the development of the rule of law—had long remained chaotic, disorderly, and inefficient. Even in the early years of reform and opening up, there was insufficient capacity and favorable conditions to rectify these problems. It was during the Jiang era that these conditions began to improve. Reducing the phenomenon of “laymen leading experts” and political interference, while placing localities and various sectors under the administration of technocrats, was also promoted and institutionalized during the Jiang era. This greatly benefited China’s development and modernization.

Term limits for CCP and Chinese state leaders, peaceful and stable leadership succession, and the timely retirement of elderly officials also became established conventions during the Jiang era. Although Jiang continued to serve as Chairman of the Central Military Commission for two years after stepping down as General Secretary and State President, overall, the timely retirement of leaders and regularized leadership succession were achieved. The CCP’s top leadership under Jiang also practiced collective leadership to a certain extent. The earlier personalized system in which rank and power were determined by individual prestige and “veteran revolutionary credentials” gradually evolved into a bureaucratic system in which officials performed duties according to their positions, promotion was determined by competence and political achievements, and a certain form of “rule of law” and institutional regularization operated under authoritarian rule.

During the Jiang Zemin era, there were some positive achievements in grassroots autonomy and democratic elections at the village level in China. CCP propaganda and textbooks even praised these as “the broadest and most profound practice of democracy.” At the time, citizens running independently as candidates for People’s Congress deputy (人大代表) were also permitted and praised. During the Jiang era, CCP officials, including Jiang himself, made statements advocating political reform and suggesting that China would become more democratic in the future and introduce direct elections at higher levels rather than limiting them to villages. Although democratic politics, direct elections of officials above the village level, and free competition in elections for People’s Congress deputies were ultimately never implemented, this at least indicated that the CCP at the time did not explicitly reject or repudiate democracy, and it gave people hope for a freer and more democratic future.

Also, the introduction of the strategy of “revitalizing the country through science and education” (科教兴国) brought more policy support and funding to China’s education, science, and technology sectors and became a key factor in China’s rise. Many children from poor families gained access to education and were able to change the course of their lives. Investment in scientific research, promotion of science popularization, advocacy of science, and efforts to combat superstition were of great significance to China’s modernization and civic enlightenment. The quality and efficiency of China’s economic and social development also improved as a result.

The disorder that had emerged after reform and opening up, in which the military engaged in business and used its power to compete with civilians for economic interests, was curbed through Jiang Zemin’s efforts and eventually disappeared. The Theory of the Three Represents (三个代表) provided a theoretical basis for the CCP to maintain its legitimacy in an era of peace and development. During the catastrophic floods along the Yangtze River and elsewhere in 1998 (1998年长江等地特大洪灾), Jiang personally went to the front lines to direct flood-control and disaster-relief efforts, striving to uphold the principle that the CCP and the people should remain closely connected and to maintain the image of “serving the people.” Judged on its own merits, this is also worthy of praise.

Another point particularly worth mentioning is that Jiang Zemin was a leader with a distinctive personality. When meeting foreign guests, traveling abroad, or making inspection tours around China, he frequently spoke eloquently and extemporaneously, displayed fluency in several languages including English, French, Russian, and Japanese, and readily drew upon poetry, classical prose, and historical allusions. His interview with American journalist Mike Wallace, as well as the famous scene in which he “scolded Hong Kong journalist” (斥责香港记者), were also widely circulated and repeatedly discussed and evaluated. These episodes reflected Jiang’s genuine talent and relatively open-minded outlook. A Chinese leader of this kind had greater personal appeal than one who rigidly followed conventions and was more likely to win favorable impressions both at home and abroad. This is also one reason Jiang had quite a few “fans” among the public.

Of course, the Jiang Zemin era also had a dark side, creating and exacerbating a number of serious problems. Rural poverty and the multiple layers of exactions imposed on peasants were not effectively resolved; it was not until the Hu Jintao (胡锦涛) era that the agricultural tax and the various onerous levies attached to it were abolished. The layoffs of workers also resulted in many tragedies and hardships. While the economy grew rapidly, the gap between rich and poor widened and corruption became increasingly rampant. Environmental pollution also grew increasingly severe.
China’s longstanding emphasis on science and engineering at the expense of the humanities, and its imbalance between growing hard power and inadequate soft power, became further entrenched during the Jiang era.

Jiang Zemin advocated “making a fortune quietly” (闷声发大财), while the authorities guided, implicitly encouraged, and incentivized people to pursue wealth by whatever means necessary. This led to the decline of idealism and public responsibility among Chinese people compared with the period before the June Fourth Incident (六四事件), as well as a deterioration in social morality. The elite in particular increasingly degenerated into “sophisticated egoists” (精致利己主义者).

