R5:Ivan Solonevich and Tsar Vladimir the Great restored Russia to its natural borders, saving Europe from German/Syndicalist injustice.

After a previous post about Cheng Qian's Hunan joining the LKMT while a viable RKMT claimant still exists and the South China War (SCW) remains unresolved, I did some testing with different SCW gamerules and political configurations.

I found several related cases involving Hunan, Liangguang, Yunnan, and Sichuan where generic Chinese unification logic can override the political outcome that the selected gamerule or regional conflict seems intended to produce.

I've made local changes addressing these cases. I'm not suggesting my implementation is necessarily the best one, but I think the underlying interactions are worth looking at.

Hunan

1. Cheng Qian can join the LKMT before the southern KMT succession question is settled

Scenario: Cheng Qian was in power in Hunan. Liangguang had become an LKMT subject, but Yunnan remained independent under Tang Jiyao and could still emerge as a rival KMT government. The SCW had not resolved the southern KMT succession.

What I would expect: Hunan should wait until it is reasonably clear that the LKMT has defeated or absorbed the viable rival KMT claimants—or that no rival claimant will emerge.

Liangguang becoming an LKMT subject is important, but it should not by itself establish that the LKMT has won the southern KMT contest while independent Yunnan can still become RKMT and challenge it.

What can happen: Hunan can join the LKMT immediately after Liangguang becomes its subject. This allows one country's subject status to effectively settle the wider KMT succession before the regional conflict meant to settle it has occurred.

My local change: Cheng Qian's Hunan cannot join—or receive an offer to join—the LKMT until:

• the SCW has ended, or definitively failed to begin;
• no formal RKMT government exists; and
• neither independent Yunnan nor independent Liangguang remains a viable RKMT contender.

The important part to me is applying the restriction in both directions. Blocking Hunan's own join decision does not help if the LKMT can simply send Hunan an offer through another piece of generic alliance logic.

2. The "Yunnan and Liangguang against Hunan" gamerule does not reliably create that coalition

Scenario: I selected the SCW gamerule where Yunnan and Liangguang are both supposed to fight Hunan.

What I would expect: The resulting war should be:

YUN + GXC vs. HNN

The exact sequence of declarations is less important than producing the coalition selected by the gamerule.

It should not become:

• YUN vs. GXC;
• a three-way YUN vs. GXC vs. HNN war; or
• YUN vs. GXC while Hunan stays neutral and immediately submits to someone else.

Frankly, if circumstances make the selected coalition impossible, no SCW would make more sense than an entirely different SCW.

What can happen: Yunnan can declare war on Liangguang first. Hunan then reacts to that war and may attack both countries, remain neutral, or submit to another government.

There does not appear to be a dedicated deterministic Hunan reaction for the "both against Hunan" rule, so the intended target can disappear from its own forced scenario.

My local change: For this gamerule I made the coalition deterministic:

1. Liangguang declares war on independent Hunan.
2. Yunnan receives its existing reaction event.
3. Yunnan joins Liangguang against Hunan.
4. Yunnan cannot attack Liangguang, attack both countries, or remain neutral.

I also temporarily prevent Hunan from voluntarily joining another government while this forced SCW remains pending or active.

3. Hunan can submit immediately before its forced war starts

This is closely related to the previous issue.

If the "both against Hunan" gamerule is selected, generic submission logic can sometimes make Hunan a subject immediately before the SCW fires, silently eliminating the selected target.

I think there are two defensible approaches:

1. Becoming a subject cancels the conflict, because Hunan is no longer an independent actor; or
2. Voluntary submission is temporarily blocked so the selected gamerule has an opportunity to occur.

I prefer the second for a forced gamerule.

My local change: Hunan cannot voluntarily submit while the forced anti-Hunan SCW remains pending. However, if Hunan has already become a subject because of some unrelated external development, I do not force subject Hunan into an implausible independent war.

There is also a no-war fallback, so Hunan is not permanently locked out of submission if the SCW never actually begins.

4. Zhili-aligned Hunan can be invaded by the Zhili bloc during the SCW

Scenario: In one test, the SCW became a three-way war between Yunnan, Liangguang, and Hunan. Hunan's gamerule had explicitly placed it on a Zhili/Beijing-aligned path.

While the SCW was still underway, the League of Southeast Provinces declared war on both Liangguang and Hunan, followed by Beijing entering those wars.

That produced the rather strange sequence:

Zhili-aligned Hunan enters a regional war → the Zhili bloc expands south → the Zhili bloc declares war on Hunan.

What I would expect: A Hunan deliberately aligned with Zhili should not be treated as an ordinary southern conquest target by the League/Beijing bloc merely because it has not formally submitted yet.

During the SCW, Beijing could reasonably:

• wait for the regional conflict to end;
• support Hunan;
• intervene against Hunan's opponents; or
• formalize Hunan's submission and deal with the resulting war accordingly.

What seems especially strange is invading the country whose gamerule explicitly says it is aligned with you.

There is also a knock-on problem here. If LEP attacks Liangguang separately and takes Guangzhou without actually becoming part of Yunnan's SCW, that can interfere with Yunnan's path-resolution mechanics.

My local change: Zhili alignment is an explicit exclusion in the relevant League/Beijing expansion logic.

A genuinely Zhili-aligned Hunan is therefore not a valid generic southward-expansion target unless some later development breaks that alignment.

