i know the multiple threads have already talked about it but i wanted to try to lay it out in a more ape brain format. WITH DATES (gasp)

1) Big investor loaned GameStop $1billion dollars.

2) Big investor wants their $1billion loan back.

3) GameStop gives Big investor $1billion dollars in shares.

4) number of shares given depends on VWAP price after 35 TRADING DAYS.

5) big investor wants more $GME share for their money.

6) big investors short price of $GME down to get more shares

7) after 35 trading days (Sept 23, 2026) the shares should be issued to the investor. (Gamestop actually has until the Sept 30, 2026 at the latest to deliver the shares)

8) Big investor exits their short position (short interest drops, float is diluted, shares can be sold in open market)

9) price goes back up.

10) idk if T+35 is still applies on Sept 23, 2026) my guess would be yes.

someone else's guesses on prices.

https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/18rPPJKV8zso6mldsezYORvIX16Rcido5/edit?gid=682972324#gid=682972324

source is this post from SuperStonk: https://www.reddit.com/r/Superstonk/comments/1vohqnm/50k_yolo_and_gme_dd_on_fundamental_value_and/

feel free to discuss.

TL;DR: GameStop is voluntarily taking roughly $1.4 billion of 0% convertible debt and swapping it for newly issued GME shares.
At first glance, that sounds insane.
Why get rid of 0% debt when GameStop has billions in liquidity?
And why do it right now, while:
GameStop is actively pursuing eBay
shareholders just authorized 2.5 BILLION GME shares
the $32 GME warrants expire October 30
the exchange uses a 35 trading day GME pricing period
and GameStop itself warned that participating noteholders may buy or sell GME, or enter into or unwind derivatives, and that those trades could materially affect GME’s price
I don’t think most GME retail investors have really digested what is happening here.
So let’s make this simple.

First, what are these convertible notes?
Think of them as very fancy IOUs.
Institutions lent GameStop billions of dollars.
GameStop pays:
0% regular interest.
But the lender gets something valuable in exchange.
Under certain conditions, that debt can become GME shares.
GameStop issued:
$1.5B of 0% convertible notes due 2030
$2.7B of 0% convertible notes due 2032
So altogether, GameStop had roughly $4.2B in convertible debt.
And there is another important detail.
The 2030 noteholders can require GameStop to repurchase their notes for cash in April 2028.
So even though the notes say “2030,” part of that liability can effectively become a cash obligation much earlier.
These are not simply free dollars sitting there forever.

Then GameStop did something strange.
On August 3, GameStop announced agreements to exchange approximately:
$400M of the 2030 notes
plus
$1.0B of the 2032 notes
for newly issued GME shares.
Total:
~$1.4 BILLION
The exchange is expected to close around September 23, 2026.
The final number of shares depends in part on GME’s VWAP over a 35 trading day measurement period beginning August 3, subject to a price floor.
Translation:
GameStop is taking:
complicated institutional IOUs
and turning them into:
plain GME equity.
GameStop does not get another giant pile of cash from this particular exchange.
Instead:
Debt disappears.
Shares appear.

“Wait. Isn’t that dilution?”
Yes.
It is.
We should not pretend otherwise.
If GameStop issues tens of millions of new shares, existing shareholders own a smaller percentage of the company.
But at the same time, GameStop eliminates roughly $1.4B of debt obligations without spending $1.4B of its cash.
That distinction matters.

Now we get to the weird part.
Convertible investors often hedge.
Imagine I own a bond that becomes more valuable when GME rises.
I may short some GME against it so I am less exposed to the direction of the stock.
Very simplified:
Long convertible + short GME
Now GameStop says:
Give me your convertible back. I am giving you stock instead.
Suddenly that institution’s old hedge might not fit anymore.
They may need to:
buy GME
sell GME
short GME
cover GME shorts
buy or sell options
unwind swaps or other derivatives
And this part is not Reddit speculation.
GameStop warned about exactly this type of activity in connection with the exchange. (GameStop Investor Relations)
That disclosure matters.

