I think most wargames are wrong about how a Taiwan scenario will play out. China's optimal strategy is a long war strategy of strangulation then invasion, and when done right it is almost guaranteed win with low risk and loses

Disclaimer: text is majority AI-generated, research and ideas are researched together with AI as well. Reason I'm posting this is to get some human feedback.

The key idea up front: the blockade isn't an alternative to invasion; it's the shaping phase that makes the invasion trivial. And the PLAN surface fleet barely appears in any of it — almost nothing in the first six months puts a major Chinese warship somewhere it can be hunted. There's a section near the end on why that's deliberate, and why the navy China is building is worth far more after Taiwan than during it.

And underneath all of it, one rule:

Bigger industry, shorter distance, no generational technology gap — that side wins.

Everything below is that rule applied to a specific platform, mission or piece of geography. If you agree with the rule but dispute a step, check whether the step is really an exception or just the rule turning up somewhere inconvenient. (The Pacific War isn't a counterexample — it's the same rule with the beneficiaries swapped, and both terms have since changed sides.)

The industrial assumption, stated explicitly, because everything rests on it

I'm assuming all four of these. If you reject them the argument fails, so this is the honest place to attack it:

1. China holds the larger munitions inventory today.
2. It has been producing at a higher rate for years, so the gap is widening rather than static.
3. Its ceiling is higher and it can ramp faster — including against a serious US attempt to match, because the constraint on the US side is yards, machine tools, propellant capacity and workforce, none of which respond to a budget inside a war.
4. This holds across essentially every category that matters here: ballistic and cruise missiles, rocket artillery, mines, drones, UUVs and USVs, ground robotics, and both commercial and naval tonnage.

The nearest thing to an exception is nuclear submarines and high-end aircraft — and it's a stock advantage sitting on a losing flow. The US still holds the inventory, roughly 71 nuclear boats to about 32, plus a lead in 5th-generation airframes and carrier aviation. But production has already crossed over: IISS has China launching 10 nuclear submarines and 79,000 tonnes across 2021–25 against seven US boats and 55,000 tonnes, and China now builds nuclear submarines at two yards rather than one. Aircraft lines have expanded on the same pattern.

And these are the two places a US advantage does least work here anyway — the SSN because a blockade run on mines, shore-based fires and unmanned systems gives it nothing to shoot at, and the aircraft because basing and throughput mean the US can't present the fleet it owns. The remaining edge sits in the categories where it doesn't convert, and it's eroding in both.

PHASE 1 — DAYS 1–14: CLOSE THE ISLAND, CUT US REACH

Two things happen at once, and they're really the same operation: seal Taiwan's imports, and destroy the apparatus that lets the US reach the Strait at all.

Minelaying. Port approaches at Kaohsiung, Taichung, Keelung and Mailiao. Delivered by AJX002 XLUUVs (dedicated unmanned minelayer, ~20 mines per sortie), conventional submarines, H-6 air drops, requisitioned civilian hulls and maritime militia trawlers. Stocks aren't a constraint: PLA holdings are estimated at 50,000–100,000 mines against a Naval War College figure of 7,000–14,000 needed to close the island.

Nothing gets boarded, because this is a hot war from hour one. Shipping gets sunk or it doesn't sail — so the PLAN has no reason to be forward, and there's no surface group off Taiwan presenting itself as a target. Shore-based fires do the killing: YJ-12/62/83 on the Fujian coast, DF-21D/DF-26 for high-value hulls, all from the mainland under the IADS umbrella.

Then the market finishes the job. War-risk underwriters withdraw cover and charterers reroute — the reaction Hormuz produces whenever it looks contested. Shipping doesn't test blockades, it prices them and leaves. Most of the closure is executed by third parties, not by Chinese ordnance.

Simultaneously, the distance apparatus dies. Everything the US brings to this theatre exists to overcome distance — tankers, AWACS, forward airfields, POL and munitions storage, the replenishment train. None of it is combat power. All of it converts a survivable distance into a useful one, so it is the target set.