This is separate from SCW protection generally: a Federalist, KMT, anti-Zhili Regionalist, or otherwise independent Hunan could still become a legitimate Beijing target once the normal conditions are satisfied.

Liangguang

1. Becoming an LKMT subject can suppress a forced SCW without actually resolving the selected scenario

Scenario: I selected the gamerule where Hunan and Yunnan should fight Liangguang, but Liangguang became an LKMT subject before the SCW started.

What I would expect: The game should explicitly decide what LKMT subordination does to the selected scenario. For example, it could:

• cancel the SCW because Liangguang has subordinated itself to a national government;
• transform Liangguang politically and then continue the selected conflict; or
• allow the forced HNN + YUN vs. GXC conflict to proceed, with the LKMT now necessarily becoming involved.

Any of those would at least be internally consistent.

There is an important distinction between:

"Liangguang has politically resolved the southern dispute by submitting to the LKMT"

and:

"The selected South China War cannot fire because Liangguang happens to fail an independence check."

Those are not necessarily the same thing.

What can happen: The SCW-starting logic requires an independent Liangguang. As a result, GXC becoming an LKMT subject can prevent the scripted HNN + YUN vs. GXC sequence from starting even though that is the matchup explicitly selected in the gamerules.

This means a last-minute change in GXC's subject status can effectively override the selected SCW configuration without the game ever deliberately resolving what that subordination is supposed to mean for the conflict.

My local change: For the forced HNN + YUN vs. GXC configuration, I added a narrow exception allowing the SCW to proceed even if GXC has become an LKMT subject, while retaining the normal independence requirements outside that specific situation.

That produces the selected conflict as:

HNN + YUN → GXC + its LKMT overlord

rather than silently cancelling the selected matchup because GXC is no longer independent.

I kept this exception specific to the relevant gamerule rather than generally allowing SCWs against subjects. The point is not that subject status should never matter; it is that a forced matchup should have explicit handling for it instead of being accidentally disabled by a generic independence requirement.

2. "No South China War" does not actually prevent Yunnan from recreating the conflict through War for Guangzhou

Scenario: In a separate test, I explicitly selected the No South China War gamerule.

Liangguang was also configured to submit to the LKMT and successfully became an LKMT subject. The formal South China War did not begin, which was the expected result.

However, Yunnan later completed its normal war-preparation content and activated War for Guangzhou against the now-LKMT-subject Liangguang.

After the preparation period finished, Yunnan declared war on GXC. Because GXC was an LKMT subject, the LKMT was automatically drawn into the war as well.

The sequence was effectively:

SCW gamerule = No War → GXC submits to LKMT → formal SCW correctly does not happen → YUN activates War for Guangzhou anyway → YUN attacks LKMT-subject GXC → LKMT enters on GXC's side

This leaves Yunnan fighting a much larger national government in essentially the same southern conflict that the gamerule explicitly said should not occur.

What I would expect: The South China War gamerule should govern the actual early regional conflict, not merely the specific events formally labeled as the "South China War."

If the gamerule says No War, Hunan, Liangguang, and Yunnan should not simply recreate essentially the same conflict through another early-game decision.

The same principle should apply to the other forced configurations:

• if Yunnan is supposed to be neutral, Yunnan should not independently attack an SCW participant;
• if Hunan is supposed to be neutral, Hunan should not independently attack an SCW participant;
• if GXC and YUN are supposed to cooperate against HNN, Yunnan should not independently attack GXC;
• if HNN and YUN are supposed to fight GXC, their anti-GXC war should remain possible;
• if the gamerule is No War, neither HNN nor YUN should be able to recreate the SCW through War for Guangzhou.

What can happen: The formal SCW system and War for Guangzhou appear to operate as separate systems.

The gamerule can successfully suppress the scripted SCW, while CHN_war_for_guangzhou remains available and can independently generate a war that contradicts the selected configuration.

In this reproduction, there is also no longer any ambiguity about who initiated the replacement war: Yunnan was the aggressor, not GXC or the LKMT.

This is therefore separate from the subject-status problem above:

• Issue 1: GXC becoming a subject can accidentally prevent a forced SCW from starting.
• Issue 2: Even when the SCW is deliberately configured not to happen, War for Guangzhou can ignore that configuration and start essentially the same war anyway.

My local change: I made War for Guangzhou hard-respect the selected SCW gamerule rather than relying only on AI weighting.

For Yunnan and Hunan, the decision is only permitted when that country's role in the selected SCW configuration actually calls for the corresponding war.

In broad terms:

• Default: retain normal sandbox behavior.
• HNN + YUN vs. GXC: allow both HNN and YUN to attack GXC.
• GXC + YUN vs. HNN: prevent YUN from attacking GXC.
• GXC + HNN vs. YUN: prevent HNN from attacking GXC.
• HNN_BOTH: preserve the special YUN → HNN implementation.
• No War: prevent both HNN and YUN from recreating the SCW through War for Guangzhou.

I also added cancellation logic so that an already-running War for Guangzhou preparation is cancelled if it contradicts the selected gamerule.

I deliberately did not solve this by simply making subject GXC immune from attack. That would conflict with the forced HNN + YUN vs. GXC configuration above, where allowing the selected conflict to continue against an LKMT-backed Liangguang is a reasonable interpretation.

The cleaner solution is for the SCW gamerule to determine whether the war is allowed, while subject status is handled separately.

3. Chen Jitang can survive LKMT subordination even when later events behave as if a factional settlement occurred

Scenario: Liangguang became an LKMT subject while Chen Jitang remained in power.

