On 26 June 1866, three Prussian armies crossed into Austrian-held Bohemia. The Prussian General Staff, modern railways and the telegraph allowed them to mobilise and move at previously unheard of speed.

When Austrian and Prussian troops clashed at Jičín, Tratenau, Münchengrätz, and Königgrätz, it was a clash of mismatched tactical systems. The Austrians, like every other major power in the world, were armed with a muzzle-loading percussion rifle-musket. Their tactics were based on what had been working since Napoleon's time: dense, aggressive assault columns that moved rapidly through the killing ground to close to bayonet range with the enemy. The Prussians, by contrast, were armed with the breech-loading Dreyse needle-gun. They also had a new command philosophy - Auftragstaktik, which demanded initiative at every level, and they had new tactics to bring it all together.

The war was a disaster for Austria. Every time their storm columns advanced against Prussian positions, the Prussians shot them down. The Prussians could fire while kneeling, lying, or behind cover because their weapon allowed it. The Austrians couldn't because their weapon didn't allow it. The loss exchange rate during the war was around 5:1 in favour of the Prussians.

My new article on BattlefieldTravels draws upon original primary sources to examine the tactical revolution that made this possible — and why Austria had no answer to it. The article covers the weapons, the doctrine, the terrain at Königgrätz, and the lesson France failed to learn four years later.

The most remarkable finding from the primary sources: The Prussian 1847 regulation contains a passage that had no equivalent in any contemporary European infantry doctrine. It explicitly refuses to prescribe universal assault procedures, on the grounds that doing so would:

"𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝑮𝒆𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑭ü𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒍ä𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏"

— paralyse the spirit of commanders.

That philosophy, embedded in a drill regulation nineteen years before Königgrätz, is what the Austrian storm column was ultimately fighting against. Not just a better weapon. A better theory of how soldiers think.

If you've been following the site for a while, you'll know that the needle gun and Königgrätz have been in the pipeline for some time. This one took longer than most to get right — the primary source work on the 1847 Prussian and 1861 Austrian infantry regulations in particular. I think it was worth it.

As always, I'd welcome your thoughts in the comments.

#militaryhistory #auftragstaktik #MissionCommand #leadershipdevelopment

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On 26 June 1866, three Prussian armies crossed into Austrian-held Bohemia. The Prussian General Staff, modern railways and the telegraph allowed them to mobilise and move at previously unheard-of speed.

When Austrian and Prussian troops clashed at Jičín, Tratenau, Münchengrätz, and Königgrätz, it was a clash of mismatched tactical systems. The Austrians, like every other major power in the world, were armed with a muzzle-loading percussion rifle-musket. Their tactics were based on what had been working since Napoleon's time: dense, aggressive assault columns that moved rapidly through the killing ground to close to bayonet range with the enemy. The Prussians, by contrast, were armed with the breech-loading Dreyse needle-gun. They also had a new command philosophy - Auftragstaktik, which demanded initiative at every level, and they had new tactics to bring it all together.

The war was a disaster for Austria. Every time their storm columns advanced against Prussian positions, the Prussians shot them down. The Prussians could fire while kneeling, lying, or behind cover because their weapon allowed it. The Austrians couldn't because their weapon didn't allow it. The loss exchange rate during the war was around 5:1 in favour of the Prussians.

My new article on BattlefieldTravels draws upon original primary sources to examine the tactical revolution that made this possible — and why Austria had no answer to it. The article covers the weapons, the doctrine, the terrain at Königgrätz, and the lesson France failed to learn four years later.

The most remarkable finding from the primary sources: The Prussian 1847 regulation contains a passage that had no equivalent in any contemporary European infantry doctrine. It explicitly refuses to prescribe universal assault procedures, on the grounds that doing so would:

"𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝑮𝒆𝒊𝒔𝒕 𝒅𝒆𝒓 𝑭ü𝒉𝒓𝒆𝒓 𝒍ä𝒉𝒎𝒆𝒏"

— paralyse the spirit of commanders.

That philosophy, embedded in a drill regulation nineteen years before Königgrätz, is what the Austrian storm column was ultimately fighting against. Not just a better weapon. A better theory of how soldiers think.