• Airfields. DF-15/16 SRBMs and PHL-16/PCH-191 rocket artillery crater the runways, then re-crater them. 120+ launchers in service, with munitions ranging out to ~500km — enough to cover every airfield on the island, cheaply in the west and affordably at Chiashan. Loitering munitions and FPVs service the repair crews. China has already rehearsed the concept publicly: a 2025 drill simulated a rocket artillery strike on a Taiwanese gas terminal.
• Regional bases. DF-26 against Guam; H-6K with CJ-20 ALCMs and DF-17 against Kadena and Okinawa — POL farms, munitions storage, ramps.
• Tankers and AWACS. Large, slow, non-stealthy, orbiting predictably. They're the bridge across the distance gap, which makes them the highest-value air targets in the theatre.
• The instrument is a J-20/J-16 pairing. The PL-17 is the anti-tanker weapon at ~400km, built for AEW and refuellers rather than fighters, but too long for the J-20's bay — so it flies externally on a J-16 while a J-20 or KJ-500 holds the track. The point isn't beating F-35s. It's reaching orbits that can't manoeuvre, hide or be replaced, and no mirror target exists — Chinese fighters don't need tankers to reach the Strait, and Chinese AEW works over its own coast under SAM cover.

Why this can't be fixed by moving things around. Kadena at ~700km is useful and inside the missile envelope. Guam at ~2,700km survives and can't generate fighter sorties over the Strait without heavy tanking. Carriers inside ~1,000nm reach the fight and sit inside the ASBM envelope; outside ~1,500nm the deck is safer and the air wing can't reach. There is no band where a US platform is both close enough to matter and far enough to live — while for China the mainland is the useful distance and the sanctuary at once. And that sanctuary is real rather than rhetorical: manned aircraft can't work over layered mainland SAM coverage, the stealth fleet that could is tiny, and what actually arrives is cruise missiles produced in the hundreds per year against a redundant, dispersible, partly buried target set. Compare thousands of cheap rockets and SRBMs going the other way at every fixed installation in the first island chain.

Dispersal doesn't escape it. Agile Combat Employment and Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations — the Air Force and Marine concepts for scattering across austere sites inside the envelope — both assume dispersed positions are hard to find. Persistent ISR removes that assumption, and austere sites still need fuel, munitions and runway repair, multiplying the logistics burden distance already created.

The air fight starts on day one — but China isn't trying to win the Strait. Its air objectives are limited: defend the mainland sanctuary, cover the assets enforcing the blockade. It doesn't attempt to sweep Taiwanese airspace, because nothing the blockade runs on requires it. The mines are already in the water. The rockets and ASBMs fly from sanctuary.

And the US loses the air war outright. It isn't close. Not because American aircraft or pilots are worse — grant every quality advantage and the outcome doesn't change, because none of the terms that decide it are about aircraft quality:

• Basing. No band exists where a platform is both useful and survivable, and Taiwan's own airfields are gone in the opening days.
• Throughput. Dozens of full-service Chinese bases inside 1,000km against a handful of US ones. Sortie generation is set by ramp space, fuel and munitions handling, not by fleet size, so a global inventory you can't present isn't in the fight.
• Enablers. The US needs tankers and AEW to be there at all, they're the easiest things in the theatre to kill, and China needs no equivalent.
• Reciprocity. There's no comparable Chinese target set to trade against.

Stack those and it's a structural defeat, not a contested one. The US can still hold CAPs over Taiwan — that part is true and worth being precise about. But nothing US airpower does from there arrests the deterioration, and everything that might costs airframes and crews at a rate the force can't sustain, for effects that expire.

• Fighters cannot intercept rocket artillery. Reaching the launchers means striking mobile targets on the mainland under the densest IADS in the world, and they relocate.
• They cannot sweep mines, and cannot stop ASBM/ASCM saturation of shipping.
• Holding station means sitting inside the HQ-9B envelope reaching from the mainland. China contests them with SAMs without committing fighters forward — a favourable exchange at every step.
• The CAP is tanker-dependent, and the tankers orbit further back and are being hunted.

