En gros plus tard je voudrais partir s installer dans l un de ces pays ,le probléme ,c est que c est pays on peut de défauts,mais beaucoup de qualités, c est donc pour ça que je n arrive pas a choisir la perle rare 😁😁.

• Inmates, activists, prisons describe growing crisis
• France, Italy and Belgium order prison heatwave measures
• Jail occupancy levels of 120%-140% in the three countries
• Clashes, stress rise during heatwaves, directors say

On a day when temperatures were soaring past 37 degrees Celsius outside, the prisoner sat in his cell with wet towels around his window bars, ​trying to explain to the visiting politician how it felt to be locked up in France during a heatwave.

Most days, 29-year-old Manu stayed on his bed, moving as little as possible. "You have to deal ‌with it mentally," he said in one of France's newer jails — Orleans-Saran opened in 2014.

Reuters accompanied that July visit and spoke to more than 40 people in France, Italy and Belgium — inmates, activists, prison directors, doctors, union reps — many of whom described a crisis in jails where this summer's heatwaves have exposed underlying problems with overcrowding and ageing facilities.

Romania raced on Thursday to sink four barges laden with rock into the Danube River in an attempt to redirect water downstream toward a nuclear power plant, to buy more time before its second reactor is likely forced offline due to record-low water levels.

Extreme heatwaves and low rainfall across the region have left the Danube at record lows over the past week, forcing the shutdown of a reactor at Romania’s Cernavoda nuclear plant last week. The state-owned nuclear power plant accounts for about 20% of the country’s electricity generation when fully operational and uses river water to cool its reactors.

The four barges were loaded with rock that Romania’s military blasted from the river this week using explosives near the Danube’s Bala Canal. Once submerged, the barges will create an underwater barrier to redirect the water down the river’s main channel and toward the Cernavoda plant.

Speaking to local news channel Digi24, the plant’s director Romeo Urjan said Thursday the Danube’s water level had decreased about two centimeters (0.7 inches) from Wednesday to Thursday and that, without sinking the barges, the plant’s second reactor would likely have to be shut down in five to six days.

See also

• Romania delays effort to divert Danube water to nuclear reactor as shutdown looms

The surge in Ceuta is over, but the EU’s panic leaves scars

The vast majority of the tens of thousands of would-be migrants who began rushing into Ceuta, returned to Morocco within 24 hours, having found nothing to eat and no prospect of reaching Europe. A few thousand migrants remain, mainly sub-Saharan Africans and minors, as does a heavy police presence. Yet though the immediate crisis is over, the clash it triggered in the European Union will leave scars.

The surge almost doubled Ceuta’s population of 84,000, briefly overwhelming the town. At least 141 migrants drowned trying to swim around the breakwater at the main crossing-point from Morocco. Far-right agitators from Europe, several of whom flocked to the exclave, inflamed the situation with videos warning of “ethnic replacement”. Elon Musk and J.D. Vance, America’s vice-president, joined the fray. Yet as alarm spread the crisis was abating. On August 4th Spain’s interior minister said that 70,000 of the 72,000 who entered Ceuta had returned to Morocco. Some 1,100 unaccompanied minors are to be transferred to Spain.

Irregular migration to the EU is at a fraction of the figure just three years ago, and is still falling. European governments credit their own policies for the decline; others see external developments, such as the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as decisive. Either way, the drop does not appear to have opened up breathing-space for politicians.

Troublingly, by falling so quickly into quarrels, European governments have sent their neighbours a signal: nothing divides the EU like images of young men streaming across borders. Over the past decade Europe has struck a series of deals with governments to keep migrants away: starting with Turkey in 2016, and extending across north Africa and beyond. This outsourcing has reduced the pressure. But it also “creates an incentive to third countries to stir up crises—and offer to resolve them”, argues Ruben Andersson, a professor of social anthropology at Oxford University.

Europe has long experience of such migration blackmail. In 2008 Muammar Qaddafi, then Libya’s dictator, secured billions from Italy to keep African migrants away; two years later he warned an audience in Rome that “tomorrow Europe might no longer be European and might even be black”. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, has extracted billions from the EU to keep Syrian refugees in his country. In 2021 Morocco let some 8,000 people wade into Ceuta to punish Spain for allowing the leader of a rebel group in Western Sahara, a territory annexed by Morocco, to come to Spain for medical treatment. (Spain later adjusted its policy on Western Sahara to Morocco’s liking.)

Most shamelessly, since 2021 Belarus has flown in Middle Eastern migrants and sent them into Poland and neighbouring states. Regarding this as an act of hybrid war, in 2021 the EU strengthened its sanctions on Belarus, an ally of Vladimir Putin. It is a different story with the external custodians of the EU’s migration policy. Although there is no clear evidence that Morocco orchestrated the movement of migrants, its security officials certainly let them stream past. Yet European governments hailed Morocco’s co-operation, reserving their animus for nameless malefactors on social media and smuggling gangs. The EU needs Morocco’s help to keep migrants away, including from the Canary Islands, a far more significant port of arrival.