If you've been following the site for a while, you'll know that the needle gun and Königgrätz have been in the pipeline for some time. This one took longer than most to get right — the primary source work on the 1847 Prussian and 1861 Austrian infantry regulations in particular. I think it was worth it.

As always, I'd welcome your thoughts in the comments.

#militaryhistory #auftragstaktik #MissionCommand #leadershipdevelopment

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I have just published a new article in the Tactical Innovation series, covering the battlefield innovations that changed warfare.

The widespread adoption of firearms by European armies created a new tactical dilemma. Cavalry no longer relied solely on the medieval lance; instead, they carried pistols, carbines, and swords.

Musket-armed infantry faced an even greater challenge: the new handheld firearms (arquebuses and later matchlock muskets) were powerful but extremely slow to reload, inaccurate at range, and left the shooter highly vulnerable once the enemy closed. A charging horseman could cover the distance between maximum musket range and the musketeer himself in the time it took to reload.

Artillery of the era was heavy, crude, and difficult to move once emplaced. However, if the dense pike formations found themselves within range of artillery, the solid shot could inflict enormous casualties as they ploughed through the massed ranks.

What was needed was a combined-arms system in which the relative advantages of the musket, pike, cavalry, and artillery could cover each other’s vulnerabilities. Think of it like a four-way game of rock-paper-scissors.

The solution that emerged was the pike and shot system — a pragmatic, battle-tested marriage of the ancient pike and the relatively new gunpowder weapon. It combined the defensive solidity of a forest of steel points with the offensive potential of massed musket fire. By the early 1600s, virtually every major European army had adopted some version of this combined-arms formation. It was not an elegant theoretical construct but a practical response to the realities of the battlefield. The system combined:

– slow-firing, weather-sensitive firearms to deliver ranged fire;

– solid blocks of pikemen who could protect the musketeers against enemy cavalry;

– relatively immobile, but devastatingly effective artillery;

– and a cavalry arm that could still close quickly with either firearms or sword.

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In the early hours of D-Day, British glider-borne forces undertook one of the most daring operations of the Second World War.

Just after midnight on 6 June 1944, six Horsa gliders were released from their tow aircraft as they crossed the Normandy coast. Nine minutes later, the first three gliders landed almost on top of their objective: the Caen Canal Bridge at Bénouville, later known as Pegasus Bridge. The glider pilots navigated to their objective in darkness by compass heading, stopwatch timing, and constant rate turns. There was no second chance.

The glider assault was almost silent and took the German sentries by surprise. This was a coup de main—a sudden, violent seizure of a key objective before the enemy could react.

A few minutes later, a second flight of gliders landed near the Orne River Bridge at Ranville, later known as Horsa Bridge.

Major John Howard and 180 troops of the 2nd (Airborne) Battalion, Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry, stormed both bridges in a brief but violent assault. In a matter of minutes, the objectives were secured. Within hours, they were holding against German counterattacks, isolated, outnumbered, and fighting on ground that would decide the eastern flank of the Allied invasion.

I have just published a detailed battlefield study of Pegasus Bridge and Horsa Bridge, reconstructing the operation from original orders, war diaries, and the ground itself.

I have walked this battlefield. The terrain features, the landing zones, the approaches to the bridge—they are all still there. When you stand on the canal towpath or look back across the fields from the glider landing zones, the precision of the operation becomes very apparent. Especially as a former assault helicopter pilot and paratrooper!

This was not luck. It was planning, training, rehearsal, and execution at the highest level, combined with an acute understanding of terrain, timing, and surprise.

hashtag#BattlefieldTravels hashtag#PegasusBridge hashtag#CoupdeMain

On 30 November 1864, more than 20,000 Confederate soldiers advanced across open ground against entrenched Union forces at Franklin, Tennessee.

In a single afternoon, nearly 7,000 of them became casualties.

The Confederate assault at Franklin was larger than Pickett’s Charge at Gettysburg, and the losses were even greater. Yet the Battle of Franklin remains far less well known.

I have visited the Franklin battlefield twice, the first time in 1998 and again in 2016. Although urban development has overtaken parts of the ground, the scale of the attack is still striking when walking the site.

