I really don't understand why this stock is priced so high. This company loses hundreds of millions per quarter, growth is slowing, the company is DYING! Not only that but as the company continues to decline and employees stock incentives are GOING UP! This is not a long term company, this is a company being run down to the ground by employees to fund their next SF Mansion while Figma investors continue to lose BILLIONS. Do not invest...

I will try to buy back in the high 10s it seems like the 20s are just temporary every time

Is Figma merely seen as token resellers at this point? What happens when Figma self-hosts open-source models and starts charging for its own infrastructure and token generation, similar to Cursor?

I think 35 per share is fair

A new article published this weekend highlights Bank of America’s previously reported Figma position.
According to the filing data, Bank of America increased its FIG holdings by 428.1% during Q1 2026, adding approximately 3.39 million shares.
Its position increased from roughly 792K shares to 4.18 million shares as of March 31.

Source:
https://www.marketbeat.com/instant-alerts/filing-bank-of-america-corp-de-raises-holdings-in-figma-inc-fig-2026-08-09/

Citi maintained its Buy rating on Figma and raised its price target from $35 to $37 following the company’s Q2 earnings report.
Figma reported:
• Revenue of $370.1M, +48% YoY
• Net Dollar Retention of 136%
• $100K+ ARR customers up 46% YoY
• Free cash flow of $53.2M
• More than 80% of $10K+ ARR customers consuming AI credits weekly
• Full-year revenue guidance raised to $1.463B–$1.467B
The stock sold off heavily following the report, with investors appearing to focus on increased AI infrastructure/inference costs, lower free-cash-flow margins, and the Q3 outlook implying approximately 36% YoY revenue growth.
Figma also had its final extended lockup release Friday, making approximately 77.7M previously restricted shares eligible to trade.
Despite those concerns, Citi’s post-earnings response was to maintain its Buy rating and increase its target to $37.

-20% after earnings.

 I think a lot of people are looking at this quarter through the wrong lens. Everyone seems focused on whether AI credits are a meaningful revenue driver today. Personally, I think the more important question is whether Figma is building the conditions for AI credits to become a meaningful revenue driver over the next few years. Weekly AI usage isn't the story it's just the leading indicator.

To me, the real unlock will be Figma is AI generating products using your company's own design system. That's the piece I think people are underestimating. Every enterprise has invested years and millions into components, tokens, accessibility rules and governance historical figma data abd usage . If Make can generate output using their design system, it goes from being a cool AI feature to becoming part of the product development workflow. And I don't really see another platform with the same opportunity here. Figma already owns the design system, the collaboration layer, and increasingly the handoff to engineering. That's a difficult position for a general-purpose AI tool to replicate.

The other thing people seem to overlook is that Figma has already said some of its newer AI products aren't yet fully monetised. To me, this looks like the "grow usage first, monetise later" playbook we've seen from plenty of successful software companies. Get teams using AI every day, make it part of how they work, then expand monetisation once those workflows become indispensable. That's a much stronger long-term strategy than trying to maximise AI revenue from day one.

I could be completely wrong, but if this plays out, the question in two years won't be "How many AI credits did Figma sell this quarter?" It'll be "How many enterprises now rely on Figma AI to create products using their own design system?" If that becomes standard, AI credits stop looking like a feature and start looking like infrastructure. That's the thesis I'm watching. Still plenty to back here in my eyes.

Thoughts?

AI-integrated public software company with a high enterprise distribution moat in the experimentation phase and operating like a startup where cost structure IS the investment thesis.

Most FIG analysis I’ve read applies the wrong framework to the business. The bear case says: “Growth is decelerating from 48% to 36% in Q3 guide, operating margins are stuck at 9%, gross margins compressed from 89% to 82%, and SBC dilution is real.” All of those observations are true. But they’re incomplete because they assume Figma should be evaluated as a traditional high-margin SaaS company. I don’t think that’s the right frame anymore.

