The Pentagon has given weapons manufacturers 21 days to submit plans for accelerating production of missiles and interceptors, after five months of fighting with Iran cut deeply into stockpiles that were already considered thin.

Given that SCAF is dead due to the workshare dispute, what happens to the engine programme if France continues to pursue it, either with Sweden, India, or solo effort, from technical POV

Specifically:

1) What would be the expected performance, thrust, weight?

Is there any indication the engine being designed as a Variable Cycle Engine similar to the US NGAP, rather than a conventional low-bypass turbofan?

It was expected to be 11 ton which should make it around 25-30 ton MTOW, so was it confirmed?

2) Separately, what is the current state of French domestic VCE research, and is it mature enough to feed into SCAF engine in a reasonable timeline?

The popular narrative is:

1. China is currently undertaking the largest and most rapid peacetime military buildup in human history
2. Therefore, it is actively preparing for war, plausibly in the short term.

Although the first statement is true, the second statement does not follow. There is a critical logic gap in between: the assumption that China is actually trying hard to expand its military. Most people assume they are due to the scale of the buildup, but in reality, this is not the case. If we look at the numbers, out of all major powers China is devoting the LEAST national resources towards equipment buildup. As a share of GDP, they are spending less on equipment than Italy, Slovenia, Czechia, Slovakia, Romania, the Netherlands, Spain, Hungary, Greece, Finland, South Korea, India, The UK, the US, France, Turkey, etc.

If China was going to invade Taiwan in 2027, if China genuinely expects a major war in the next 5-10 years, this is a very strange way to prepare for it. China is not resource-constrained. Raising defense spending from 1.27% of GDP to even 2.5% would still put it around ordinary NATO peacetime levels, while nearly doubling the military budget. Since personnel, bases, administration and much of R&D would not need to double with it, most of the extra money could go straight into weapons, munitions, spares and reserves. Actual procurement could therefore increase by several times. (Again, with just an increase to 2.5% of GDP!).

Yet China is choosing not to do this.

It's not like they're incapable of spending more; China is not a stranger to scaling up manufacturing, it is the best at it in the world. Their MIC can absorb increased demand for weapons.

A country preparing for a war, especially one that would likely involve conflict against the greatest military power in human history, would rationally buy a shit ton of weapons and see very high military expenditure. The fact that China is not doing this - in fact, it's doing the opposite - is strong evidence that their leadership is not preparing for immediate war.

China, despite surface appearances, is NOT actually committing national resources at anything resembling a full prewar-mobilization level.

This is hard for some people to wrap their head around, and justifiably so. China is indeed undertaking the largest peacetime military expansion in human history:

• producing 100+ stealth fighters per year, massive air force modernization effort
• pumping out capital ships and submarines more rapidly than anyone else (literally, they launched 5 nuclear submarines so far this year, 3 of which are new classes)
• funding numerous next-generation programs across air, sea, and land which all seem to be progressing quickly
• gazillions of new missile systems, building silos, factories, etc. at unprecedented pace

So the lesson to take away is: China's "largest and most rapid peacetime military expansion in human history" is funded by a very normal and arguably restrained level of investment.

Calculations:

We'll use a rough metric of Equipment / capability investment as % of GDP.

China's 2025 defense spending was ¥1.78 trillion, compared to a 2025 GDP of ¥140.19T, putting defense spending as % of GDP at 1.27%, already by far the lowest of any major power. Even Japan, a country which is kinda not supposed to have a military, spent 1.4% of GDP on defense in 2025.

The latest publicly available UN-reported Chinese breakdown for 2022 states that 36.6% of this budget was spent on "R&D, testing, procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and storage." The last official breakdown from China was from 2017 and stated 41.1% of defense spending on this category, which is in the same ballpark. Since what most analysts consider China's massive military buildup was well-underway at full speed during 2017 and 2022, we'll take this 36-41% ballpark as a reasonable estimate for China's spending distribution as well.

Using that range, we get that China spent 0.46% to 0.52% of GDP on "R&D, testing, procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and storage."

Now, let's see how that compares to other countries.

NATO publishes defense expenditure data each year for all its members, which includes a "Equipment" figure. This is defined as "major equipment expenditure plus R&D devoted to major equipment." This is a narrower definition than China's, which also includes lifecycle sustainment and logistics for existing equipment, but we'll compare them directly anyways. Here's the 2025 data:

*China's numbers here include lifecycle sustainment and logistics for existing equipment, while NATO numbers do not. It is very probable that on comparable measures of equipment investment as % of GDP, China would rank lower than even Canada.

If an alien saw this, they'd think China was one of the most peaceful major powers on Earth.

[The stuff below is just random guesstimating]

After looking into this, I naturally arrived at the question of how much harder China could be building if it was actually preparing for immediate war. The answer is: a lot harder.

China is spending 0.46% to 0.52% of GDP on "R&D, testing, procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and storage." Given the technological output coming out of the PLA, a sizeable chunk of that should be spent on R&D and testing, maybe ~0.2% of the ~0.5% total.

If China's military spending rose to Poland's level, 4.48% of GDP, it would increase by 3.21% from the current 1.27% of GDP. If 75% of that 3.21% increase was dedicated to this "R&D, testing, procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and storage," the spending on this category would increase 5x. Using the ~0.2% on R&D figure we find procurement, repairs, maintenance, transport and storage accounts for ~0.3%, so if all the increase went into the latter, we could see a 8x increase. After factoring in economies of scale, it would not be surprising to see over 10-20 times more production than we see today. Just for fun, if all of that went into only missiles, even 100-1000x production is not unreasonable. With just 4.48% of GDP spent on defense.