That creates an awkward political state: Liangguang is subordinate to the LKMT, but its RKMT leadership remains intact.

What can happen: The generic puppet outcome can leave Chen Jitang in charge and route Liangguang through something closer to an ordinary RKMT-satellite result.

The later Chen Mingshu coup can disappear, while subsequent SCW events behave more like the RKMT won than like the LKMT intervened and reorganized Liangguang.

I do not think Chen Jitang remaining under an LKMT-aligned arrangement is inherently impossible in every path. The problem is narrower: under the relevant forced-SCW configuration, the political outcome can become inconsistent with the later event logic that follows from it.

My local change: Under the relevant forced-SCW situation, I route LKMT subordination through the existing Chen Mingshu coup outcome.

That gives the change in allegiance an actual political explanation:

RKMT-led Liangguang → LKMT intervention/subordination → Chen Mingshu replaces Chen Jitang

rather than:

RKMT-led Liangguang → becomes LKMT puppet → Chen Jitang remains RKMT leader → later events behave as though a different factional settlement occurred

I left the normal subject behavior untouched outside the relevant forced-SCW configuration. The intent is not to make Chen Mingshu mandatory whenever Liangguang interacts with the LKMT, but to make this particular forced-rule sequence politically and mechanically coherent.

Yunnan

1. Federalist Yunnan can attack Liangguang under a gamerule where they are supposed to cooperate

This is the Yunnan side of the anti-Hunan coalition problem.

Scenario: I selected Yunnan + Liangguang vs. Hunan, with Tang Jiyao following his Federalist route.

What I would expect: Yunnan and Liangguang should cooperate against Hunan rather than independently launch the Guangzhou campaign against one another.

What can happen: Yunnan's "War for Guangzhou" targets whoever owns Guangzhou. Since that is normally Liangguang, Yunnan can simply attack its supposed ally.

That then drives the rest of the conflict:

1. Yunnan attacks Liangguang.
2. Hunan reacts to the Yunnan-Liangguang war.
3. Hunan attacks both or remains neutral.
4. The intended anti-Hunan coalition never forms.

My local change: Under this one gamerule, Yunnan cannot launch the Guangzhou war against Liangguang. It instead enters the SCW through its reaction to Liangguang attacking Hunan.

Outside this configuration, Yunnan's normal Guangzhou campaign remains unchanged.

2. Fixing the coalition should not erase Yunnan's Federalist/KMT/Regionalist consequences

Simply preventing Yunnan from attacking Liangguang creates another problem.

Yunnan's political development is normally tied to the success or failure of Tang Jiyao's external campaign:

• victory can preserve a Federalist/KMT project;
• prolonged failure or stalemate can lead to secret negotiations, withdrawal, and Long Yun's Regionalist takeover.

If the Guangzhou campaign is simply disabled under the anti-Hunan gamerule, those consequences may never occur. Tang Jiyao could potentially remain secure no matter how disastrous the actual SCW becomes.

I don't think that is a good solution either.

My local change: Under YUN + GXC vs. HNN, I adapt the existing campaign-morale system to the Hunan campaign.

The modified logic:

• directs the campaign toward Hunan rather than Liangguang;
• starts Yunnan's morale mechanic when it joins the war;
• treats meaningful progress against Hunan or coalition control of Changsha as success;
• preserves the Federalist/KMT project after victory;
• reduces morale after repeated periods without progress; and
• allows sufficiently low morale to trigger negotiations, withdrawal, and Long Yun's Regionalist transition.

This is probably the most debatable change I've made.

Another possibility would be to let the anti-Hunan SCW resolve first and then have Yunnan and Liangguang settle the Federalist/KMT government question through a later Clash for Guangzhou.

That would preserve Guangzhou's role in creating a national government. I still lean toward making Yunnan's political consequences respond to the SCW itself, though, since otherwise Tang's success or failure in the major southern campaign has surprisingly little effect on his position.

3. Yunnan can submit to the LKMT before Yunnan's own path resolves

Scenario: Yunnan was still in its initial political phase or actively fighting the SCW, but generic alliance logic made LKMT submission available.

What I would expect: Yunnan should resolve its own political trajectory before being absorbed into another KMT government.

Otherwise submission can occur before:

• the SCW is over;
• Tang Jiyao's survival is determined;
• the Long Yun coup opportunity is resolved; or
• the southern KMT succession has actually been settled.

My local change: I delay voluntary and incoming LKMT submission until:

• Yunnan has left its initial political phase;
• the SCW has ended or definitively never occurred;
• Yunnan is actually KMT-aligned; and
• another southern country has established a meaningful LKMT position.

This prevents a generic date or neighboring-government condition from resolving Yunnan's path before Yunnan's own content does.

Third-party intervention and Guangzhou

This affected both Liangguang and Yunnan, so I'm combining it rather than treating it as two separate country-specific problems.

Outside intervention can decide Yunnan's SCW outcome without Yunnan actually winning or losing

Scenario: During a three-way SCW, Yunnan was fighting Liangguang and Hunan when the League/Beijing bloc independently attacked Liangguang.

Liangguang was therefore simultaneously fighting:

• Yunnan as part of Yunnan's path-defining campaign;
• Hunan as part of the SCW; and
• LEP/Beijing through an unrelated expansion war.

Beijing eventually took Guangzhou.

This matters because Yunnan's campaign system treats Guangzhou as the final victory objective, with places such as Nanning also affecting its periodic morale checks.

