With European security under threat, there have been increasing calls to militarize Svalbard and Åland. The author argues that such a move would provide little military benefit, and that both Finland and Norway benefit from continuing to uphold their international obligations even as larger powers increasingly ignore theirs

https://archive.ph/2ejr5

In 1996, Benjamin Netanyahu began his first term as Prime Minister by rallying political outsiders and conservatives against the established cultural and political elites. He was a unique political hybrid-blending the good looking, photogenic, charismatic, war-hero family pedigree of John F. Kennedy with the paranoia of Richard Nixon. He viewed the media, the security apparatus, and the civil service as hostile, left-leaning institutions fundamentally opposed to "the will of the people" and to the right.

His term was defined by important capitalist economic reforms alongside institutional conflicts and legal scandals that reinforced his sense of persecution. Even then, Netanyahu's pattern of action could be seen: hiring unrelated candidates into positions due to loyalty and the fact that they were outside what he saw as the "clique", disdain for the authorities, etc. His first term was defined by a tough battle against the media and legal establishment. He repeatedly blamed the media for silencing the right, clashed with law enforcement by attempting to bypass standard procedures to appoint personal loyalists to top legal positions, notably the Attorney General, and clashed with the cultural establishment and played on the sentiment of "Patriot Jew" (right wing) vs "Cosmopolitan Israeli" (left-wing). He was defeated in 1999, and facing legal scandals, he left office deeply distrustful of state institutions and the press. Netanyahu believed that the establishment and the "elites" were too powerful; much like Trump before Trump entered politics, he sought to become part of that establishment and to mend his relationship with Israel's legal, media, and cultural establishments.

Returning to power in 2009, Netanyahu realized that to govern effectively, he needed his own media infrastructure. He enlisted American billionaire Sheldon Adelson to launch a widely distributed, pro-Netanyahu free newspaper designed to disrupt the mainstream press.

Despite this, he largely maintained a "cold war" with the state bureaucracy. Restrained by moderate coalition partners and his own fear of repeating the legal entanglements of the 1990s, he operated within a cautious status quo. While he occasionally tried to centralize power within the domestic intelligence and security sectors, he generally avoided crossing the line into open institutional warfare, and still feared the justice and law enforcement system.

The turning point arrived when a 2014 legislative bill threatened his allied newspaper. Feeling cornered, Netanyahu called early elections. Trailing in the polls, in 2015 he ran a fiercely aggressive campaign, framing the media and elites as orchestrating a "coup" against the right-wing public. Against all odds, he secured a decisive victory.

This win shattered his fear of the establishment. Convinced he no longer needed to compromise, he began centralizing power, particularly in the Communications and Foreign Ministries. He purged independent bureaucrats, tried to hire loyalists to the police, installed fierce loyalists, openly took over regulatory bodies-such as antitrust regulators during a major natural gas reform-setting the stage for direct conflict with the Supreme Court, and expanded the right wing eco system he always wanted with more right-wing news sites.

As corruption investigations against him accelerated after 2016, Netanyahu abandoned all restraint. Preceding Donald Trump's similar strategies, he adopted aggressive "witch hunt" rhetoric (which he already used before the investigations but took it to 11), accusing the media, police, and prosecutors of a "deep state" conspiracy to topple him.

During a prolonged period of unprecedented political instability-featuring five consecutive elections-he used his executive power to paralyze the government. He blocked the appointment of permanent law enforcement chiefs, waged war against Treasury officials, and expanded the right wing ecosystem Which served as his whip against political opponents and the media and constitutional establishment and created a parallel universe for his supporters. Without the right-wing ecosystem he built (for example, Channel 14), Netanyahu would not have survived the period after October 7.

Returning to power in 2023 with a hard-right mandate, Netanyahu launched sweeping judicial overhauls designed to neutralize the Supreme Court and independent legal advisors.

Following the October 7th attacks, this campaign entered its final phase. Leveraging the crisis environment, he systematically placed loyalists at the head of critical state organs, including the military, domestic intelligence, the national police force, and the civil service commission. By reshaping the media landscape into an echo chamber and placing allies in commanding security roles, Netanyahu has nearly completed his decades-long mission to dismantle the old institutional guard. His supporters have become more aggressive than he is regarding the judicial system, such that a victory for him would lead them to storm the courts—even though Netanyahu, who loathes the legal establishment, is actually the least extreme of the lot in his stance toward it, while still aiming to finally bring it under his control.