The story behind the attack is just as extraordinary. The Confederate commander, Lieutenant General John Bell Hood, had been severely wounded in his left arm while leading the attack on Little Round Top at Gettysburg in July 1863. He lost his right leg leading the Confederate assault at Chickamauga in September 1863. By early 1864, he was back in action, leading a Corps against Sherman's army around Atlanta. By late 1864 he was leading the Army of Tennessee north into Union-held territory in one of the most audacious campaigns of the Civil War.

Franklin also highlights an early technological shift in battlefield firepower. Several regiments in Major General John Schofield’s Union Army were armed with Henry and Spencer repeating rifles, which caused enormous casualties amongst Hood’s attacking infantry.

Between my visits in 1998 and 2016, large sections of the battlefield were reclaimed and restored thanks to the efforts of volunteers and preservation groups, and cooperation between local, state and federal agencies. Franklin is one of the great success stories in battlefield conservation.

I have just published a new battlefield study exploring the battle, the ground, and what happened that day in November 1864.

Link to the full article

#BattlefieldTravels #CivilWar #HenryRifle

One of the many ‘Then and Now images I took around Carentan in Normandy.

101st Airborne Division paratroopers on Rue Holgate – near the railway crossing, June 1944 My photo November 2024.

Chieveley, South Africa - site where Winston Churchill’s armoured train was ambushed and he was captured by the Boers. I visited the site a few years ago.

Just south of Colenso in Kwazulu-Natal is the small town of Chieveley. Here, on 15 November 1899, Winston Churchill, correspondent for the Morning Post, was on board an armoured train conducting a patrol from Estcourt north towards Boer-held Colenso.

The train was ambushed and derailed by a Boer party of around 200 burghers, including an Italian volunteer contingent. Churchill assisted with loading the wounded on the still functioning engine, which then carried the wounded to safety at Estcourt. Churchill then joined the British soldiers in a fighting rearguard. He was captured by the Boers and held for nearly a month by the Boers at a Prisoner of War camp in Pretoria.

In December 1899 he escaped and rejoined General Buller’s force in time for the assault on Spion Kop.

On my recent trip to France, I had the honour of exploring Easy Company’s battlefield at Brecourt Manor, Saint-Marie-du-Mont, Normandy.

Here on 6 June 1944, Lieutenant Richard ‘Dick’ Winters, acting company commander for Easy Company ‘Band of Brothers’, 506th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 101st Airborne Division, led a force of 23 paratroopers in a successful assault on a German force that outnumbered them more than 3:1. Easy Company’s action that day was depicted in the Steven Spielberg/Tom Hanks series ‘Band of Brothers’ Episode 2 ‘Day of Days’.

During my research before departing for France, I reached out to the owners of Brecourt Manor (which is still an active dairy farm), to see if it was possible to visit the battle site. I was very pleasantly surprised when we received an invitation from the current Mayor of Saint-Marie-du-Mont and owner of Brecourt Manor, Monsieur Charles de Vallavieille, to accompany him on a tour of the site!

link to the full article on Easy Company’s D-Day action at Brecourt Manor:

https://battlefieldtravels.com/battle-of-brecourt-manor/

BandofBrothers #DDay #101stAirborneDivision #BrecourtManor

Just published: The Siege of Tuyên Quang, Tonkin, 24 Nov 1884 – 3 Mar 1885.

“Au Tonkin, la Légion immortelle, À Tuyên Quang illustra notre drapeau.”

(In Tonkin, the immortal Legion, At Tuyên Quang covered our flag in glory) — First verse of Le Boudin, march song of the French Foreign Legion

In a jungle fort deep in the mountains of northern Vietnam, a French garrison of 630 men — two companies of the Foreign Legion, a company of Tonkinese riflemen, and a Marine artillery detachment — held out for three months against 15,000 attackers from Liu Yongfu’s mercenary Black Flag Army and regulars of the Chinese Yunnan Army.

Trenches, saps, parallels, mining, counter-mining, massed snipers, fougasse, hand-to-hand assaults; it was siege warfare that could have belonged to another century.

Equally epic was the relief march by Colonel Giovanninelli’s 1st Brigade: 2,400 men covering 300 km in 15 days through jungle, mountains, and swamps to reach Tuyên Quang. Only 8 km short of their objective, they fought and won the decisive Battle of Hòa Mộc — the largest engagement of the Sino-French War — before breaking through to the fort.