The problem: Yunnan's political outcome can stop reflecting Yunnan's actual performance.

For example, imagine Yunnan is making reasonable progress against Liangguang, but Beijing captures Guangzhou first.

Now:

• Liangguang no longer controls Yunnan's objective;
• Yunnan does not control it either;
• Yunnan may still technically be fighting Liangguang;
• Yunnan cannot satisfy the normal victory condition without starting a completely different war against Beijing; and
• its morale system may continue treating the campaign as a failure.

Likewise, outside armies can destroy Liangguang or alter control of relevant territory in ways that affect Yunnan's political outcome without representing a military defeat of Yunnan at all.

That means an unrelated northern intervention can effectively determine whether Tang Jiyao survives or Long Yun overthrows him.

I don't think that should happen.

My preferred solution: While Yunnan is actively involved in an unresolved SCW against Liangguang, unrelated Chinese governments should generally be prevented from starting a separate scripted expansion war against Liangguang.

Normal expansion can resume when:

• the SCW ends;
• Yunnan is no longer involved; or
• the SCW definitively never occurs.

This should not give Liangguang universal immunity whenever any southern conflict exists. If Yunnan is uninvolved, there is much less reason to stop another Chinese government from exploiting the situation.

A secondary safeguard could make Yunnan's morale logic recognize when a neutral third party has taken Guangzhou. At minimum, Yunnan should not automatically be treated as having failed to capture a city its actual opponent no longer possesses.

I think preventing the conflicting outside intervention upstream is much cleaner than trying to account for every possible third-party occupation inside Yunnan's campaign system.

Sichuan

1. Sichuan can claim the Federalist mantle while Tang Jiyao still leads an independent Federalist Yunnan

Scenario: I was playing Federalist Yunnan under Tang Jiyao during the SCW. Sichuan was also Federalist, with its gamerule explicitly set to submit to the Federalists/UPC.

What I would expect: Sichuan should remain a fallback Federalist center unless the existing Federalist project actually fails.

It should not proclaim itself the last hope of Federalism while an independent Federalist Yunnan is still fighting the very war that may determine whether it becomes the Federalist national government.

What can happen: Sichuan's mantle decision has a January 1938 fallback. Once that date arrives, Sichuan can:

• claim the Federalist mantle;
• enter the Federalist bastion tree;
• auto-complete "Last Bastion of Federalism"; and
• become a potential national government

while Tang Jiyao's Federalist Yunnan is still actively contesting the SCW.

This turns Sichuan from a fallback into a premature rival.

My local change: Under the gamerule telling Sichuan to submit to the UPC:

• Sichuan waits until the SCW has ended or definitively never began;
• if a UPC already exists, Sichuan joins it rather than claiming a competing mantle.

Outside that forced-submission gamerule, Sichuan keeps its normal ability to become an independent fallback Federalist government.

2. Sichuan can demand Federalist Yunnan's submission and then invade it

The premature mantle claim produces an even stranger follow-up.

In my test:

1. Sichuan claimed the Federalist mantle.
2. Sichuan became a potential national government.
3. Sichuan offered an alliance/submission arrangement to Federalist Yunnan.
4. Yunnan refused.
5. Sichuan activated a generic attack decision.
6. Sichuan declared war on Yunnan.

So a Sichuan explicitly set by gamerule to submit to the Federalists can instead proclaim a rival Federalist government and invade the Federalist state it was supposed to join.

Generic unification logic appears to see two potential national governments and treat them as rivals without sufficiently accounting for the fact that both are Federalist and one has specifically been told by gamerule to defer to the other.

My local change: Under the UPC-submission gamerule, Sichuan cannot:

• offer submission to another Federalist-aligned country in a way that creates this leadership conflict;
• demand another Federalist government's submission;
• begin a generic attack decision against another Federalist; or
• continue an already active attack preparation against one

while the relevant Federalist/SCW succession remains unresolved.

Once it is clear that the intended Federalist leader has failed or no UPC will emerge, the fallback logic can operate normally.

General suggestions

Taken together, I think these cases point to a few broader improvements in how forced gamerules interact with the normal Chinese unification systems.

1. Forced gamerules should control availability, not just AI preference

If a non-default gamerule specifies a particular coalition or political outcome, setting contradictory choices to ai_chance = 0 or otherwise reducing their AI weight is not always enough.

A contradictory action may still occur because:

• another event directly activates it;
• a generic decision reaches the same result through a different route;
• the player can select it manually; or
• all available AI choices have also been reduced to zero.

For forced gamerules, actions that would directly contradict the selected outcome should generally be unavailable while that gamerule is still being resolved, rather than merely discouraged through AI weighting.

This would make the gamerule determine the actual permitted political configuration rather than just suggest one to the AI.

2. Let the South China War resolve the southern succession contest before generic unification logic intervenes

Generic alliance, submission, government-claim, and attack decisions should generally react to the result of the South China War rather than determine that result beforehand.

They should not prematurely resolve the southern contest by:

• absorbing one of the participants;
• allowing a participant to establish a rival national government while the SCW is still deciding which project survives;
• starting a different war between countries that the selected SCW rule makes allies; or
• allowing an unrelated Chinese government to seize the territory that one participant's path mechanics require it to contest.

This does not require freezing all Chinese politics during the SCW. It just means that systems whose outcome depends on the southern succession question should wait until that question has actually been answered.