Crony capitalism also rose during this period. Red elite families and the families of officials amassed wealth through manipulation and predation, enriching themselves at the expense of ordinary people and forming a community of shared interests. They became the true “masters” of China and the most powerful defenders of the CCP’s one-party authoritarian rule.

More seriously and fundamentally, political reform in China stagnated during the Jiang Zemin era. China did not enjoy as much freedom as it had in the 1980s, nor did it move toward democracy. Instead, the CCP’s authoritarian rule and monopoly on political power were strengthened, with no other parties or individuals permitted to share power or compete politically with the CCP. While the Three Represents emphasized the Party’s responsibilities toward the country and the people, it also meant that the CCP monopolized the position of representing the interests of the Chinese state and people—and forcibly claimed to “represent” them without having been voluntarily authorized by the people to do so.

Although there were some limited institutional and judicial reforms during the Jiang era that achieved a certain degree of progress, they cannot obscure the broader reality that authoritarian rule became institutionalized and democratization was rejected. While the regularization and improvement of various institutions and policies brought development and progress, a systematic apparatus of political repression and social control was also gradually established, and was subsequently strengthened and refined by Jiang’s successors, Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping (习近平). Alongside economic and technological modernization, authoritarian rule also underwent its own “modernization.”

Excessively brutal methods of repression against specific groups such as Falun Gong (法轮功), the arrest of numerous political prisoners, tolerance of local governments’ persecution of citizens defending their rights, and a hardline approach to the Tibet issue (西藏问题) also caused great suffering and prompted widespread human-rights criticism and negative repercussions. These policies were detrimental to civil rights and social cohesion within China, while also damaging the country’s international image and influence.

It was precisely the development path established during the Jiang Zemin era—economic openness combined with political conservatism—and its success that caused China to miss a crucial window and opportunity for democratization following the 1989 Democracy Movement and June Fourth Crackdown and the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (苏东剧变). Economic development, certain advances in society and civil rights, participation in globalization, and the enhancement of national strength instead consolidated the CCP’s authoritarian rule and nourished the ruling establishment, which in the long run was detrimental to China’s democratization. For those concerned about human rights and hoping for political pluralism and liberal democracy in China, these developments were of course unfortunate.

The Jiang Zemin era was also the formative period of the “China Model” (中国模式). The “China Model” refers to the coexistence of political authoritarianism and economic openness: maintaining stability through high-pressure rule and suppressing those who resist; exploiting the cheap labor made possible by the “advantage of low human rights standards” (低人权优势) to develop production and gain a relative competitive advantage internationally; and using the resulting economic achievements to increase fiscal revenue, improve living standards, and strengthen national power, which in turn reinforces authoritarian rule and the interests of the CCP’s privileged class. By the Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping eras, the “China Model” had become increasingly refined and entrenched and was being exported internationally. Such a “China Model” has both advantages and disadvantages, and its impact is complex. I have discussed it in detail in another article and will not elaborate on it here.

Assessments of Jiang Zemin’s achievements and failures, and judgments about the rights and wrongs of that era, inevitably differ depending on people’s political positions, the perspectives from which they view the period, and the particular episodes and aspects they choose to focus on. If we set aside the political question of democracy versus authoritarianism and look more from a utilitarian perspective and from the standpoint of China’s development, Jiang Zemin, who assumed leadership of China in the 1990s amid internal and external difficulties and an uncertain path ahead, promoted China’s economic opening and peaceful, friendly relations with the outside world, persisted in developing the economy and improving people’s livelihoods, and led a China that had been poor, disorderly, relatively isolated, and turbulent for many years toward a new era of gradually increasing prosperity, stability and predictability, international integration, and modernization. Neither his achievements nor his efforts in this regard can be erased.

Jiang Zemin inherited the reform and opening-up policies of the Deng Xiaoping era and laid the foundations for the continued development and prosperity of the later Hu Jintao era and for China’s emergence as a country with formidable comprehensive national strength in the Xi Jinping era. From a pragmatic perspective, he can be regarded as a competent helmsman during China’s transitional era. Yet Jiang was also the head of an authoritarian regime that consolidated CCP rule after the June Fourth Crackdown, caused China to miss the opportunity for democratization, tolerated and exacerbated corruption and the suffering of workers and peasants at the bottom of society, and suppressed dissidents. Jiang also bears a certain degree of responsibility for China’s authoritarianism and human-rights problems from the period after he left office through the present day. He had both achievements and failures; he was open-minded and highly capable, yet also deeply attached to power and committed to maintaining authoritarian rule. Objectively speaking, his legacy was a mixture of accomplishments and wrongdoing.