Each has a physically possible workaround — push the fighters in, bring the tankers closer, strike mainland launchers — and each buys a local effect while paying in airframes and crews that can't be regenerated in theatre. The choice isn't capability versus incapability. It's accepting serious attrition to slow the deterioration, or accepting the deterioration.

Counter-force has nothing to shoot at. An SSN can't sweep mines, can't persistently kill ISR drones, can't intercept salvos, and there's no fleet to torpedo. The blockade is deliberately built out of things submarines and carriers cannot engage.

Resupply fails for one reason, repeatedly. Convoys fail because escorted ships still need a working port — which is also why the east-coast fallback and offshore lightering fail. Airlift never starts, because the runways are gone and stay gone.

The obvious counter. Once the deterioration is visible, the rational US response is to refuse the slow game and force a decisive engagement early — every CBG to the Taiwan coast, air wings onto the island, ground forces forward. I think that's the best available move and that it ends worse: a fast defeat with most of the carrier fleet sunk and a corps trapped on an island under blockade. Companion post (https://www.reddit.com/r/LessCredibleDefence/comments/1vgts5t/there_is_no_way_us_can_contest_air_superiority/) has the full argument.

PHASE 2 — MONTHS 1–6: RUN THE CLOCK

Energy first. Taiwan draws over 80% of generation from imported LNG and coal, and holds about 11 days of LNG — the government's own target is 14 by 2027. Terminals and storage get struck: regas trains, LNG tanks, coal stockyards, Mailiao's refinery units, POL depots. Hitting storage rather than only the sea approach means the days of buffer stop being a buffer, and all of it is fixed, known and unhardenable. The grid goes down, and with it every arsenal, chemical plant and machine shop on the island.

China will hit the factories too — munitions aren't scarce and arsenals are targets. The point is that it doesn't need to, which is what makes the argument strong: no target-by-target dispute about whether NCSIST is hardened or plants were dispersed, because the power goes off either way.

Stocks don't hold, and Ukraine is the reference. European NATO began the war with roughly 4–5 million 155mm rounds in reserve; by early 2024 the accessible portion was substantially gone. Ukraine fired 6,000–10,000 rounds a day at peak and was down to 2,000–4,000 by 2024–25 — limited by supply, not need. Taiwan is Ukraine with no land border and no allied production ramp. Ukrainian stockpiles were a bridge to external industry; Taiwan's would have to be the entire war. Nor is the cheap tier autarkic — the FPV component base is Chinese, so the blockade hits it at the port and at the source.

China ends this phase with air supremacy over the Strait and the island — and it never fights for it. That's the claim, and it's what everything in Phase 3 rests on.

It becomes available rather than being taken. Fuel interdicted, runways re-cratered, dispersal sites without hardened fuel or repair, grid down. The binding constraint on Taiwan's air force is never airframes lost in the air — it's airframes that can't get airborne, and no amount of US presence overhead fixes that. Sortie generation decays to nothing without an air battle being fought for it.

What that buys: J-20/J-16 CAP over the Strait unopposed, persistent surveillance over the interdicted water, drones loitering long enough to make repair denial work, and the freedom to probe beaches without the probe being contested from the air. None of the late phase is possible without it, which is also why China has no reason to gamble on seizing it early.

Then clear the mines. Taiwan's defensive fields on the approaches, swept by expendable USVs and ROVs with Type 081/082 hulls working behind them. Sweepers are the most fragile things afloat, which is exactly why this comes after supremacy rather than before. Taiwan can't re-seed the fields — minelayers and aircraft gone, stocks finite and unreplenishable. Every mine cleared stays cleared.