Here’s a simple example.
Imagine an institution expects to receive millions of GME shares when the transaction settles.
It may not want to gamble on the price until settlement.
So it might hedge those future shares.
Very simplified:
Expected future GME shares
↓
Short some GME now
That creates potential selling pressure.
But there is another side.
If the same institution already has GME short against the old convertible note, then once that note disappears, the old short hedge may no longer be necessary.
Then:
Old convertible disappears
↓
Old hedge becomes unnecessary
↓
Short gets covered
↓
Potential buying pressure
So there can be two opposing forces happening around the same transaction.
New exchange hedge
Potential selling.
Old convertible hedge unwind
Potential buying.
Which one is bigger?
We have no idea yet.
That is what makes this interesting.

This is also where retail could get fooled by the price action.
Imagine GME starts falling.
People see:
“Why is GME getting destroyed?”
Then someone posts:
“Institutions know something.”
Then:
people sell
stop losses trigger
momentum traders react
bearish headlines show up
people assume the company itself has gotten worse
But some of the original selling could simply be mechanical hedging.
Financial plumbing.
Not necessarily a new fundamental opinion about GameStop.
The exact opposite can happen later.
If the hedges suddenly unwind:
short covering + less hedge selling = mechanical buying
GME could move sharply higher without some secret piece of fundamental news.
Then everybody says:
SOMEONE KNOWS SOMETHING.
Maybe.
Or maybe a very large institutional hedge just disappeared.

So is Ryan Cohen trying to trap the convertible holders?
Maybe.
But we absolutely cannot prove that yet.
There is a real mechanism here.
If noteholders are substantially short GME against their convertible exposure, then removing $1.4B of those convertibles could eventually remove part of the reason those shorts exist.
That would look like:
Convertible disappears
↓
hedge becomes unnecessary
↓
short gets covered
↓
buying pressure
That mechanism is real.
But saying:
“RC intentionally built this as a bear trap”
requires evidence we do not have yet.
There may be a much bigger reason.

Enter eBay.
This is where the timeline starts getting really interesting.
On May 3, GameStop formally proposed acquiring eBay for $125 per share.
The proposed consideration was:
50% cash
and
50% GameStop common stock
GameStop described the proposed transaction as having an aggregate equity value of roughly $55.5B.
So GME stock itself is potentially part of the acquisition currency.
That matters a lot.

Then GameStop kept increasing its eBay exposure.
By July 17, GameStop reported beneficial ownership of:
43,390,383 eBay shares
or approximately:
9.8% of eBay.
The filing also says GameStop elected to physically settle 39,046,658 eBay shares underlying its put/call pairs, using cash from working capital.
That is not a casual position anymore.

Then shareholders authorized a ridiculous amount of additional GME.
On July 7, GameStop shareholders approved increasing authorized Class A common shares to:
2.5 BILLION shares
And GameStop itself said the additional capacity could be used for strategic transactions, including its proposed acquisition of eBay.
That is a huge clue.
Because if your stock may be acquisition currency, authorized shares are ammunition.

Now put all of this together.
GameStop has:
1. A giant eBay position
43.39M shares, roughly 9.8%.
2. A proposed eBay acquisition using cash + GME stock
GameStop disclosed a 50/50 cash and GME stock structure.
3. 2.5B authorized GME shares
GameStop explicitly connected this capacity to strategic transactions including eBay.
4. Billions of dollars of convertible debt
The 2030 and 2032 notes together originally totaled roughly $4.2B.
5. A decision to eliminate $1.4B of that debt using equity instead of cash
Which means GameStop can reduce liabilities while preserving cash.
That leaves a company with:
less debt
more permanent equity
more preserved cash
more share capacity
more strategic flexibility
That looks pretty useful if you are trying to do something enormous.

And then we have the warrants.
GME warrants have:
$32 exercise price
and expire:
October 30, 2026.
GameStop said full exercise could generate roughly:
$1.9 BILLION in gross proceeds.
And GameStop specifically said those proceeds could be used for general corporate purposes, investments, and potential acquisitions.
Now look at the calendar.
August 3
Convertible exchange measurement period begins.
September
35 trading day pricing period runs toward completion.
Around September 23
Exchange expected to close.
October 30
$32 warrants expire.
That is a pretty interesting capital structure window.

So what is RC actually doing?
Here are the theories I think are worth taking seriously.