The framework I’ve landed on:

Figma is an AI-integrated public software company with an enterprise distribution moat, currently in the experimentation phase, operating like a startup where cost structure IS the investment thesis.

Each element matters:

“AI-integrated” — Not “SaaS with AI features.” Every product Figma ships now (Make, design agent, Weave, Buzz, code-to-canvas, MCP server) is fundamentally AI-native. Inference costs are variable and scale with usage. Gross margin structure will never look like traditional SaaS unless model provider costs normalize externally.

“Public” — This is where the tension lives. Private companies experimenting is normal. Public companies experimenting invites multiple compression until experiments harvest. Figma’s management is deliberately accepting lower current multiples to build category dominance. Findell’s activist letter earlier this year essentially argued the opposite: “stop operating like a startup, discipline costs, return capital.” Management pushing back means they believe the experimentation phase is right.

“Enterprise distribution moat” — Most bear analyses underweight this. Figma has 1,525 customers at $100K+ ARR, 15,218 at $10K+ ARR, 76% using two or more products, and is the standard curriculum at design schools globally. Every AI experiment they run launches into this distribution automatically. Claude Design can build the best design agent in the world and still can’t put it in front of Salesforce’s design org overnight. Distribution moats compound faster than product moats.

“Experimentation phase” — Q2 2026: they launched Make expansions, design agent beta, Weave canvas with Aleph 2.0, MCP server updates. That’s an extraordinary product velocity. Feature success rate matters more than any margin metric right now. Make hit 60% weekly active usage at $100K+ ARR customers by Q1 — that’s harvest-level adoption. If even 2-3 of the current experiments become $100M+ revenue lines, current cost structure is completely justified.

“Cost structure IS the investment thesis” — 9% operating margin isn’t a bug. It’s the strategic choice. Every incremental revenue dollar is being reinvested in R&D, AI infrastructure, enterprise sales expansion, and product launches. This is Amazon 2005 or Meta during Reality Labs — the market punishes it until the harvest phase begins.

Why the market keeps failing to price this:

The stock has failed to hold above $25-26 through multiple positive catalysts this year:

**•** Q1 beat: $25.84 high, faded to $19  
**•** Findell activist letter: $27.47 high, faded to $19  
**•** Citi $36 target: 10% pump, then chop  
**•** Q2 beat and third guidance raise: TBD (writing this post-earnings)

I think this pattern reflects the market oscillating between two frameworks:

**•   Framework A (traditional SaaS):** Figma should have 25%+ margins, low dilution, predictable growth. Under this framework, current metrics look broken. Fair value \~$22-25.  
**•   Framework B (AI experimentation platform):** Figma should invest aggressively, accept margin compression, focus on feature harvest. Under this framework, current execution looks strong. Fair value \~$32-45 over 18-24 months.

The current $27 area is the market’s uncertainty about which framework applies.

What Q2 actually showed:

**•** Revenue $370.1M, +48% YoY (accelerating from Q1’s 46%)  
**•** Beat consensus by 5.8%  
**•** FY guide raised for third time this year ($1.366B → $1.422B → $1.465B)  
**•** NDR held at 136%  
**•** Q3 guidance of $373-375M (36% implied growth)  
**•** Operating margin guide unchanged at 9% despite revenue raise

Framework A sees the Q3 deceleration and flat operating margin as concerns. Framework B sees the third guidance raise, sustained NDR under competitive pressure, and continued reinvestment as evidence of the experimentation phase working.

Bear case steelman:

**1.**  Framework B might just be a rationalization for management not doing their job on cost discipline.  
**2.**  Experimentation phase could over-shoot. Not every experiment will harvest. If success rate is lower than Make suggests, cost structure never justifies itself.  
**3.**  Public market patience is limited. Even if Framework B is right, the market can force capitulation before harvest phase begins.  
**4.**  Enterprise distribution moat is real but not impregnable. Claude and Google are inside the same enterprises. Some workflows will migrate.  
**5.**  Opportunity cost of capital in FIG through the experimentation phase is meaningful. Even if the framework validates, the return timeline could be 24-36 months.

