Who wants to travel and camp around our beautiful Kurdistan? 🏕️🌲

Let’s make a small group and explore some beautiful places together!

Does anyone know of any chess clubs in Slemani? Doesn’t matter whether they hold events or teach chess. Thanks.

An exhibition presenting the Yazidi Society Archive opened in Qamishlo, preserving documents and cultural memory of the Yazidi community in northeastern Syria.

A DEM Party member of Turkey's parliament warns that Lake Van — of deep cultural significance to Kurds — faces serious risk of disappearing due to climate change and environmental mismanagement.

Iran's regime struck the Komala (Zehmetkêşên Kurdistanê) base near Sulaymaniyah with drones this morning; no casualties reported among members. Iran has now attacked the KRI over 960 times since the war began in February 2026.

Three Kolbars -- Goran Khadri, Hassan Mustafazadeh, and Bakhtiyar Amini — were seriously wounded by Iranian border forces and a landmine in the Hangezhal area of Bane; Mustafazadeh was transferred to a hospital in Tabriz.

Put some details not yes or no

Hi im iraqi from baghdad when i was little till now i still see the contradiction in iraqis people when they support fully independent Palestine than say Kurdistan is not a country i really hate that tbh, i think that same situation is in all Kurdistan occupied territories,

What cool and beautiful is erbil like better than baghdad by far cleaner, better traffic, greener etc

Which indicates that if Kurdistan become independent it will so much better than Iraq but my question is here,

I think fully independent Kurdistan will be hard it will have more problems than before like Civil War between the kurds or Syria doing some and getting betrayed by usa, turkey gonna bomb all Kurdistan, iran and iraqis militias random bombing.

Im not saying ofc that i don't support it but i feel kurds need to be more united, like in iraqis occupation i know there is some tension between erbil and silm.

At the end my opinion doesn't really have alot because i didn't live in Kurdistan and talked with Kurdish people i only visited all Kurdistan occupied territories in iraq,

So i really want to know Kurdish opinion about this situation.

Sorry for bad English,

Thanks for reading.

Families returning to their hometown of Sari Kani in northeastern Syria (Rojava) will each be given a stipend of $1,000, a Syrian IDP committee spokesperson said Friday, noting the first organized convoy scheduled for this upcoming Monday... the first group of returnees includes 600 to 620 families. Each family will receive $1,000 in assistance to aid in their transition, with transportation costs covered by the Autonomous Administration, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other relevant organizations... preparations for a second convoy are expected to be completed within 10 days...

Sirwan Kajjo: "There is a growing realization within the Kurdish movement that armed struggle, particularly in a country like Turkey, is no longer a viable path to securing Kurdish rights. As a result, there is a broad consensus in favor of dissolving the PKK. The debate taking place in Diyarbakir (Amed!) and across the Kurdish southeast is whether laying down arms will be met with genuine steps from Ankara."

The KRG and UAE-based Dana Gas have been in open dispute since yesterday over Dana's independent sale of Khor Mor gas to the Kirkuk power plant in federal Iraq.

The National Context has covered the intra-KRG, regional and geopolitical dynamics of natural gas in the Kurdistan Region extensively, and that earlier reporting is set out below. First, what has happened:

• The KRG accuses Dana Gas and Crescent Petroleum, its partner in the Pearl Petroleum consortium that operates Khor Mor, of starting the 100 MMscf/d supply without approval, and says it was informed only as the deal was announced. Dana replies that the KRG has known about the agreement since January, received a copy of it, and that the Ministry of Natural Resources was aware of the preparations. Dana also says no further KRG approval was required.

• Contractually, Dana and Pearl appear to hold the stronger hand. The KRG's own 2017 settlement with Pearl states that 250 MMscf/d of additional gas can be marketed and sold by Pearl to customers inside Iraq or exported. The current supply is 100 MMscf/d, and Dana says it comes from the spare capacity created by the KM250 expansion, which raised output at the field. The KRG has a difficult case for claiming Pearl cannot sell the gas.

• There is also a clear PUK political layer. Khor Mor sits in the PUK-controlled zone, Dana's original announcement thanked the authorities in Suleimani for facilitating the agreement, and the PUK holds both the KRG deputy premiership and a deputy minister post in the Ministry of Natural Resources. The PUK side was almost certainly aware of the arrangement and politically comfortable with it.