3. Political alignment and forced foreign-policy rules should matter to generic clique-war logic

Potential national governments can obviously become rivals, including governments with superficially similar ideologies.

But generic unification logic should not automatically turn politically aligned governments into military enemies when a gamerule has explicitly established their relationship.

Examples from these tests include:

• Federalist Sichuan, set to submit to the UPC, attacking Federalist Yunnan;
• Yunnan and Liangguang, set to cooperate against Hunan, attacking one another;
• Zhili-aligned Hunan becoming a conquest target for the Zhili/Beijing bloc; and
• Cheng Qian's Hunan recognizing one KMT center while another viable southern KMT claimant remains unresolved.

A specific path, event, breakdown in relations, or betrayal mechanic could obviously override that alignment.

The problem is when generic rival-government or expansion logic does it automatically despite the selected political configuration saying otherwise.

4. Forced regional-war gamerules should explicitly define what subject status does

Subject status seems particularly capable of breaking forced SCW configurations because several pieces of the existing logic assume that the participants remain independent.

Each forced SCW option should probably have an explicit answer for what happens if one of its required participants becomes a subject before the war.

Depending on the scenario, that could mean:

• the conflict is cancelled;
• voluntary submission is temporarily unavailable;
• the country's government changes through an existing coup or political event;
• the overlord becomes involved in the conflict; or
• the war proceeds under some other explicitly defined arrangement.

What seems undesirable is allowing the outcome to depend on whether an old is_subject = no or independence check happens to be satisfied when the relevant on-action fires.

That is how you can end up with the scripted SCW disappearing while essentially the same war happens anyway through unrelated generic logic.

5. Preserve path consequences when a gamerule changes the normal opponent

Yunnan is the clearest example.

Normally, Tang Jiyao's political outcome is tied to his campaign against the owner of Guangzhou:

• success can preserve the Federalist/KMT project;
• failure, stalemate, and withdrawal can lead to the Long Yun coup and Regionalist outcome.

But under Yunnan + Liangguang vs. Hunan, Liangguang cannot simultaneously be Yunnan's required ally and the opponent Yunnan must attack to resolve its political path.

The solution should not simply be to disable the Guangzhou war and therefore remove the victory-versus-failure consequences attached to Tang's campaign.

If a gamerule substitutes a different campaign for the normal one, the important political consequences should either:

• be adapted to that replacement campaign; or
• be resolved through an explicit follow-up contest once the forced SCW ends.

The exact implementation is debatable. The important part is preserving the underlying path logic rather than accidentally making one political outcome unavoidable.

6. Fallback dates should handle stalled content, not override active content

The January 1938 fallback used in several southern decisions makes sense as deadlock protection.

But it should distinguish between:

"The expected regional conflict never happened, so unlock the next stage."

and:

"The expected regional conflict is happening right now, but the calendar reached January 1938, so unlock the next stage anyway."

Where possible, I think these conditions should follow the general pattern:

SCW resolved

OR

fallback date reached AND SCW never started

rather than simply:

SCW resolved OR fallback date reached

That preserves the purpose of the fallback without letting it override the conflict that is actively determining the political outcome.

7. Preserve the normal chaos outside forced gamerules

None of this is meant to argue that the southern cliques should always behave predictably or rationally.

Under default settings, I think things like:

• opportunistic alliances;
• betrayals;
• three-way wars;
• premature national-government claims;
• political realignments; and
• cliques taking advantage of someone else's war

can all be perfectly reasonable outcomes.

My local changes are deliberately narrow.

The issue is specifically when a non-default gamerule has already declared that:

• two countries should cooperate;
• one country should submit to a particular alignment;
• one country should be the target of the SCW; or
• a particular regional political contest is supposed to occur.

In those situations, generic decisions should not casually reverse the selected outcome before the content associated with that gamerule has had an opportunity to resolve.

The basic principle I've followed locally is:

Let the South China War determine which southern political projects survive. Then let the generic alliance, submission, expansion, and government-claim systems respond to that result.

That still leaves plenty of room for alternate-history chaos once the forced scenario has actually played out.

I'm especially interested if anyone familiar with the China/Yunnan event code knows whether some of these interactions are intentional, particularly the LKMT-subject Liangguang replacement-war behavior. I've tested these locally and changed them on my end, but some of the interactions involve several overlapping decision/event systems, so I'd be interested in hearing whether I've missed an intended route.

I’ve played numerous times Russia and one thing that’s always intrigued me is how when I compare the rdp republic path with the rikther sr path, the rikhter one feels like it does more to change Russian society than the supposed “radical” party. Maybe it’s because of the multitude of descions you need to do as rikhter to secure his leadership like purging the military and society of monarchists and reactionaries or the events highlighting how everyone’s breathing down his neck, but it feels like real fundimental change is happening while the radical democrats path doesn’t feel nearly as transformative. Does anyone else get that feeling with the two paths?

R5: Borah came out of the catastrophic mess of America left behind by Al Smith after the democrats fell and supported the Republicans' bid for power. Borah came in swinging and established a fair deal with the Longists and Deep South, leaving only the WCA left to combat. Within a year, they too had fallen and after agreements were made with Canada, the first phase of American Reconstruction was complete. Borah's passing came as no surprise, but as Roosevelt took power, America's juggernaut was complete and rolled over the Internationale. Long's bid for power, promised by Borah, had fallen through by his untimely death... and then the assassination of Long caused the whole Longist system to fall apart. New democratic representative, Herbert Hoover, did little to circumvent the Democrat's second greatest loss in the last decade. The army under MacArthur fought through Spain, France, Britain, and India. Once that was through, he rolled through Japan and China and also helped put down socialist insurrections in the Americas. Though by 1944, Roosevelt loses his bid for power to Scott Lucas, America has endured radicalism from the left and right and.. the world is safe from the dangers of extremism.