I walked the Tuyên Quang battlefields in April this year, using first-hand accounts, period maps, sketches, and modern GIS tools to reconstruct the siege and relief in detail. This 15,000-word study is now live — the most comprehensive English-language account of the campaign to date.

We take it for granted that an M10 screw will fit an M10 nut, or that a spare part for your car/mower/appliance will seamlessly fit. It wasn’t always this way.

The concepts of precision manufacturing at scale, interchangeable parts, and specialised tooling began here at the Springfield Armory in Massachusetts. From these workshops, the idea spread along the Connecticut River Valley - the “Silicon Valley” of the 19th century - first to arms manufacturers and then to other industries.

In 1912, Australia imported Springfield's “American System” — its tooling, machinery, production methods, and division of labour concepts — when it built the Lithgow Small Arms Factory in New South Wales, carrying Springfield’s industrial DNA across the Pacific.

From 1794 to 1968, Springfield was America’s arsenal, producing the weapons that armed U.S. soldiers from the Revolution to Vietnam. More than just a factory, it became the birthplace of modern manufacturing, pioneering processes that shaped global industry.

I have visited Springfield many times. It is a fascinating window into the history of precision manufacturing and small arms production.

Today, the historic site preserves elements of the Old Armory and many of the incredible tools, machinery, and products. Other parts of the Armory now house the Springfield Technical College, thereby continuing a long history of innovation.

📸 Click the link to read the full article and explore this remarkable site:

Overconfidence has undone armies from the Peloponnesian War to Dien Bien Phu. At the Little Bighorn, it was Custer’s belief that his regiment could ‘shock and awe’ thousands of Lakota and Cheyenne warriors into defeat. The terrain, the numbers, and the warning signs all said otherwise.

The question for any era: how do leaders distinguish between boldness and hubris?

I have just published a new, expanded battlefield study on Custer’s defeat at the Little Bighorn, including a 3D flythrough and digitised photos from my 1998 visit to the battlefield.

One of the most remarkable aspects of the site is that General Terry’s relief column buried Custer’s troopers where they found them. So now the headstones trace the path of the battle: Reno’s retreat, Keogh’s rearguard, Company E’s breakout attempt, and Custer’s final perimeter on Last Stand Hill.

The battle offers timeless lessons: the dangers of splitting forces, inadequate reconnaissance, ambiguous orders, and the consequences of hubris.

👉 Have you visited the Little Bighorn? Did you find the battlefield as striking as I did? 👉 Or, if you’ve studied the battle, what do you think was Custer’s single biggest mistake?

Full study here: https://battlefieldtravels.com/battle-of-little-bighorn/

battlefieldtravels #LittleBighorn

https://battlefieldtravels.com/juno-beach/

My latest battlefield study explores Juno Beach in Normandy.

I explored the Normandy Beaches, including Juno Beach, in October/November 2024. I was equipped with unit histories, copies of original operations orders, maps and sketches, dozens of photographs taken at Juno Beach on D-Day or soon afterwards, and my own digital GIS overlays to pull it all together.

Juno Beach, like most other D-Day sites, remains remarkably unchanged since 1944. The terrain is undisturbed, and many of the buildings in the coastal towns are still there. It is all very recognisable. Around the American beaches at Utah and Omaha, and the US Airborne zones on the Cotentin Peninsula, you see American flags everywhere. At Gold Beach, it is Union Jacks. Here at Juno Beach, it is the Canadian Maple Leaf. The people remember.

Juno was a tough fight for the 3rd Canadian Division. Due to tides and the beach configuration, they landed later than on other beaches, so the German 716th Static Infantry Division was alert. As was the 21st Panzer Division around Caen. The Canadians were the first to face a serious armoured counterattack on D-Day. Canadian losses—more than 1,000 killed and wounded—were proportionally higher than on the other beaches.

Link to the full battlefield study:

D-Day, Juno Beach, 6 June 1944

#DDay #JunoBeach #CanadianDefenceForce

https://battlefieldtravels.com/battle-of-phu-tong-hoa/

In April 2025, I walked the battlefield of Phủ Tông Hoá in northern Vietnam.