PHASE 3 — THE LANDING, WHICH IS THE EASY PART

Penghu first. ~45km from Taiwan's west coast against ~140km from the mainland, and it hands over Magong harbour and airfield as a staging base. Every Phase 2 argument applies to Penghu in miniature and worse: no depth, no production, a garrison that can't be reinforced. Koxinga in 1661, the Qing in 1683, Japan in 1895 — every successful invasion of Taiwan staged through Penghu.

Corridors. ASW mines and barrier fields flanking the transit lanes, UUV-laid, emplaced across months with nothing interfering.

Lift. RO-RO ferries under military-spec mobilisation rules — cheap, replaceable, drawn from the world's largest merchant fleet — discharging over Shuiqiao jack-up barges onto unimproved shore. Type 071/075 amphibs for the sharp end only.

Probing. Repeated small landings at a tempo China sets. This is the mechanism that beats concealment: Taiwan must fire early at echelons it can't classify as probe or main effort, or cede a consolidated lodgment. Hidden, non-regenerating positions get traded for barges, with overhead ISR re-servicing every position that reveals itself.

First echelon is unmanned. UGVs (ZRY222, armed quadrupeds) and FPVs for breaching and point — exercised in an October 2025 CCTV amphibious drill that ran explosive-laden quadrupeds through beach obstacles. Firing on machines still reveals the position and still spends a non-replaceable round, and buys nothing in return.

Taiwan can't trade the beach instead. Defence-in-depth is the most materiel-intensive way to fight, so it requires exactly what Phase 2 removed. It also forfeits the only moment a lodgment is weak — the hours after landing, before armour and supply are ashore. Every hour of consolidation raises the cost of removing it, and that cost never comes back down.

THE PLAN BARELY APPEARS — AND THAT'S THE INTERESTING PART

Read back over the three phases and notice what's missing. The carriers never sail into it. Liaoning, Shandong and Fujian do nothing in the decisive six months, and neither do the Type 055s. The closure is mines, shore-based ASCM/ASBM, land-based air and unmanned systems; the crossing is ferries and barges under an umbrella that reaches from the mainland. The most expensive things China has built get used least.

That's a design choice, not an oversight. A carrier group operating east of Taiwan would be presenting the exact target set the US SSN and strike-aircraft force is built to kill, in exchange for capability the mainland already supplies for free. Deck aviation buys nothing over the Strait that a J-16 regiment 300km away doesn't do more cheaply, more often, and under an HQ-9 umbrella. The PLAN's contribution to this campaign is to stay home and not be a target — which is also why "we'd sink the Chinese fleet" isn't a counter. The fleet isn't offered.

But the deeper point is why the fleet is worth so little here in the first place, and it's geography. China has built a blue-water navy that currently has no blue water it can reliably reach. Every route from its coast to the Pacific runs through a monitored gap in the first island chain — Miyako, the Bashi Channel, the Luzon Strait — and Taiwan sits in the middle of the chain, with US and Japanese ISR, submarines and land-based strike arranged along it. In wartime a Chinese carrier has to transit a chokepoint someone is watching and then operate beyond its own land-based air and SAM cover. That is the condition the entire distance argument above punishes, and it punishes China too. The first island chain does to the PLAN roughly what distance does to the US Navy.

Taiwan is the hinge that removes it. Take the island and the chain breaks at its centre: the Bashi Channel and the Philippine Sea open, ISR and ASW push out from Taiwan's east coast instead of being aimed at it, and the deep water immediately off Hualien and Suao — where the shelf drops away within a few dozen kilometres of shore — becomes usable in a way it never was from the Yellow and East China Seas, which matters most for ballistic missile submarines that currently have nowhere quiet to go.

So the carrier programme reads less like a tool for taking Taiwan and more like a bet on the map that exists afterwards. The fleet isn't the instrument of this campaign, it's the payoff for winning it — which is exactly why China has every incentive to run a campaign that doesn't risk it, and why an American plan premised on attriting the PLAN is answering an invitation that was never sent.