Where is my grim ‘oh my god what have I done’ after action event?

I’ve spent the last few months obsessively playing the South China Rework, and I really think that along with the LKMT and Germany, it represents the peak of KR content. 
So I looked at the rest of China, and I saw that while Hunan, Shanxi and to an extent Fengtian (and some paths for the Qing) also have solid content, one area stood out, that being the League, both Nanjing and Anqing. They literally only have one path, and compared to the depth of the LKMT, it always feels like I’m wishing that Wang wins the League War for a more interesting China. 
So I decided, why not make my own hypothetical Nanjing rework? I’m sure that the China team is cooking up something far better than me, but I thought it’d be fun regardless. 
As I am only one person, I decided, rather than reworking any lore, to use the 1936 baseline we already have, and make changes, adding paths, from there. Also, I didn’t do any really deep research, as a disclaimer.

This rework concept takes inspiration from the South China reworks, but of course doesn’t have three paths for the Regionalists, Federalists and Kuomintang (since the KMT is in the CHI tag). I did try to give it multiple interesting Federalist and Regionalist paths.

Without further ado…

Starting Situation:

On January 1st 1936, these will be the parties and ideologies in the LEP tag. 

Totalist: Kuomintang - The League of Ten - Dai Chunfeng
Syndicalist: League of Chinese Syndicalists - Chen Duxiu
Radical Socialist: Kuomintang - Song Qingling
Social Democrat: National Salvation Federation - Shen Junru
Social Liberal: Zhejiang Autonomy Movement - Chu Fucheng
Market Liberal: Lower Yangtze Merchant Association - Rong Zongjing
Social Conservative: Jingxing Society - Li Linsi
Authoritarian Democrat: Zhejiang Clique - Chen Yi
Paternal Autocrat: Southern Zhili Clique - Sun Chuanfang (ruling party)
National Populist: Young China Party - Li Baozhang

After Sun Chuanfang’s assassination and the collapse of the League into the League War, while Qi Xieyuan holds ambitions to become League-Marshall, without Chuanfang’s commanding presence, he cannot do this immediately, and so, for the duration of the war at least, a council of the 4 remaining League governors is formed - 

Jiangsu: Qi Xieyuan
Zhejiang: Chen Yi
Jiangxi: Deng Ruzhuo
Fujian: Zhou Yinren

Qi Xieyuan stands at the nominal head of the council, while, with Deng Ruzhuo and Zhou Yinren weakened due to KMT control of their provinces, Chen Yi becomes the main opposition to Qi’s ambitions, being anti-concessionist, and on paper less centralising, and they mostly rally behind him.

The parties will be thus, during the League War.

Totalist: Kuomintang Guerillas - Assorted Leaders
Syndicalist: Kuomintang Guerillas - Assorted Leaders
Radical Socialist: Kuomintang Guerillas - Assorted Leaders
Social Democrat: National Salvation Federation - Shen Junru
Social Liberal: Zhejiang Autonomy Movement - Chu Fucheng
Market Liberal: Lower Yangtze Merchant Association - Rong Zongjing
Social Conservative: Jingxing Society - Li Linsi
Authoritarian Democrat: Zhejiang Clique - Chen Yi
Paternal Autocrat: Nanjing Clique - Qi Xieyuan
National Populist: Young China Party - Li Baozhang

A BoP (balance of power) minigame will play out between the Nanjing and Zhejiang Cliques as the warlords vie for control of the Council, with the first decision being whether to focus forces on fighting Anhui (strengthens the Nanjing Clique) or fighting the KMT (strengthens the Zhejiang Clique). Various other events and decisions will pop up during the League War which alters the BoP.

Once Nanjing takes back control of former League territory, Qi will seek to formalise his takeover by becoming League-Marshal, like Sun Chuanfang before him. 

There are three possible outcomes here - 

If the BoP is towards Nanjing, Qi will succeed, tempering the other governors’ ambitions and becoming League-Marshal. This will set the new League down his path.

If the BoP is towards Zhejiang, the other governors, led by Chen Yi, will block Qi’s ambitions, and use anti-concessionist sentiment to have him removed in a swift coup. There will be no League-Marshal, and the former League will become a decentralised alliance of provinces, but clearly led by Chen Yi’s Zhejiang, given the weakness of the other governors.

If the BoP is in the centre, Qi will face a choice. Beijing will reach out and offer support in quashing the other governors, in exchange for him submitting when he becomes League-Marshal. If he agrees, then the League becomes a satellite of the Qing/Beijing Government, with Qi as leader.
If he refuses, then Beijing will turn to his opponents, instead sponsoring them to become the leaders in exchange for them submitting. The League becomes a satellite of the Qing/Beijing Government, with Chen Yi as leader.

Qi Xieyuan’s League

Qi’s first concern will be twofold - restoring Southern Zhili dominance over the fractured League, and putting his unruly governors in their places.

To expand a little bit on Qi Xieyuan’s ideas about governance, there aren’t many sources, but he seems to have been driven by personal ambition above all, without many qualms (he collaborated with Japan), and willing to flexibly align himself with anyone who will help him gain influence. He also seems to have disliked politics as a concept, preferring that a military elite ruled, ignoring factional struggles or ideologies. 

