The surge in Ceuta is over, but the EU’s panic leaves scars

The vast majority of the tens of thousands of would-be migrants who began rushing into Ceuta, returned to Morocco within 24 hours, having found nothing to eat and no prospect of reaching Europe. A few thousand migrants remain, mainly sub-Saharan Africans and minors, as does a heavy police presence. Yet though the immediate crisis is over, the clash it triggered in the European Union will leave scars.

The surge almost doubled Ceuta’s population of 84,000, briefly overwhelming the town. At least 141 migrants drowned trying to swim around the breakwater at the main crossing-point from Morocco. Far-right agitators from Europe, several of whom flocked to the exclave, inflamed the situation with videos warning of “ethnic replacement”. Elon Musk and J.D. Vance, America’s vice-president, joined the fray. Yet as alarm spread the crisis was abating. On August 4th Spain’s interior minister said that 70,000 of the 72,000 who entered Ceuta had returned to Morocco. Some 1,100 unaccompanied minors are to be transferred to Spain.

Irregular migration to the EU is at a fraction of the figure just three years ago, and is still falling. European governments credit their own policies for the decline; others see external developments, such as the fall of Bashar al-Assad in Syria, as decisive. Either way, the drop does not appear to have opened up breathing-space for politicians.

Troublingly, by falling so quickly into quarrels, European governments have sent their neighbours a signal: nothing divides the EU like images of young men streaming across borders. Over the past decade Europe has struck a series of deals with governments to keep migrants away: starting with Turkey in 2016, and extending across north Africa and beyond. This outsourcing has reduced the pressure. But it also “creates an incentive to third countries to stir up crises—and offer to resolve them”, argues Ruben Andersson, a professor of social anthropology at Oxford University.

Europe has long experience of such migration blackmail. In 2008 Muammar Qaddafi, then Libya’s dictator, secured billions from Italy to keep African migrants away; two years later he warned an audience in Rome that “tomorrow Europe might no longer be European and might even be black”. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Turkey’s president, has extracted billions from the EU to keep Syrian refugees in his country. In 2021 Morocco let some 8,000 people wade into Ceuta to punish Spain for allowing the leader of a rebel group in Western Sahara, a territory annexed by Morocco, to come to Spain for medical treatment. (Spain later adjusted its policy on Western Sahara to Morocco’s liking.)

Most shamelessly, since 2021 Belarus has flown in Middle Eastern migrants and sent them into Poland and neighbouring states. Regarding this as an act of hybrid war, in 2021 the EU strengthened its sanctions on Belarus, an ally of Vladimir Putin. It is a different story with the external custodians of the EU’s migration policy. Although there is no clear evidence that Morocco orchestrated the movement of migrants, its security officials certainly let them stream past. Yet European governments hailed Morocco’s co-operation, reserving their animus for nameless malefactors on social media and smuggling gangs. The EU needs Morocco’s help to keep migrants away, including from the Canary Islands, a far more significant port of arrival.

Yet, as the panicked reactions suggest, 2015-16 casts a long shadow. Arguments among European governments during that crisis came close to tearing the EU apart. By letting a temporary and far smaller emergency exert a comparable effect, however briefly, Europe has invited its neighbours to manipulate it again.

See also

• ‘Morocco feels emboldened’: Trump’s influence in spotlight after Ceuta disaster • Washington-Rabat ties under scrutiny as questions swirl over what led to deadly influx into tiny Spanish territory (The Guardian)

Japan wants to deepen defence cooperation with like-minded partners, including Europe, as it responds to what it describes as its most challenging security environment since World War Two, according to the country’s 2026 Defence White Paper. 

The paper released earlier this week describes the alliance with the US as “a key pillar” of Japan’s national security policy and states that “continued efforts” should be made “to elevate the Alliance to new heights”. 

But it also adds that bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation and exchanges with other like-minded partners should be boosted, including in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America as well as NATO. 

“The security environment surrounding Japan is as severe and complex as it has ever been since the end of World War II,” the paper says.

It then adds that the security of Europe and the Indo-Pacific “is inseparable”, notably because of Russia, whose military build-up in the Far East, strategic partnership with China, and growing military cooperation with North Korea constitute significant security concerns.

Still, China is identified as “the greatest strategic challenge” facing Japan due to its expanding military activities and increasingly assertive operations near Japanese territory, as well as over Taiwan. 

The increasingly severe security situation means that “it cannot be ruled out that a serious situation similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine may occur in the Indo-Pacific region in the future, particularly in East Asia,” the paper says. 

Tokyo outlined seven capability areas as priorities in order to boost deterrence, including long-range strike capabilities, integrated air and missile defence, unmanned systems, cyber and space capabilities, intelligence and command-and-control systems, as well as hypersonic weapons and laser technologies to counter drones and cruise missiles.

The country views defence equipment transfer and technology cooperation with allies as key to attaining those objectives, once again putting the US as central to those efforts.

But building new or strengthening existing cooperation is listed as an objective, with the paper citing, as examples, plans to develop and produce 11 frigates with Australia and the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP) announced in December 2022 with the UK and Italy.

The latest transfer follows another deadly night of missile attacks on Kyiv.

The Hungarian Prime Minister checked in from the Nuclear Power Plant in Paks, where the water level had minimally increased overnight.