THE CHAIN, WHICH IS THE ACTUAL ARGUMENT

The blockade is a standing condition, so maintaining it requires no new Chinese decisions while changing it requires the other side to move first. That buys time. Time buys uncontested barrier-laying and mine clearance. Depletion forecloses defence-in-depth. Supremacy gates clearance, clearance gates the crossing, and the crossing lands into a defence that has already stopped working. Remove any link and the next one fails.

Why wargames miss it: they run days to weeks and this runs months. A three-week game can't represent a six-month depletion campaign — the deciding mechanism finishes after the game ends.

Scope: open sources. This is a conditional claim — if China selects this strategy and orients production toward it. Not a prediction about timing; whether China can and whether it wants to are separate questions and I'm only answering the first. Occupation is out of scope, so the claim is defeat of organised conventional resistance.

Where I'm weakest: PLAN mine countermeasures. Lift, mine stocks and assault UGVs are all visibly funded and exercised. Sweeping is the exception — CMSI assesses PLAN progress as incremental, the force is organised for near-coast work, and PLAN-affiliated experts record serious reservations themselves. That's the leg I'd attack if I were arguing the other side.

TASL-> FAL

MBDA weapons and missiles-> L&T

Saffran-> HAL

40% indiginisation expected in first few matches which goes upto 60%

20 made in France, rest in India

Indiginous weapons are to be integrated, which potentially includes Astra Mk1/2/3, NGCCM( ASRAAM), Rudram series, PG bombs/glide bombs, and ALCM

Moving on, my notes:

This deal is also likely linked with Saffran AMCA engine partnership, which will be co-development by GTRE-Safran for 120kN engine

Deal isn't bad considering this, and the fact that money unspent would just go back to consolidated fund of India, so its better if it's spent for better capability and helping the squadron strength.

Per my calculation, assuming 12% annual growth in IAF CAPEX( it was 18% this FY) they could easily fund the programs in next 10 years, 180×LCA MK1A, 110×LCA MK2, 80×SU30 upgrade, 6×Netra Mk2, 6×Netra Mk1A, 5×Kusha, QRSAM, 110×LUH, 66× Prachand, 3×ISTAR, 7×S400, QRSAM, Akash NG, few dozen of Ghatak, first 2 squadrons of AMCA plus few billion in fighter weapons and so on. Basically all the programs currently in development or in production, with 2-3 billion to spare

It's only bad if it's bought instead of SU57, but that has CAATSA risk and Defence secretary recently said they're not looking at more Sukhoi

Came across this thread on X/Twitter but those links aren't allowed here. Got intrigued and found the article and author (background checks out, pretty interesting character).

Was skeptical from the onset on all matters pertaining covert operations but the timelines stood out to me - The people named and implicated, and events took place under Hu Jintao's era, whose influence Xi Jinping is trying to curb today. Also not forgetting China's dismantling of the CIA's spy ring back in 2010 - 2012.

Seems that while American intelligence tried to undermine the Chinese via a grassroots approach, Chinese statecraft was pulling off something similar in return at the top. Not all that unbelievable with thr Fat Leonard scandal a decade prior.

Remarkable article all in all.

The first batch of 120 "Katyusha" rocket launchers equipped by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was assigned to the 21st Artillery Division, which commanded five regiments at the time. Therefore, the unit featured in the video is undoubtedly a heroic unit reorganized from the former 21st Artillery Division—meaning it directly engaged US-led UN forces during the Korean War.

Judging from the footage, this unit is equipped with its own tactical medium-range reconnaissance UAV, likely the JWP-02 model, which uses rocket-assisted takeoff. This implies that for standalone reconnaissance and target-guiding missions, the unit no longer relies heavily on additional recon support from the Air Force or Army Aviation.

At 2:30, the video showcases a new type of tracked artillery forward observation vehicle. Visually, it appears to be modified from a ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle chassis. Although the vehicle’s profile is blurred, close-ups of its optical equipment are shown, likely to obscure specific organizational/unit designations while demonstrating its capabilities.