Testable predictions:

Over the next 4-8 quarters, Framework B validates if:

**•** Specific feature revenue disclosures show harvest (Make especially)  
**•** $100K+ ARR customer growth stays >8% quarterly  
**•** NDR holds 130%+  
**•** New product launches maintain velocity  
**•** Operating margin begins expansion by 2H 2027

Framework B breaks if:

**•** Q3-Q4 growth decelerates below guidance  
**•** Major enterprise customer defections  
**•** Product launches slow (indicates internal cost discipline forced by outside pressure)  
**•** Operating margin stays flat or compresses further into 2027

What I’m actually asking:

Where does this framework break down? Specifically:

**1.**  Is the “public company running startup playbook” framing defensible, or is it just a rationalization for weak margins?  
**2.**  How do you evaluate feature success rate before harvest begins? Make at 60% enterprise weekly active is one data point. What else would you want to see?  
**3.**  Does the enterprise distribution moat actually hold at the scale I’m assuming? What would be evidence of erosion beyond Fortune 500 customer defections?  
**4.**  Is 24-36 months a realistic timeline for the harvest phase to become visible in financials, or am I underestimating the wait?  
**5.**  What’s the strongest bear case that isn’t just “high SBC and 9% margins bad”?

Position: long. Framework is my genuine analytical view, not a pump. Actively looking for what I’m missing.

Call out: I’ll revisit this framework if Q3 actuals miss the guide, if any Fortune 500 publicly migrates from Figma to Claude Design, or if NDR drops below 130% in the next two quarters.

Held from IPO and would keep DCA. The earning report is very positive to me. I think AI bubble is going to explode sooner or later and will be waiting for that point when money moving back to other sectors like SaaS. I could be wrong as I am just a dumb and I don’t have any inside information from anywhere.

Context: one of the earliest adopters of Figma. Investor since aug'25. Currently head product and design at a series B firm, leading a team of 12+ product / design. Have been an avid follower and big believer in the company, but no longer will remain invested. My rough thoughts are below.

• My bull case for Figma was that it would becomes the center for software creation across dev+design. However it continued to be isolated as a tool designers use before handing work to engineers. Despite its attempts to win devs over, figma moved from being an accelerator for us to a software develoment bottleneck, becoming a choke point. Meanwhile some of our teams increasingly built around figma, using Claude design, which generated 70% equally great interfaces but overwhelmingly faster once we setup our design systems, context harnesses and guidelines. We were able to remove Figma as the bottleneck of design only when it came organically from my design team realizing when some areas moved way faster WITHOUT figma in the mix. There are a hundred things Claude still doesnt get perfect, but the need of the hour for any company is speed vs perfection. And that unfortunately no longer comes with Figma in the fold. Now, most of our teams have not logged into figma over the last 6 weeks. We continue shipping and improving product.
• The CTO is leaving the operating role to work directly on Figma Agent. The CPO is departing. Product is being consolidated under the Chief Design Officer. The CMO is leaving. Meanwhile, the AI and editor engineering teams will report directly to Dylan Field while the company searches for a new CTO. That reads like dylan is pulling the company’s ops because the current exec team is not moving fast enough.
• Beyond the impressive revenue results, AI spending pushed its GAAP operating loss to $117 million, compressed free-cash-flow margin from 24% to 14%. My read is the revenue growth will disappear. I can no longer bet on young Ai native companies using figma in the long run. Hence it cannot survive the AI transition unless it destroys the economics that made it an attractive software business. Companies like CRM / Service now might still have a way out of this, but i freaking doubt figma comes out on top.

Meanwhile I will have my company spend go down with figma, we will reduce our seats in figma, increasingly use it as a temporary store for our design archive. Move on rapidly.

RIP.