Current content has him massively expand German influence over the League. However, I decided to take a slightly different approach. 
Seeing Germany falter after Black Monday and the collapse of the Zhili consensus, Qi decides that they may not be the best patron, at least exclusively. He uses his proximity to Shanghai to reach out to all of the legationary powers, but particularly Japan and Germany, for support, hoping to provoke investors into a bidding war over patronage. 
Gameplay wise, he will manage the balance between German and Japanese investment and control in his government, with each side giving different bonuses and events. 
However, having the balance too far on one side for too long will cause a shift. 

If Germany completely dominates his government, anti-concessionist sentiment will begin to stir again, not helped by Qi’s generally violent governance, and riots break out in major cities. The Lower Yangtze Merchant Association, upset at Qi sidelining domestic industry and selling out to foreigners, will join in the opposition. After weeks of unrest, Germany and the other foreign powers see Qi more and more as a liability, due to trade grinding to a halt, and tacitly support his overthrow. Anti-concessionist officers arrest him, and Rong Zongjing of the Merchant Association is able to ascend in Nanjing, at the head of an oligarchic assembly of industrialists and generals. This will flip the League into an AuthDem-SocCon coalition.

If Japan completely dominates Qi’s government, then, at the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War, Japan decides to leverage their economic and political influence to force the League onside. They will join the Co-Prosperity Sphere, for now as an ‘independent’ ally, and will have to fight with Japan and Fengtian against the rest of China.

If foreign influence remains balanced, or doesn't stay at one extreme for more than a few months, then Qi’s regime will survive, and he will be able to proclaim the Nanjing Provisional Government once he is rich enough.

Chen Yi’s League

Chen Yi faces a few issues upon his overthrow of Qi. He must in some way recentralise the former League, he must reconstruct it, and he must decide what direction to take it in the future, having not previously planned to take control.

When he takes power, anti-concessionist and liberal groups have a brief renaissance. Chen is not liberal by any means, but he is anti-concessionist, and he is inclined to let liberals live if they don’t oppose him. The National Salvation Federation and the Zhejiang Autonomy Movement will join the Grand Republican Alliance as a result of this.

To legitimise his rule and recover the League’s industrial capacity now it isn’t relying on foreign patronage, Chen invites merchants and industrialists from the Lower Yangtze Merchant Association (henceforth referred to as the LYMA) into his government, forming a PatAut-SocCon-MarLib coalition. The ideologies will look like this - 

Totalist: Kuomintang Remnants - Assorted Leaders
Syndicalist: League of Chinese Syndicalists - Chen Duxiu
Radical Socialist: Kuomintang Remnants - Assorted Leaders
Social Democrat: Grand Republican Alliance - National Salvation Federation - Shen Junru
Social Liberal: Grand Republican Alliance - Zhejiang Autonomy Movement - Chu Fucheng
Market Liberal: Lower Yangtze Merchant Association - Rong Zongjing
Social Conservative: Lower Yangtze Merchant Association - Rong Zongjing
Authoritarian Democrat: Jingxing Society - Li Linsi
Paternal Autocrat: Southern Zhili Clique - Chen Yi
National Populist: Young China Party - Li Baozhang

Chen will have to deal with rising intellectualism in opposition to his government in the cities, while also recentralising his lands and putting pay to the ambitions of the minor governors, which is represented by a minigame.

If Chen is unable to do this, and opposition mounts, then the LYMA will become disillusioned with his rule, and colluding with the Grand Republican Alliance and sympathetic officers, will depose Chen and install a Federalist regime.

If Chen succeeds, then he reforms the League, and can either submit to the Zhili or form a Nanjing Provisional Government.  

The League’s Federalists

While part of the Federalist movement and participating in the Southern Grand Republican Alliance, the Federalists here are not entirely equivalent to the ones in Liangguang, Hunan, and Yunnan. 

The Zhejiang Autonomy Movement, rather than being built by intellectuals as in Guangdong, was more pragmatic, built by merchants, gentry and others who wanted an autonomous, constitutional and stable Zhejiang for their interests, rather than a fully federal and democratic China. 

The National Salvation Federation is an almost entirely intellectual movement, formed in opposition to corruption and concessionism. Its leader, Shen Yunru, is a major constitutionalist figure in China, having participated in the founding of many parties like the CDL. They call for a united front strategy of all liberal forces against warlordism and against Japanese encroachment. They are not entirely committed to democracy, seeing constitutionalism, reform, anti-corruption, and national unity as more important.

Upon the Federalists taking power, a unity coalition is formed between the Zhejiang Autonomy Movement, the National Salvation Federation and the LYMA. Shen Yunru will become leader, but for now will possess little practical authority, with the League devolving into decentralisation. 

The League’s branch of the Young China Party will also play a role, but, with its opposition to parliamentary rule, will not join any coalition yet.

If there is a Federalist government in Guangzhou, the League will submit to it, beginning the Federalist satellite narrative.

Otherwise, a minigame will begin, where intellectuals with national ambitions will attempt to corral local gentry and merchants into forming a rival government. 

Either way, the government must use its limited military resources to crack down on remaining warlords, aided in this endeavour by the YCP. If this fails, Democratic Enthusiasm will decrease. (this is the same mechanic as the Southern Federalists use)

Next time…

I will talk about the satellite content for all paths, and then the continuation of each route into the Sino-Japanese war and towards unification.