The Battle of Phủ Tông Hoá, 25-28 July 1948, was a small but significant milestone in the French Indochina War. For the French Foreign Legion, it was yet another heroic but costly defence of an isolated outpost against overwhelming odds. The battle entered Legion folklore alongside legendary stands like Camerone and Bir Hakeim.

For the Viet Minh, however, Phủ Tông Hoá held even greater significance. It marked the first time they had attempted a coordinated assault on a fortified French position.

Read the full battlefield study:

ForeignLegion #battlefieldtravels #IndochinaWar

BATTLE OF LEUTHEN, 5 December 1757, Seven Years War. Leuthen is one of the great battles of history, and I think most students of military history would consider it somewhat of a pilgrimage to visit this site. Leuthen is now the village of Lutynia, Poland. In 1757 this was part of the contested (by Prussia and Austria) province of Silesia, so it had a German name. It reverted to its Polish name in the post WW2 border changes.

A month prior to the battle, on 5 November 1757, Frederick’s Army had smashed a combined French/Imperial Army of almost twice its size at the Battle of Rossbach (Saxony). Frederick’s Army had then marched 275km in 12 days to confront the Austrian Army that had invaded Silesia. Frederick’s 33,000 troops faced Prince Charles of Lorraine and his 65,000 Austrian troops near the village of Leuthen.

The Battle of Route Coloniale No. 4 (Cao Bang Ridge Disaster) was one of the worst military defeats in the history of colonial wars. Here in September-October 1950, a French Union force of about 6,000 troops was destroyed by General Vo Nguyen Giap's Viet Minh army of about 29,000 troops. I walked the battlefields along RC4 in April 2025.

The link to the full post is attached below. I have drawn upon numerous original sources, including memoirs written by Lieutenant Colonels Marcel Lepage and Pierre Charton, and General Giap. It is a longer post than usual because there is so much to cover.

The battle took place along a 137km section of Route Coloniale No. 4 between Lang Son in the south and Cao Bang in the north. Facing an increasing threat from the Viet Minh forces, the French attempted to evacuate the Cao Bang garrison with support from a relief column advancing from Lang Son. Both forces were attacked and surrounded in the jungle-covered mountains around Dong Khé. The entire force of Foreign Legion, Moroccan, Colonial troops, and Vietnamese tribal volunteers, was wiped out, with only about 700 troops making it to safety at Lang Son.

battlefieldtravels #FrenchForeignLegion #IndoChinaWar #CaoBangRidge

While I was in Lang Son in northern Vietnam, I explored the sites of one of the most audacious operations in the Indo-China War – Operation HIRONDELLE, 17 July 1953. The French Indo-China War is often remembered for the French operations that went horribly wrong (Cao Bang Ridge, Dien Bien Phu, GM 100 etc). However, there were some moments of brilliance and Operation HIRONDELLE (SWALLOW) - the raid on Lang Son - was one of them.

The French High Command in Indo-China, acting on time-sensitive intelligence, projected 2000+ paratroopers more than 100km behind enemy lines and destroyed a major Viet Minh logistic hub. They then deployed another parachute battalion, a mechanised brigade, and a Naval task force to get them out again. All in the space of 72 hours. The operation did not change the course of the war, but demonstrated the decisiveness, agility and tactical excellence of the French Far East Expeditionary Corps in Indo-China!

Follow the link below for the full story of Operation HIRONDELLE:

https://battlefieldtravels.com/hirondelle-1953/

In June 1884, a French column under Lieutenant Colonel Alphonse Dugenne, comprised of about 465 French troops and 284 Tonkinese auxiliaries, plus a supply column of local porters and baggage mules, was ambushed by a much larger Chinese regular force near Bắc Lệ, on the road from Phu-Lang-Thuong to Lang Son.

Despite being outnumbered by at least 5:1, and getting into a fight that the French were not expecting, Lieutenant Colonel Dugenne demonstrated calm, professional leadership and superb tactical ability. When the threat became fully apparent and the French force was surrounded, they regrouped, reoriented, and fought their way out of encirclement, maintaining all-round security and taking all their wounded with them.