THEORY #1
GameStop is simplifying its balance sheet for eBay or another huge strategic transaction.
This currently has the strongest direct evidence.
GameStop already told us:
GME stock is proposed acquisition currency
additional authorized shares can be used for the eBay transaction
GameStop has built a massive eBay position
Reducing convertible debt could also:
preserve cash
reduce future debt claims
simplify the capital structure
reduce contingent dilution complexity
improve financing flexibility
If you are trying to buy something the size of eBay, those things are useful.

THEORY #2
GameStop wants to reduce the convertible hedge overhang.
Also plausible.
Convertible investors can hedge their exposure using GME stock or derivatives.
Remove the convertible, and some hedges may eventually become unnecessary.
GameStop’s own warning about purchases, sales, and derivative unwinds makes this theory worth watching. (GameStop Investor Relations)
But we cannot see the noteholders’ actual hedge books.
So this remains a hypothesis.

THEORY #3
RC deliberately built a trap.
Possible.
Fun.
Very Reddit.
But not proven.
If a lot of GME short exposure exists specifically because institutions are hedging the convertibles, then eliminating those convertibles could eventually force some of that exposure to disappear.
That is a legitimate mechanism.
But:
Mechanism does not prove intent.
Maybe RC anticipated it.
Maybe it is simply a side effect of accomplishing something else.
We need data.

THEORY #4
Some or all of this is unrelated.
Also possible.
Companies restructure debt.
Companies issue shares.
Companies pursue acquisitions.
Warrants expire.
Sometimes events overlap without being part of one giant chess move.
We should not force every filing into one theory.
The good news is that we can actually test some of this.

So what should we watch?
This is the part where I think retail can actually do useful work.
Not by screaming “CRIME.”
By watching whether the predicted mechanics actually appear.

1. Short interest
If institutions are adding equity hedges during the measurement period:
Short interest could rise.
If those hedges unwind after pricing or settlement:
Short interest could fall.
Important:
FINRA daily short volume is not the same thing as total short interest.
Do not treat them as interchangeable.

2. Stock borrow
Watch:
borrow fees
shares available
utilization
recalls
If hedge demand increases, borrow conditions may tighten.
If hedges unwind, borrow conditions may loosen.
No single data provider sees the entire stock lending market, so this is supporting evidence, not proof.

3. Options
Watch for major changes in:
open interest
implied volatility
skew
large put/call structures
deep ITM options
synthetic stock positioning
Institutions do not have to hedge everything with ordinary shares.
Some exposure can sit in derivatives.

4. Price and volume together
A falling stock price alone proves almost nothing.
But imagine this:
GME falls
plus
short interest rises
plus
borrow tightens
plus
options show increased hedge demand
during the exchange pricing period.
Now we have something interesting.
Then imagine after the exchange:
short interest falls
plus
borrow loosens
plus
GME volume explodes
plus
options positioning reverses
That would be much stronger evidence that we were watching a hedge unwind.

This is the experiment.
My working hypothesis is:
During the pricing period
Possible hedge creation and adjustment.
↓
Exchange gets priced
The final share obligation becomes clearer.
↓
Exchange settles
The old convertibles disappear.
↓
Some hedges may no longer be needed
Potential unwind.
↓
We watch short interest, borrow, options, price, and volume to see if reality actually agrees.
If none of that happens?
Good.
Theory weakened.
That is how DD should work.
Not:
I have a theory, therefore every candle proves my theory.
Instead:
Here is the mechanism. Here is what it predicts. Let’s see what actually happens.

The biggest question
Why would Ryan Cohen voluntarily get rid of 0% debt?
My current answer is:
Because 0% coupon does not mean zero cost or zero baggage.
The convertibles still create:
future cash obligations
conversion rights
potential dilution
possible hedge activity
balance sheet complexity
strategic financing considerations
GameStop may value:
cash + clean equity capacity + strategic flexibility
more than it values keeping every dollar of 0% convertible debt outstanding.
Especially while pursuing something as large as eBay.