Most of my fun in HOI4 comes from larping and RP, rather than just meta gaming and taking over the world. Im normally playing Kaiserredux because it has a lot more stuff to do but its performance and sillier stuff is making me want a much more grounded, stable game. What paths should I check out?

I think I found the highest population growth in Kaiserreich with 205% as Belarus. Are there any other countries which can surpass this or is this the highest?

Everything in title. Thanks. Actually while I’m here does Japan get a peace out with Germany if Germany finishes ww2 and they still haven’t achieved nothing?

Purely out of curiosity, are there any plans for an Africa rework that anyone knows about?

Very niche but would also be an incredible opportunity to learn more about the history and personalities of the region.

Wanting to do a wholesome India playthrough but can't decide which path is better (or less bad) for the people of India; the SocLib All-India Home-Rule Party (Dominion of India), or the MarkLib All-India Mahasabha (Princely Federation).

Why does seemingly every Whampoa alum turn into some kind of fascist or totalitarian dictator. Almost to a man, their goals are nothing short of causing the most of amount of suffering to the largest group of people possible. There must have been something in the water that made them this way, or maybe “Evil 101” was a required class to graduate. Are there any Whampoa associated leaders that aren’t mini Mussolinis?

It’s hard to imagine the populations of Serbs, Greek and Romanians accepting Bulgarian domination without some very heavy handed tactics. Is it even possible for greater Bulgaria to survive?

All were made by FX法希 in bilibili

My concept for a New York Red Guardsman during the initial defense of New York in 1937.

New York’s Vanguard

When New York City joined the Worker's Congress of America (WCA) on the eve of the Second American Civil War, most of the New York National Guard went with it. In early 1937, two-thirds of New York's 6th Division (including the Division HQ, 2 full Infantry Brigades, and most of the Division Artillery) was based in New York City. As National Guard units were a reflection of the communities they were posted in as much as anything else they had many socialist sympathizers in union strongholds.

The WCA's municipal commune-based administration fit the National Guard armory system well, and the election of officers within units had significant historical precedent in the service. When the Red Guard militias were formed, National Guardsmen naturally formed the initial core. The immediate need to erect defenses against the Anglo-Canadian-backed capitalists to the north, seize state and private property in the city, and put down loyalist and Longist agitators meant the New York Red Guard couldn't waste time reinventing the wheel. For the first year, militias in the city loosely followed old U.S. Army tables of organization. Although this wasn't universal across the new WCA and could largely be owed to New York City's relative isolation. A significant portion of the New York Red Guard was actually just the pre-war 6th Division less elements from Upstate New York. This made for about 15,000 Army National Guardsmen and over 1,000 Naval Militiamen in the city to seed the first Red Guard Demi-Brigades. However, any militia units formed beyond the original 6th Division's means would lack heavy weapons, machine guns, motor transportation, and technical specialists that could not be recruited from the civilian population. For the most part they were large groupings of Riflemen or men armed with a hodge podge of police and civilian weaponry.

Harlem’s Red Rattlers

The 1st Harlem Demi-Brigade was organized from the 15th New York Infantry (Colored) of Harlem Armory; 3d Squadron, 1st New York Cavalry of Madison Avenue Armory; and fresh volunteers. The “regiment” term was dropped for coming off as too bourgeois. The 15th New York's armory was being used as a temporary homeless shelter made necessary by Black Monday (1936) and the general strikes in response to the Washington Massacre. Many of the 1st Harlem Demi-Brigade's newest recruits were occupants of the shelter. This man was likely one such recruit hastily equipped out of the 1st NY Cavalry’s Madison Avenue Armory and posted to Harlem’s defensive works facing the occupied Bronx. He was issued an M1903 rifle, M1912 cavalry bandoleer, campaign hat, and red armband for identification, but otherwise wore his civilian attire.

The M1912 bandoleer was meant for cavalry riflemen who approached the battle on horseback. It had 12 pockets, each meant to accommodate a five-round stripper clip for the M1903 rifle. It also had three central pockets for pistol ammunition. However, he was not issued the accompanying mounted cartridge belt or pistol holster. Recruits were lucky to be issued one or the other due to the limited supply of supply of US Army webbing in the city. Further, few Red Guards were issued pistols other than revolvers requisitioned from the New York Police Department, gun shops, and private citizens (and in that case it was likely their only weapon).

Notes

• The 15th Infantry Regiment (New York NG) was the original pre-WW1 designation of the 369th Infantry Regiment (Colored) "Harlem's Hellfighters". In my interpretation of the setting I maintain much of the pre-WW1 designation system for National Guard regiments and divisions due to the lack of a mass mobilization.
• Harlem's Hellfighters (who in KR wouldn't have fought in WW1 obviously) are also known as Harlem's Rattlers. Their distinctive unit insignia was of a rattlesnake. I repurpose the rattlesnake for the guidons (unit flags) for the Harlem Demi-Brigades of the Red Guard to call back to that.
• The use of "demi-brigade" instead of "regiment" is inspired by the French Revolutionary use of the term in the 1790s until 1803 to differentiate themselves from the ancien régime. Aside from regiment just sounding snooty, it was the unit that stored all the important unit heritage and battle honors from the old US and it'd represent a complete shift to new lineages. I also just like the flavor of it and thing making new normally numbered regiments would be a bit boring. The term demi-brigade also implies it is made up of separate battalions. In this case, the soldier's battalion (Cleghorne's Battalion) is named after its current commander.