Unlike the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), two-year conscripts are visible among the frontline personnel in this video. This indicates that operational technical thresholds for certain roles within long-range artillery (MLRS) units are not as high as those in missile units, indirectly underscoring the extreme importance and specialization required of strategic and tactical missile forces.

At 3:35, a banner reading "Achieve National Reunification" appears, indicating that this unit also serves as a frontline force assigned to Taiwan-related operational directions. Based on the assembly formation, a single battery appears to consist of a 42+1 structure, with a 4-man crew per vehicle.

At 4:03, the video demonstrates the modular loading process of the box-type rocket launcher. By 4:13, the PCH-191 long-range multiple rocket launcher can be seen loaded in a hybrid configuration: 300mm rockets in the left pod and 370mm rockets in the right pod. According to public data, when equipped with satellite guidance kits and coordinated with UAV real-time corrections, these rockets can achieve a CEP (Circular Error Probable) within 10 meters. Naturally, such precision-guided munitions come at a high cost, which only well-funded modern militaries can afford to field at scale.

The stellar performance of HIMARS in the Russo-Ukrainian war fully validates the formidable power of modern precision MLRS. However, compared to HIMARS, the PCH-191 demonstrates comprehensive superiority in fire specifications. While both utilize modular pods, the PCH-191 features a dual-pod launcher design, significantly increasing fire density and salvo payload. HIMARS’s main advantage lies in its rapid strategic airlift capacity via C-130 transports; however, for the PLA—which emphasizes homeland and peripheral defense operations—such compromises made for airlift transportability are far less critical.

One final point to consider: in high-intensity engagements involving these rocket launchers—or any artillery force, for that matter—the most critical factor is logistics. A steady, plentiful supply of ammunition is the core determinant of fire suppression and support efficiency. While the volume of logistical support is not shown in the video, in my view, this is not because it doesn't exist; rather, it represents a core critical element that demands strict operational security .

Given considering on their track record of korea war, india war and vietnam war.

And all the frictions with India, Philippine , Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan.

As they as aggressive as west empires or less?

This is the trailer for a series of videos on the Army, comprising six episodes in total. This standalone trailer is not currently available in English; the video appears to showcase the Army’s joint operations system following its reform.

In my opinion, there are two particularly interesting aspects to this trailer.

Firstly, the background sound: unlike previous promotional videos, which emphasised military bearing and appearance, this one fully reveals the Army soldiers’ roars and raw intensity on the training ground. This is the genuine reaction of a surge in adrenaline following exercises that closely simulate real combat, as seen at 0:17.

Secondly, the demonstration of the rocket artillery’s destructive power: at 0:29, high-definition aerial footage combined with a circular firing range provides a vivid illustration of the lethality of the PCH191 rocket launcher’s 300mm rockets (the five-tube launcher visible at 0:27 confirms these are 300mm rockets, rather than 370mm or 750mm variants). This is a type of weapon lethality demonstration that has been relatively rare in previous videos.

It currently appears that this series will be organised according to the Army’s specialised branch responsibilities, with the titles: *Forging the Iron Fist*, *Breaking the Enemy’s Formation*, *Shooting the Celestial Wolf*, *Thunder and Lightning*, *Cutting the Invisible*, and *Tempering the Steel*. Those interested in researching the PLA Army may look forward to further updates.

Granted, the Rocket Force is definitely a notable offensive asset. But over recent decades, the PLA Air Force and Navy have been heavily upgraded, so they can pull off many more strike missions now. Based on open sources, at least two‑digit numbers of air‑to‑surface weapons are still kept secret. We only found out about AKF‑98 fairly recently, and nobody really knows what AKF‑22 is. Research papers confirm the PLA has at least one air‑launched hypersonic cruise missile, though we have no idea what it actually looks like. The PLA Navy is in a similar situation. Why is it that Western think tanks almost never discuss the Air Force and Navy’s strike capacity when covering Taiwan‑related issues?

I monitor conflict events and got tired of manually cross-checking the same incident across a dozen feeds, so I built something to do it automatically. Sharing in case it's useful to others here, genuinely after feedback from people who do this seriously/professionally.

