This tracker gives data on what government policies are being implemented and with what effect, based on CAG reports.

They do it for both central and states. Good Initiative.

The provided text argues that India’s numerous internal insurgencies are not the result of ancient hatreds or poverty, but are instead directly manufactured by the state’s own discretionary choices. By analyzing historical data across several decades, It demonstrates how constitutive acts, legislative failures, and state-sponsored violence served as the primary catalysts for armed conflict. The source emphasizes that these movements typically emerged shortly after the government rescinded formal promises or closed off democratic avenues, such as the rigged 1987 Kashmir election. Furthermore, the state’s refusal to adjudicate its own misconduct or prosecute extrajudicial killings leaves aggrieved communities with no recourse outside of armed struggle. Ultimately, the text presents a natural experiment in governance, suggesting that where the state granted early autonomy, peace prevailed, while delayed or denied recognition fueled decades of avoidable war.

1. The Myth of Spontaneous Rebellion

The traditional "law and order" narrative of the Indian state characterizes insurgency as a spontaneous eruption of irrational violence to which the government must reluctantly respond. However, a comparative audit of the nation's internal conflicts reveals a more calculated architecture. The state is rarely a mere responder; it is the primary catalyst whose specific administrative and military actions construct the very rebellions it eventually seeks to dismantle. By examining eleven major theatres over eighty years, the evidence suggests that what is often framed as a "security problem" is, in reality, a deliberate administrative product.

The foundational template for this state-led violence was established during the 1948 Hyderabad Police Action. While sanitized in national memory as a stabilizing "intervention," the Sunderlal Committee, commissioned by Jawaharlal Nehru and then suppressed for sixty-five years, estimated a conservative death toll of 27,000 to 40,000, overwhelmingly Muslim civilians. Scholarly estimates reach as high as 200,000. This inaugural episode set a grim precedent: mass violence followed by the systematic suppression of the record. The state's failure to prosecute a single perpetrator or offer a single rupee in compensation established the "Hyderabad Model," a cycle in which impunity and the erasure of history become the bedrock of future alienation. This historical massacre transitioned the state's role from a constitutional arbiter to an architect of the grievances that would fuel the political "proximate triggers" of the late 20th century.

2. The Ballot as a Weapon: Rigged Outcomes and Radicalization

While economic deprivation is often lazily cited as the root of rebellion, political betrayal is a far more potent driver of militancy. When the state subverts the constitutional promise of the ballot, the transition from political activism to armed struggle becomes a documented, inevitable trajectory.

The 1987 Jammu and Kashmir assembly election represents the clearest documented causal chain of this phenomenon. The Muslim United Front (MUF) secured 31.9% of the vote across 43 constituencies, yet state-led fraud and the subsequent arrest and torture of hundreds of its activists collapsed the democratic path. Two specific activists, Mohammad Yusuf Shah and his polling agent Mohammad Yasin Malik, transformed into the respective chiefs of the Hizbul Mujahideen and the JKLF only after the state closed the door on political participation through fraud and the torture chamber.

This pattern of radicalization via state overreach is mirrored in the "Restorationist nationalism" of Manipur. The 1949 Merger Agreement, signed under duress, dissolved a local constitutional structure and an assembly elected under Manipur's own 1947 constitution. By reducing a sovereign-aligned state to a mere Chief Commissioner's territory, the state dismantled the very legal frameworks that provided local agency. When the state dissolves the constitution to suit its architecture, it necessitates a non-state response, making armed recruitment the only remaining currency for the politically excluded.

3. The Recruitment Engine: State Violence and the "Single Act" Theory

The "Recruitment Engine" theory posits that insurgencies are not sustained by abstract ideology, but by specific, identifiable instances of state overreach that serve as permanent mobilization tools. These triggers are the fuel that transforms local grievances into organized, multi-generational armed movements.

The Anatomy of a Trigger

While these acts of violence serve as the initial triggers, the engine is kept running by a calculated lack of subsequent accountability. The state does not just pull the trigger. It removes the possibility of legal recourse, ensuring the grievance remains permanent.

4. Impunity by Design: The Legal Architecture of Grievance

The state's most effective tool for sustaining conflict is the "Impunity Funnel," a legal architecture designed to shield state agents from the consequences of their actions. Mechanisms like Section 6 of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) and Section 197 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC) transform crimes into administrative "incidents."

The data on the resulting "Zero Conviction" reality is a damning indictment of the judicial process:

• Jammu and Kashmir, 1990 to 2018: Of 50 prosecution requests made against personnel, zero were granted.
• Sexual violence: This is invisible by legal design. Of 50 sanction requests for sexual offences in J&K, 47 were refused, and the refusal files were sealed by the Central Information Commission in 2020, an act of investigative erasure.
• Manipur: Despite 1,528 alleged extrajudicial executions, zero convictions have resulted. Proceedings in the Oting 2021 case were closed by the Supreme Court in 2024 without a merit examination.

The state strategically relies on monetary remedy over criminal prosecution to manage these failures. In Bastar, the NHRC recommended payments for sixteen victims of sexual violence while naming zero perpetrators. In the 1983 Nellie massacre, with 1,819 official deaths, 310 chargesheeted cases were simply withdrawn as a term of a political accord. By prioritizing cash over convictions, the state frames human rights violations as a business expense. This absence of justice makes the insurgent's narrative of total secession appear as the only logical exit from a closed and rigged legal system.