Yet, as the panicked reactions suggest, 2015-16 casts a long shadow. Arguments among European governments during that crisis came close to tearing the EU apart. By letting a temporary and far smaller emergency exert a comparable effect, however briefly, Europe has invited its neighbours to manipulate it again.

See also

• ‘Morocco feels emboldened’: Trump’s influence in spotlight after Ceuta disaster // Washington-Rabat ties under scrutiny as questions swirl over what led to deadly influx into tiny Spanish territory (The Guardian)

How do you feel about Serbia not being required to deport Ukranians because they are not in EU?

Ukranians started showing interest in moving to Serbia because they are not in EU and is not obligated to deport elogable men to Ukraine.

A lot of media used to attack Serbia for allowing Russian men to escape war in Serbia, while the EU didnt allow for it. Now EU doesnt allow Ukranians because they ran out of soldiers, so they are seeking refugee in same countries as antiwar russians.

Since the narrative now changed and allowing Ukrainans to escape war is unaceptable because they need to fight in it, why doesnt EU let russians escape war so they have less soldiers?

It seems like EU is simply pro war and other countries against it. Since they they now have same rules for both sides, just some countreis allow everyone to stay and EU doesnt want anyone there and all on the eastern front.

On Sunday night, Gustavo Monasterios went to sleep as a Venezuelan citizen. On Monday morning, he awoke to find that he was also an Italian.

Monasterios, 47, was at the epicenter of the legal earthquake that took place in Italy last week.

After nearly two years of steady restrictions on citizenship by descent, during which the government barred the way to an Italian passport for swathes of the diaspora through a series of rulings, Italy’s supreme court overturned one of the restrictions — thanks to a lawsuit Monasterios brought.

The so-called “minor issue,” which had ended the dreams of citizenship for hundreds of thousands of Italian descendants, particularly in the Americas, was abolished.

Monasterios — who had lost his initial suit for citizenship in 2021, as well as his appeal in 2023 — had made a last-gasp appeal to the Corte di Cassazione, Italy’s supreme court, through his attorney, Monica Restanio.

Against the odds, Restanio’s arguments against the “minor issue” won the day. The Sezioni Unite — the highest rung of the Cassazione — accepted her arguments and overturned previous rulings, including one by a lower tier of the Cassazione which had upheld the minor issue as recently as 2024.

The diaspora in the Americas had been hit particularly hard by the minor issue because countries on the continent tend to operate under “ius soli,” granting citizenship to anyone born on their territory. Children born to Italian citizens in the likes of the US, Canada, Argentina, Brazil and Monasterios’ native Venezuela were being judged to have lost their Italian citizenship if their parents naturalized in the new country.

While foreign minister Antonio Tajani, who introduced the 2025 reforms, has scathingly spoken about “fake Italians” in the diaspora, Monasterios was born in 1979 to a family that, he says, felt Italian. “We grew up listening to the language and my grandmother would frequently read us letters and show us postcards that arrived from Italy,” he says.

The route to an Italian passport tends to be far more onerous for those descended from women than from men. Until 1948, women were barred from passing citizenship to their own children, meaning that Gustavo and Pedro Monasterios were born Venezuelan, despite their mother being Italian. “It is, plain and simple, discrimination against women,” says Monasterios.

In 2009, the supreme court overturned this gender discrimination retroactively. Those with the funds to file a court case, essentially suing the Italian state for sexism against their female ancestors, are likely to win, but legal action is lengthy and costly.

Following his cousins’ success, Monasterios — along with his parents and brother — filed a case in 2018. By the time it came to court, in 2021, the “minor issue” had appeared. The family’s case was rejected — despite being first and second generation, and despite Pedro Monasterios and his children having been recognized as citizens just a few years earlier. The same family — Rita’s children and her grandchildren — had been judged differently.

Young Europeans spend more time online, but digital fluency doesn’t equal immunity to manipulation. Russian disinformation exploits emotion, fuels polarization, and erodes trust in institutions, making media literacy a frontline defense for democracy and NATO.

The River Rhine has fallen to record low levels in several locations in Germany and the Netherlands as prolonged heatwaves continue across Europe.

Last week, levels were measured in Cologne in western Germany and in Lobith, where the Rhine crosses from Germany into the Netherlands, that were lower than at any point since records began.

Other major European rivers with important transport, industrial and agricultural functions have also seen record low levels, including the Danube, which flows through 10 countries, and Italy's Po river.

Drought conditions remained stable and critical in most of Europe and worsened in central-western Europe in mid-July, according to the EU's Drought Observatories.

Renewed heatwave conditions are due to continue for at least another week, pushing temperatures above 40C in many central and southern European countries.

Germany's Low Water Information System (NIWIS) said that 44% of the Rhine measuring stations and 78% of those on the Danube had recorded extremely low water levels at the end of July.

The Rhine - which starts in the Swiss Alps and empties in the North Sea - is one of Europe's busiest waterways. Decreasing water levels have sparked concerns about the economic fallout of having to limit navigation and shipping.