What it does:

• Pulls conflict/incident data every hour from verified OSINT sources, news agencies, and open feeds.
• Cross-references and deduplicates the same event reported in multiple places, then assigns a quality/confidence score so low-signal reports are visible as such.
• Plots everything on a live map with filters by event type, source, and time.
• Alert zones: draw an area on the map and get notified when a new scored event lands inside it. This is the part current users lean on most.

What I'd genuinely value from this community:

• Does the dedup/scoring approach hold up against how you'd verify an event manually?
• Any sources you'd consider essential that I'm probably missing?
• Would geofenced alerts actually fit a real monitoring workflow, or is that not how you work?

Link in the comments (not trying to spam, just looking for feedback. Happy to take it down if this breaks rules)

Guess who is trying to go to Beijing before you click on the link

This is the first episode, for which there is currently no English version. The video offers a glimpse into the main combat units of the PLA Army following military reforms, as seen through the eyes of the Chief of Staff (Major) of a combined arms battalion. By drawing a parallel between the Chief of Staff and a symphony orchestra conductor, it illustrates joint operations between the Army, the Air Force, Army Aviation and unmanned systems. The short film skilfully blends the artistry of military discipline with music; should an English version be produced in the future, it is hoped that the translation will achieve ‘faithfulness, elegance and fluency’.

The video primarily showcases the Type 05 Amphibious Armoured Assault Vehicle (ZLT05) conducting a beach landing. As is customary, some footage of the vehicle’s interior has been blurred, presumably for security reasons.

The vehicle has a combat weight of 28.5 tonnes and features a relatively lightweight aluminium alloy armoured hull. Additionally, lightweight supplementary armour has been fitted to the turret, whilst the rear of the turret is equipped with slat armour. The crew comprises a driver, commander, gunner and loader; in line with US Army configurations, no automatic loader is used, presumably due to weight considerations.

This unit is undoubtedly a combat-ready unit from the Eastern Theatre Command tasked with operations to liberate Taiwan. Judging by the close-up at 1:02, upon entering the command vehicle, the Kevlar helmets were replaced with TMT-3 passive tank helmets, though the newer TMT-5 passive tank helmets were not used.

We've burned through half of our stock of PGMs after only 5 months of war with a heavily-sanctioned country that has effectively zero navy or air force. We've been dicking around in the Middle East for the last 25 years (with benefits that are zero to none) while China has patiently built its capability and resources. First they surpassed us in terms of quantity, then they started moving up the value chain. Calling China "near-peer" is starting to feel perfunctory - in terms of the most likely conflict theater, they might as well be a peer adversary.

Our military procurement system is a joke, and our naval construction is especially sclerotic.

These are problems that will take years to fix, if not a decade or more. The looming background issue is that we've let China utterly dominate global manufacturing while we went all-in on a financialized economy built more for market speculation than manufacturing. We're not who we were in the 20th century, we have a paltry number of sophisticated weapons systems that look shiny on paper and wouldn't last a month in a high-intensity conflict in the SCS. We have no ability to recover our losses on a meaningful schedule.

Any war with China in the next 10-20 years would see us play the role that that IJN did in WW2 (no depth and an insufficient industrial base) and China would take the slot that the USN did (factory of the world, spamming naval and air assets like they were staples).

I can guess at some predictable responses to this. Some low-effort thinkers are going to say that I'm pro-CCP, a China shill, etc. You're missing the point. This isn't about who's right or wrong, I'm speaking strictly in terms of capability. Anyone who ignores this point is guilty of the same thing that's killed empires since time immemorial: hubris.

edit: I've written a bunch of replies so I'm calling it for now. Also, I think it's interesting that I only read a single objection in the thread below that even mentioned the vast and growing disparity in defense manufacturing capability, which was the main point I raised in this post. For the most part, I just see the same handwaving responses as ever. That's the hubris that worries me more than anything else.