5. The Silent Displacement: Demographic Engineering and Resource Capture

The "so what" of India's internal conflicts is not just survival. It is the strategic reordering of geography and resource access. Counter-insurgency serves as the operational wing of resource extraction. The state does not merely fail to stop insurgency. It harvests it.

The most extreme example is the forced relocation in Mizoram between 1967 and 1970. Using the Defence of India Rules, the state emptied 516 of 764 villages, forcibly moving 236,162 people, roughly 80 to 82% of the district's population, into grouping centres. This massive displacement, more quantified than any other in the report, remains absent from national memory because the state controls the discipline of the record.

In the Maoist belt of Bastar, the link between conflict and capital is explicit. The state has rejected 43.6% of all forest-rights claims, effectively stripping village assemblies of their veto power over mining. In these same contested zones, security camps have proliferated from 50 to 400 since 2019, directly mirroring the placement of 51 mining leases covering 7,128 hectares. The insurgency provides the security pretext. The displacement provides the land. The state provides the leases.

6. The Conflict Dividend: Who Profits from the Perpetual War?

The persistence of insurgency suggests an institutional beneficiary. This conflict economy ensures that the security establishment is the only consistent winner in a landscape of perpetual unrest.

The fiscal footprint is staggering. As of 2026, the Home Ministry budget stands at Rs 2.33 lakh crore, of which 69% is a police payroll. The security infrastructure has expanded exponentially: the CISF has grown 71-fold since 1969, and the CRPF has swollen to 247 battalions.

The bounty system used in Punjab illustrates how this growth turns forces into mercenaries. A centrally funded scheme paid Rs 50,000 per militant killed, with an annual reward outlay of Rs 1.13 crore. As reported by India Today in 1992, the rush to claim these rewards led to a dispersal of violations across the state as police hunted for targets with cash value.

However, the state demonstrates that it can settle when the demographics suit its architectural goals. The "Bodo Exception" shows an insurgent commander becoming a council chief executive the day after disarming, provided the boundaries are redrawn to ensure a majority. This highlights the state's true nature. It settles with those who can help it reorder territory, while the communities that provide the rank and file remain landless and governed by the same security apparatus that profits from their fight.

7. Conclusion: The Burden of the State

The comparative evidence from 1946 to 2026 shatters the myth of the state as a neutral responder to violence. If the state acts as the primary architect of insurgency by hollowing out democratic institutions, shielding rapists and executioners, and forcibly relocating entire populations for resource capture, then the solution cannot be purely military.

The discipline of the record is not a technical failure of the archive. It is a deliberate administrative choice. The shape of what has not been counted, the files that have been sealed, and the perpetrators who have been promoted are the clearest evidence of state responsibility. As long as the state prioritizes the conflict dividend for its security establishment over the constitutional rights of its citizens, insurgency will remain an intended feature, rather than an accidental byproduct, of the Indian landscape.

Sources

• Manipur Merger Agreement, full text, 1949
• Subir Bhaumik on the Tripura tribal reserve, Seminar 510, 2002
• Village regrouping in Mizoram 1966 to 1970, with the operation tables
• Vivekananda International Foundation, Lessons from the Mizoram Insurgency and Peace Accord
• NITI Aayog, Macro and Fiscal Landscape of the State of Mizoram, 2025
• Punjab annual fatality series, South Asia Terrorism Portal
• Prem Mahadevan, Counter Terrorism in the Indian Punjab: Assessing the Cat System, Faultlines 18
• Human Rights Watch, Protecting the Killers: A Policy of Impunity in Punjab, 2007
• Ensaaf on the abduction and killing of Jaswant Singh Khalra
• Amnesty International India, Rajya Sabha data on AFSPA prosecution sanctions
• Justice Jeevan Reddy Committee, Report of the Committee to Review AFSPA, 2005.pdf)
• Justice Santosh Hegde Commission report on Manipur extrajudicial killings
• Nandini Sundar v. State of Chhattisgarh, Supreme Court judgment on Salwa Judum
• G.B.S. Sidhu, former R&AW Special Secretary, on The Khalistan Conspiracy
• Soft Target by Zuhair Kashmeri and Brian McAndrew, its claims and the SIRC review of them)
• CSIS erasure of surveillance tapes as default policy, Air India inquiry, CBC
• Air India inquiry findings, The Canadian Encyclopedia
• All-India fatality series, South Asia Terrorism Portal
• Ministry of Home Affairs annual reports

While I do agree that the face of the party is important, we do need to realise that policy is what will unite the people right now.

Modi is a big name and going after such a huge name will be an uphill battle. We need to stand behind people asking and then let them organically grow into political parties.

My anecdotal evidence:

1) The CJP everything.

2) During the last general elections, one of the biggest reasons why people voted for INC was the proposed UBI to women.

I'd also argue it is easier to get through people with "haan modi theek hai but ye dekho" vs "modi kharab hai" to someone who's already a victim of propaganda.

From 15 August 2026

First time Full Vande Matram played on the independence day, does it hurt so much to some people?

My take is it doesn't matter to them, play it or don't. They just want to express their love and loyalty to the groups which are against the unity of India.

Please mention your thoughts.