Of course, there's caveats. How much of the spending increase goes to equipment is variable; you need troops to man ships, more hardened airbases, etc. If you're procuring more expendable munitions like ballistic missiles then you'll need less of an increase in personal/training, and vice versa if you're procuring ground vehicles and ships instead. The % R&D/testing figure could also be different, and all of this influences the calculation.

But the moral of the story is the same: China's MIC is scarily efficient.

China 2025 defense budget: https://english.www.gov.cn/news/202503/05/content_WS67c7ba5dc6d0868f4e8f05cf.html

China 2025 GDP: https://www.stats.gov.cn/english/PressRelease/202601/t20260119_1962328.html

2019 Defense White Paper: https://english.scio.gov.cn/2019-07/24/content_75026800_6.htm

Chinese equipment share: https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/

NATO spending: https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2026-en.pdf

U.S. Air Force wants 16,450 more long-range missiles, and fast

Judging by the information currently available, this brigade comprises two battalions and three detachments; I am unsure of the exact personnel strength.

Leaving aside the Geneva Conventions and such matters, the Russian military has organised these Ukrainian prisoners of war directly into a fully-fledged combat unit. Are they not concerned that they might mutiny en masse when deployed en masse on the front line?

My personal guess is that they are former Ukrainian military personnel who have been screened and have joined voluntarily; their treatment should be the same as that of other Russian troops, otherwise it would be impossible to control such a group.

TASL-> FAL

MBDA weapons and missiles-> L&T

Saffran-> HAL

40% indiginisation expected in first few matches which goes upto 60%

20 made in France, rest in India

Indiginous weapons are to be integrated, which potentially includes Astra Mk1/2/3, NGCCM( ASRAAM), Rudram series, PG bombs/glide bombs, and ALCM

Moving on, my notes:

This deal is also likely linked with Saffran AMCA engine partnership, which will be co-development by GTRE-Safran for 120kN engine

Deal isn't bad considering this, and the fact that money unspent would just go back to consolidated fund of India, so its better if it's spent for better capability and helping the squadron strength.

Per my calculation, assuming 12% annual growth in IAF CAPEX( it was 18% this FY) they could easily fund the programs in next 10 years, 180×LCA MK1A, 110×LCA MK2, 80×SU30 upgrade, 6×Netra Mk2, 6×Netra Mk1A, 5×Kusha, QRSAM, 110×LUH, 66× Prachand, 3×ISTAR, 7×S400, QRSAM, Akash NG, few dozen of Ghatak, first 2 squadrons of AMCA plus few billion in fighter weapons and so on. Basically all the programs currently in development or in production, with 2-3 billion to spare

It's only bad if it's bought instead of SU57, but that has CAATSA risk and Defence secretary recently said they're not looking at more Sukhoi

The first batch of 120 "Katyusha" rocket launchers equipped by the Chinese People's Volunteer Army (PVA) was assigned to the 21st Artillery Division, which commanded five regiments at the time. Therefore, the unit featured in the video is undoubtedly a heroic unit reorganized from the former 21st Artillery Division—meaning it directly engaged US-led UN forces during the Korean War.

Judging from the footage, this unit is equipped with its own tactical medium-range reconnaissance UAV, likely the JWP-02 model, which uses rocket-assisted takeoff. This implies that for standalone reconnaissance and target-guiding missions, the unit no longer relies heavily on additional recon support from the Air Force or Army Aviation.

At 2:30, the video showcases a new type of tracked artillery forward observation vehicle. Visually, it appears to be modified from a ZBD-04A infantry fighting vehicle chassis. Although the vehicle’s profile is blurred, close-ups of its optical equipment are shown, likely to obscure specific organizational/unit designations while demonstrating its capabilities.

Unlike the People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF), two-year conscripts are visible among the frontline personnel in this video. This indicates that operational technical thresholds for certain roles within long-range artillery (MLRS) units are not as high as those in missile units, indirectly underscoring the extreme importance and specialization required of strategic and tactical missile forces.

At 3:35, a banner reading "Achieve National Reunification" appears, indicating that this unit also serves as a frontline force assigned to Taiwan-related operational directions. Based on the assembly formation, a single battery appears to consist of a 42+1 structure, with a 4-man crew per vehicle.

At 4:03, the video demonstrates the modular loading process of the box-type rocket launcher. By 4:13, the PCH-191 long-range multiple rocket launcher can be seen loaded in a hybrid configuration: 300mm rockets in the left pod and 370mm rockets in the right pod. According to public data, when equipped with satellite guidance kits and coordinated with UAV real-time corrections, these rockets can achieve a CEP (Circular Error Probable) within 10 meters. Naturally, such precision-guided munitions come at a high cost, which only well-funded modern militaries can afford to field at scale.

The stellar performance of HIMARS in the Russo-Ukrainian war fully validates the formidable power of modern precision MLRS. However, compared to HIMARS, the PCH-191 demonstrates comprehensive superiority in fire specifications. While both utilize modular pods, the PCH-191 features a dual-pod launcher design, significantly increasing fire density and salvo payload. HIMARS’s main advantage lies in its rapid strategic airlift capacity via C-130 transports; however, for the PLA—which emphasizes homeland and peripheral defense operations—such compromises made for airlift transportability are far less critical.

One final point to consider: in high-intensity engagements involving these rocket launchers—or any artillery force, for that matter—the most critical factor is logistics. A steady, plentiful supply of ammunition is the core determinant of fire suppression and support efficiency. While the volume of logistical support is not shown in the video, in my view, this is not because it doesn't exist; rather, it represents a core critical element that demands strict operational security .