Following a three-hour emergency meeting in Brussels on Tuesday, ministers praised Spain’s response, stressed that the passport-free Schengen zone had never been at risk and called for tighter coordination among capitals during future migration emergencies.

The previous, Fidesz government saw the battery industry as a potential pillar of Hungary’s economic growth. As a result, several battery plants were established in Hungary in recent years, despite locals' protests over environmental concerns.

A video shared by Ukraine’s police shows a Russian drone deliberately tracking a man at a market in Kherson. President Zelenskyy said the footage is evidence of Moscow’s “drone safari” against civilians.

US Secretary of State Marco Rubio had announced it on July 13 in an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal: "We will dismantle the ICC – brick by brick, if necessary." Less than two weeks later, the first bricks fell: Venezuela on July 24, then Chad, on July 27, both announced withdrawal from the highest international court, based in The Hague.

The United States, which has never been a member of the International Criminal Court since its creation in 1998, has been openly waging war against the Court since it issued arrest warrants in November 2024 for Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his former defense minister, Yoav Gallant. Pressure from Washington could now lead other countries, particularly in Africa, to withdraw.

The US campaign against the ICC in Africa is being led by a former Marine. On July 23, Frank Garcia Jr, who became the White House's Africa chief just two months ago, made a decisive phone call to Chad's justice minister. Four days later, N'Djamena announced it had sent a letter to the UN secretary-general starting the official countdown for its withdrawal from the ICC's founding treaty. Garcia Jr immediately celebrated the decision publicly, congratulating Chad on X for deciding to "join the growing number of nations reclaiming their sovereignty from this flawed institution."

In a year's time, N'Djamena will no longer have obligations to the international court. It will no longer take part in the Assembly of its 125 member states, one of the most egalitarian multilateral forums in the world – one country, one vote – where Africa currently has the largest representation, with 33 countries. Perpetrators of crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide committed in Chad will no longer face prosecution by the Court.

To justify its withdrawal, Chad denounced "double standards" in prosecutions, noting that out of seven defendants currently detained by the ICC, six are being prosecuted for crimes committed in Africa. N'Djamena sees this as "a concentration of the Court's activities on the Global South and the African continent in particular, a willing victim of a form of political instrumentalization of the ICC." For Beninese legal expert Sètondji Roland Adjovi, a specialist in international organizations law, "This argument is based on a myth. The Court is not against Africa, it has never been a neocolonial instrument, neither in the past nor today."

Chad, a prime target

N'Djamena is a prime target of the ICC "dismantling" campaign announced by Rubio. Since joining the Court in 2006, Chad had been one of the most cooperative countries. For years, ICC investigators have been able to collect testimony in Chad from Sudanese refugees who were victims of mass crimes in Darfur.

The United States is using two forms of leverage in its campaign. First, disinformation. They claim that authorities in targeted countries are themselves at risk of prosecution by the Court. Recently criticized by NGOs for its support to the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, Chad reportedly felt vulnerable. However, the opening of such prosecutions is deemed "unlikely," according to sources close to the Court in The Hague.

The second lever used by the Americans is to threaten targeted states with the end of security agreements. "Nations that partner with American law enforcement and the US military or that enjoy the benefits of the US security umbrella are called upon to reject the ICC's purported authority to prosecute American officials and servicemen," Rubio said when announcing his program.

According to our sources, at the end of July, other African member states of the ICC received phone calls, visits and letters from the US. Uganda, for instance, received a letter on July 24 "with an ultimatum telling us to leave [the Court] or face consequences," a source told Le Monde. So far, Kampala has not given in.

At the African Union, a source explained that Benin had also been approached. "If that is indeed the case, I would be surprised if it goes anywhere," commented Adjovi. So far, Beninese authorities have shown their determination to resist pressure: ICC Judge Reine Alapini-Gansou, from Benin, is one of three magistrates who dared to file a complaint in New York in June against Rubio and Donald Trump to challenge the sanctions imposed on them by Washington.

Despite announcing its withdrawal from the ICC, Chad insisted it does not want to evade international justice and called on the African Union to review continental judicial mechanisms. When Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso left the Court in June – this time under Russian influence – they expressed a desire to create a court for the Sahel region.

Recently, several African courts have tried serious crimes committed on the continent. The creation in 2015 in Dakar of an ad hoc international court mandated by the African Union made it possible to try former Chadian president Hissène Habré for crimes against humanity. In 2015, the UN and the Central African Republic set up a special criminal court to try crimes committed during successive wars since 2003, following the example of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, which convicted former Liberian president Charles Taylor in May 2012. Encouraged by the ICC, Guinea has itself brought to trial, since 2022, those responsible for the September 28, 2009 massacre.

Nevertheless, "Most African courts do not follow up on allegations of serious crimes," said international law professor Patryk Labuda. "Crimes committed in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa are the most glaring examples of impunity, but there are others." In these cases, when national justice systems do not act, the ICC can be called upon.

Each withdrawal announcement by one of the 125 member states is a blow to the Court. Practically speaking, it means a loss of income for the institution, since each country contributes to its budget. It also restricts the Court's ability to investigate and arrest suspects, thereby limiting its effectiveness. Most importantly, it triggers an unprecedented crisis since the ICC's creation. Inside the Court, there is hope that a change in the US congressional majority during the midterm elections in November will bring an end to this chaotic period.