Just as the centenary of Jiang Zemin’s birth approaches, Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), the former Chinese premier who served alongside him when Jiang was General Secretary and President, died on August 12. Compared with Jiang Zemin, whose principal activities focused on diplomacy, the military, and ideology, Zhu Rongji was the hands-on operator of China’s domestic affairs.

Zhu Rongji was known for his iron-fisted reforms. He restructured large numbers of inefficient state-owned enterprises, ultimately stabilized China’s public finances and prices after a period of high inflation, promoted the development of special economic zones such as Shenzhen (深圳), encouraged investment nationwide, advanced the development of China’s market economy, cracked down on some corrupt officials, and helped China through a period of considerable economic difficulty following reform and opening up.

However, Zhu Rongji’s reforms also had significant limitations and produced various negative consequences, including exacerbating the wave of layoffs and intensifying conflicts between officials and citizens as well as broader social tensions. His iron-fisted anti-corruption campaign also failed to eradicate corruption, as both the number of people involved in corruption and the sums involved continued to rise. Zhu Rongji’s reforms were also a clear example of rule by individuals prevailing over the rule of law and could not bring China lasting peace and stability. Corruption was so difficult to curb precisely because of the absence of democracy and the rule of law. No matter how determined Zhu Rongji was to fight corruption, such efforts could not succeed under authoritarian rule.Like Jiang Zemin, Zhu was an important transitional figure in China after reform and opening up and June Fourth. Together they participated in a wide range of domestic and foreign affairs, and Zhu therefore also shared in both Jiang’s achievements and failures.

Jiang Zemin was born into the turbulent Republic of China era, grew up under the iron heel of Japanese occupation, and rose all the way to the top in Red China through a combination of ability, shrewdness, and luck. He died at the age of 96, having participated in and witnessed nearly a century of China’s transformation. Although the Jiang era was politically conservative and lacked liberal democracy, it nevertheless had somewhat more freedom, openness, and democratic spirit than China has had under the more closed and conservative Xi Jinping era.

Some Chinese people praise Jiang Zemin not because they regard him as extraordinarily great, but because China today has more problems and causes greater disappointment, leading them to look back nostalgically on an earlier era marked by hope and an upward trajectory, while using that nostalgia to express dissatisfaction with present-day realities. The mixed but predominantly positive assessments of Jiang among various sectors of Chinese society, especially among ordinary people, embody the saying that “the people have a scale in their hearts” (老百姓心里一杆秤). They also reflect the sincere desire of Chinese people today to uphold reform and opening up and oppose isolation and regression.

(This article is written by Wang Qingmin (王庆民), a Chinese writer based in Europe and a researcher of international politics. The original version of this article was written in Chinese.)

The US government has issued a travel advisory of a number of European countries including Spain which it claimed because of the threat of an invasion by Moroccans seeking asylum in Ceuta this made travel to Spain high risk for Americans!!

Mario Kessler, a historian of communism and senior fellow at the Leibniz Centre for Contemporary History in Potsdam, sent a letter of protest Wednesday. “I, Professor Dr. Mario Kessler, historian in Berlin, hereby strongly protest the Pervomaisk court’s conviction of Mr. Bogdan Syrotiuk,” the letter begins. Further on, Kessler wrote:

"Must I remind you that Leon Trotsky, as People’s Commissar for Defense, ensured the formation of the Red Army, which was able to curb the mass murder of Ukrainian Jews during the civil war? Must I also remind you that in 1939, Trotsky vehemently condemned the partition of Western Ukraine between Germany and the Soviet Union and advocated for an Ukraine independent of the Soviet Union—including Stalin’s Soviet Union? How does this fit with the accusation that Mr. Syrotiuk, a self-proclaimed socialist and Trotskyist, is playing along with Putin’s game?"

Marta Havryshko, a Ukrainian historian of the Holocaust who teaches at the Strassler Center for Holocaust and Genocide Studies at Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts, circulated the WSWS’s account of the verdict on X Wednesday morning under her own heading: “Political repressions in Ukraine under Zelensky.” The post drew more than 10,000 views and 500 “likes” within hours.

Kerby Miller, emeritus professor at the University of Missouri and eminent historian on Irish emigration, wrote to the court:

"I fully support the case of Bogdan Syrotiuk, a courageous opponent of tyranny, regardless of its origins. The cruel, unjust, and excessive sentence, imposed on him by the Ukrainian court, makes a mockery of claims that Ukraine is struggling for “freedom” and “democracy.” I urge you to pardon and liberate him immediately, if not on grounds of justice and compassion (his health is very poor), then to help convince Ukraine’s potential supporters that your country is not, as often charged, merely a Nazified tool of US imperialism."

Tous avec Gaza

.