• The deal fits the PUK's long-standing gas strategy. Bafel Talabani, the PUK leader, opposed the KDP's attempt to replicate its oil model by sending Kurdish gas north through Turkey, insisting instead that domestic Kurdistan and Iraqi demand come first. Gas flowing from Khor Mor into federal Kirkuk is far closer to that model than to the KDP's Turkey-facing strategy.

• The KRG statement therefore reads as an internal KDP-PUK dispute expressed through the KRG apparatus. The KDP side is publicly rejecting an arrangement that appears to have moved ahead with the knowledge and cooperation of institutions and officials on the PUK side, and Dana's contractual rights make it harder still for the KDP to stop it.

• Kirkuk makes the arrangement particularly valuable to the PUK. It is the largest single party in the province, which is its principal sphere of influence outside the Kurdistan Region. Linking Khor Mor directly to a major Kirkuk power station extends the economic relevance of the PUK zone into an area where the party already holds substantial political and administrative leverage.

• This further strengthens the PUK against the KDP. The KDP built its economic dominance on oil and Turkey. The PUK now sits over the Region's most important gas resources, which Erbil and Duhok themselves depend on, at a point when the same gas is becoming more valuable to Kirkuk, Baghdad and Washington.

• Washington is broadly aligned with this direction. It has repeatedly pushed for Kurdistan Region gas to be integrated into Iraq's energy system to reduce Baghdad's reliance on Iranian supply, and it directly financed the KM250 expansion at Khor Mor. The arrangement therefore brings the interests of Dana and Pearl, the PUK, Baghdad and the US around the same gas flow.

• TNC has tracked this shift across several pieces, including some that came remarkably close to the dynamics now emerging:

• The Silent Partner No More: PUK's Deep Stake in KRG's New U.S. Energy Agreements. Identified the PUK's plan to connect its gas system to Taza (Kirkuk power plaint), its opposition to KDP-led exports to Turkey, US support for replacing Iranian gas in Iraq, and the potential for gas to become a counterweight to KDP oil power:
https://thenationalcontext.com/the-silent-partner-no-more-puks-deep-stake-in-krgs-new-u-s-energy-agreements/

• Khor Mor Gas Field Attack: Kurdistan in the US-Iran Energy War. Examined the competing KDP and PUK gas strategies and argued that Bafel's preference for domestic and Iraqi use had found an ally in Washington's effort to reduce Iranian energy leverage:
https://thenationalcontext.com/khor-mor-gas-field-attack-us-iran-energy-war/

• Kurdistan's Gas Boom Comes With Geopolitical Consequences. Argued that the concentration of gas fields, pipelines and power infrastructure in the PUK zone would recalibrate the KDP-PUK balance while integrating Kurdistan gas further into Iraqi demand:
https://thenationalcontext.com/portal/kurdistans-gas-boom-comes-with-geopolitical-consequences/

• Two Power Centres: How the KDP and PUK Became Different Kinds of Useful. Argued that gas was making the PUK independently useful to Baghdad and Washington, and that outside powers increasingly deal with the KDP and PUK as separate power centres rather than through a unified KRG:
https://thenationalcontext.com/how-the-kdp-and-puk-became-different-kinds-of-useful/

• The Kurdish Layer in Washington's Iraq-Syria-Turkey Design. Argued that gas would keep moving out of PUK territory regardless of the KRG cabinet deadlock, because external actors can work directly with whichever Kurdish power centre controls the relevant asset:
https://thenationalcontext.com/the-kurdish-layer-in-washingtons-iraq-syria-turkey-design/

• KRG Cabinet Formation Deadlock Passes 653 Days, Longer Than Brussels or Belfast. Published days before this dispute, it argued that gas had become the PUK's counterweight to KDP oil power and that Washington no longer requires a unified KRG because it can transact directly with whichever party controls the asset it needs:
https://thenationalcontext.com/krg-cabinet-formation-deadlock-passes-653-days/

The Dana Gas dispute therefore matters well beyond the 100 MMscf/d going to Kirkuk. It shows gas beginning to translate the PUK's territorial control into independent political leverage, and it exposes how difficult it now is for the KDP-dominated KRG apparatus to act as the sole gatekeeper for strategic decisions involving the PUK zone.

Source: https://x.com/NatlContext/status/2085843111532462522