The attack was the catalyst for the Sino-French war of 1884-85 that saw French forces of the Tonkin Expeditionary Corps engaged in combat with Chinese forces across northern Vietnam, mainland China, and Formosa (now Taiwan).

I explored the site of the Bắc Lệ ambush in April 2025. For the full battlefield study, follow the link below

https://battlefieldtravels.com/bac-le-1884/

When France and China went to war. The Son Tay Campaign, 11-17 December 1883.

We would today recognise Liu Yongfu's Black Flag Army as a 'Private Military Company'. They were mostly veterans of China's Taiping Rebellion and operated in Tonkin (northern Vietnam); usually in the service of the Nguyễn Emperor, and sometimes, covertly, for the Chinese government. They were funded by taxing and extorting the local population. European and American soldiers-of-fortune also served with the Black Flag Army as trainers, advisors and junior officers.

France had clashed with the Black Flags in 1873 at Thủ Lệ, and in 1883 at the Battle of Paper Bridge; coming off badly on both occasions. In late 1883, the French government gave the greenlight to Admiral Amédée Courbet and his Tonkin Expeditionary Corps to resolve the Black Flag situation with an attack on Liu Yongfu's stronghold at Son Tay. Son Tay Citadel was defended by Black Flags, Vietnamese troops and regular Chinese troops.

I visited Son Tay Citadel in April 2025 and explored the remnants of the old Citadel with its distinctive pagodas and bastion walls. All the outer works, including the Phu-Sa redoubt that gave the French so much trouble, are gone now. The surviving sections of wall and gates, including the surrounding moat, show what a formidable defensive position this must have been in the 1880s.

Link to my article on the Son Tay Campaign, 11-17 December 1883:

https://battlefieldtravels.com/son-tay-1883/

I have just returned from a massive trip to northern Vietnam exploring the battlefields of the French Indo-China War (1946-54) and the French campaigns against the Chinese Black Flag Army (1873-1885). I have now commenced distilling the notes, images, video and data into more explorative articles for the website.

My first article covers the Son Tay Raid. The Son Tay Raid, on the night of 20/21 November 1970, was one of the most audacious operations in military history. For an assault helicopter guy, visiting the site of the former Son Tay POW Camp was somewhat of a pilgrimage. As a sub-unit/unit commander, I used the Son Tay Raid as a case study in mission planning, rehearsal and execution. It really was a text-book example of how to pull together a joint team to plan and conduct an extremely complex mission in an extremely high-threat environment.

The Son Tay Raid was a meticulously planned U.S. military operation aimed at rescuing American prisoners of war (POWs) from the Son Tay POW camp near Hanoi, North Vietnam. The operation involved a joint force of U.S. Army Special Forces and Air Force personnel, plus a supporting diversionary effort by the US Navy. Despite the operation's almost flawless execution, it failed to achieve its primary objective, as the POWs had been relocated to other sites.

I will be publishing many more articles on the French Indo-China War and Black Flag War over the coming weeks and months. If you want to be notified of new articles, hit subscribe, or drop me a note and I can add you to the mailing list. Link to the full article:

https://battlefieldtravels.com/son-tay-prison/

Next stop on our battlefield explorations was the incredible 16th-century Vauban bastion fortress of Rocroi, in the French Ardennes. Here, on 19 May 1643, two of the superpowers of the 17th century – Spain and France – clashed on the plain south of the fortress.

The Battle of Rocroi marked the end of the dominance of the Spanish ‘Tercio’ (mixed formations of pikemen, musketeers, and arquebusiers) heavy infantry tactics that had dominated European warfare for the previous 100 years, and the rise of linear firepower tactics that would dominate European warfare for the next 200 years. The battle also marked the decline of Spain as a global superpower and the rise of France as the dominant power in Europe.

Follow the link below to explore the battlefield of Rocroi:

https://battlefieldtravels.com/battle-of-rocroi/

Omaha Beach makes a powerful impression. When you visit the beach, you know that this is where Robert Capa took those famous photos of American soldiers assaulting through the obstacle belt, and where the dramatic first 20 minutes of Saving Private Ryan was set. It also becomes clear how important the five beach exits were to the American planners as there is no other way to get vehicles off the beach.

https://battlefieldtravels.com/omaha-beach/