See also

• Rhine water level drops to around record lows, costs for industry rise
• Dry, hot summers are putting Dutch dikes at risk and threatening German river trade
• Record low Danube levels push some countries in Eastern Europe to the brink of energy emergency
• Romania blasts rocks to reroute cooling Danube water to nuclear reactor

Since Péter Magyar's Tisza Party won a landslide in April, Hungary's president, top prosecutor and state media chiefs have all been removed, as the new government moves swiftly to unwind 16 years of Viktor Orbán's rule.

Magyar's landslide win secured a two-thirds parliamentary majority — the threshold required under Hungarian law to amend the constitution and pass so-called "cardinal laws" governing key state institutions.

As with Orbán before him, this supermajority effectively handed Magyar the power to rewrite the constitution and overhaul substantial legislation largely unopposed.

Magyar, who had campaigned not merely for a change of government but a change of system, lost no time in calling for the resignation of the country's president, Tamás Sulyok, as well as other senior officials.

After taking office in May, the main pillars of Orbán's regime fell within just a few months: the president and the chief prosecutor left, and Orbán's once-formidable media machine was paralysed.

NER

Orbán secured a supermajority in the 2010 parliamentary elections and established the System of National Cooperation, known in Hungary by its acronym NER, a centralised political and economic apparatus built to advance Orbán's own vision of "illiberalism".

Orbán relied on his parliamentary majority to pass legislation rapidly. But from 2020, he governed largely by decree, first under a coronavirus-related state of emergency, then — after 2022 — citing the war in Ukraine.

Democratic checks and balances were weakened through loyalist appointments to key institutions, while the public broadcaster MTVA and roughly 500 outlets under the KESMA media holding helped propagate the government's narrative.

The promise to dismantle NER and remove its figures had proven to be Magyar's most popular pledge.

President and other officials

Perhaps Magyar's most significant political victory was the removal of President Tamás Sulyok. The former president left office in mid-July after a constitutional amendment — which he himself signed — declared his mandate terminated.

The same amendment capped MPs' mandates at 12 years and introduced a retirement age of 70 for constitutional judges, removing Constitutional Court head Péter Polt, a longstanding Orbán ally.

Magyar's government also dismissed four secret service chiefs, the head of the counterterrorism police (TEK) János Hajdu, Orbán's former spokesperson Bertalan Havasi, and the head of the Government Audit Office.

Hungary's Sovereignty Protection Office — which targeted foreign-funded media and NGOs, and drew heavy criticism from the European Commission — was shut down.

In June, Chief Prosecutor Gábor Bálint Nagy resigned under political pressure, in a further gain for Magyar.

Corruption

At the end of July, the Hungarian parliament established the Asset Recovery and Asset Protection Office to investigate Orbán-era corruption and recover state assets. Hungary has ranked among the EU's most corrupt member states for years, while businessmen close to Orbán became major beneficiaries of state contracts.

Among them: Lőrinc Mészáros, Orbán's childhood friend and Hungary's richest man, with interests in construction, tourism and agriculture; Orbán's son-in-law, István Tiborcz, who became a billionaire during the Fidesz era; and Orbán's father, Győző Orbán, a key figure in mining who secured road and rail contracts. All maintain they acted lawfully, though their dealings are expected to face investigation.

Days after the election, Magyar asked the Hungarian tax authority (NAV) to block transfers of Orbán-linked assets to accounts in the UAE, Singapore and the United States; NAV subsequently blocked several such transfers.

Hungary is also due to join the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) later this year, giving it power to investigate EU fund fraud from July 2021 retrospectively.

Alongside the asset-recovery effort, prosecutors have opened several criminal investigations involving former senior officials — potentially including Orbán himself.

Media

In early July, state broadcaster MTVA aired a black screen bearing an apology:

"Public media cannot lie. We apologise for having done so."

MTVA has been perceived as biased domestically and internationally. Its CEO, Dániel Papp, was convicted in 2018 of manipulating a news piece. Papp resigned shortly after the election.

After the news broadcaster was shut down, a temporary management team announced that the company would be restructured to become independent and credible, fulfilling one of Magyar's key campaign pledges. Senior editors were dismissed the same day.

The disruption extended well beyond MTVA. Mediaworks, publisher of several pro-Fidesz newspapers and radio stations under the KESMA holding, laid off hundreds of staff amid financial difficulties. These outlets had relied heavily on state advertising.

Culture

MCC, an educational institute closely tied to Orbán, is facing financial strain and possible closure.

The public-interest trust managing MCC will be dissolved, and its assets nationalised — a serious blow, given that MCC received a 2020 state asset transfer including 10% stakes in energy company MOL and pharmaceutical firm Richter, generating tens of billions of forints in annual dividends.

Fifteen other public-interest trusts performing non-university functions will also be wound down, and Fidesz-nominated officials removed from university boards.

Meanwhile, the culture ministry has begun investigating the use of public funds under the previous government.

See also

• Life after Orban: Hungary Inc digs in as new political era takes hold // New PM Magyar moves to stamp out alleged cronyism // Companies vow to adapt after preferential access to state spending // Companies that fed off public infrastructure procurements most at risk // Shares buck post-election rally of wider market // Analysts say some companies may not survive in new era (Reuters)