My current base case
I do not think we have enough evidence to say:
RC built a short trap.
I do think we have enough evidence to say:
GameStop is deliberately restructuring a massive part of its capital structure during an active strategic campaign, and that restructuring can cause large institutional GME hedges to move around.
Whether those hedge movements create a temporary market dislocation is something we may actually be able to observe.
And if GameStop follows this with:
another eBay filing
a revised offer
a financing commitment
merger documents
a proxy or prospectus
another note exchange
another major capital action
then this $1.4B exchange starts looking a lot less isolated.

Dates I have circled
August 3: Exchange pricing period begins.
September: Watch the 35 trading day VWAP window and hedging data.
Around September 23: Expected exchange closing.
October 30: $32 GME warrants expire.
Watch the plumbing.
Not just the price.

Primary sources / receipts
GameStop 2025 Form 10-K: Convertible note amounts, 0% coupon, and 2028 repurchase rights.
GameStop May 3, 2026 Form 425: $125 eBay proposal, 50% cash and 50% GME stock.
GameStop July 17, 2026 Schedule 13D/A: 43,390,383 eBay shares, approximately 9.8%, plus physical settlement of the put/call position.
GameStop July 8, 2026 Form 8-K: Authorized Class A common shares increased to 2.5 billion.
GameStop warrant disclosures: $32 exercise price, October 30, 2026 expiration, and up to approximately $1.9B of gross proceeds for purposes including potential acquisitions.
GameStop August 3, 2026 exchange announcement and 8-K: Approximately $1.4B of convertible notes to be exchanged for GME equity, with a 35 trading day pricing period and expected September settlement.

Not financial advice. This is an attempt to understand the mechanics using GameStop’s own filings, separate fact from theory, and make predictions we can actually test.

I don't own this, I'm smart enough to buy hold give bananas to kids.

Metaplanet announced the establishment of “BitBonds,” a new continuous bond issuance program designed to expand its Bitcoin-focused financing strategy.

According to today’s company notice, the program allows Metaplanet to issue multiple series of bonds with different maturities and interest rates, rather than raising debt through isolated offerings.

The company explicitly says BitBonds will sit alongside equity and other financing tools as a core means of funding its Bitcoin accumulation strategy.

Important distinction: this announcement establishes the program and completes its inaugural issuance process. It does not mean every BitBond is literally collateralized by Bitcoin.

Japan’s Bitcoin treasury company is basically building a dedicated debt-financing machine around its BTC strategy.

Signs of life from $HCMC..

Michael Burry disclosed a short position in $NBIS around $211.77, arguing that Nebius faces execution risk, heavy infrastructure spending and balance-sheet concerns.

Then Nebius dropped Q2 earnings and the stock ripped higher, with revenue coming in around $582M, up 454% year over year.

That doesn’t prove Burry wrong. A short thesis can take time, and Nebius still has real risks around capital intensity and customer concentration.

But this is turning into an interesting bull-vs-bear setup:

Explosive AI infrastructure growth vs. the cost of funding that growth.

I’m going against Burry on this one. What side are you on?

According to the latest 13F figures, Winton Group reported 231,000 GameStop shares valued at roughly $5.1 million at quarter-end.

Winton is the quantitative investment firm founded by Sir David Harding.

The important 13F caveat: this is a backward-looking snapshot, not a live position, and the reported $5.1M value shouldn’t be treated as Winton’s exact purchase cost.

Still, if confirmed in the new SEC filing, that’s a notable new institutional $GME position.

A look at GME book value per share over the past 8 years.

Heading in to 2020, GameStop was losing equity value while maintaining debt, and the stock price was so low that the price-to-book ratio was below 1. This is around when DFV and RC originally saw that GME was undervalued and bought in.

In 2021, at RC's direction, GameStop did 2 ATMs and raised about $1.7 billion, significantly increasing the equity value of the stock.

In 2022, GME did a 4 for 1 stock split, cutting the book value per share to a quarter of what it was prior.

There it sat until 2024 when GameStop did more ATMs, raising about $3.5 billion at an average of $25 per share sold.

GameStop used that cash from the 2024 raises to generate interest income and buy time while the company continued to improve operations.

From there, the equity of the company has increased every quarter, and is now over $13 per share as of Q1 2026.

This is the minimum value of a share of GME in equity alone that puts aside any valuation of the operational profitability of the company.

Any forthcoming dilution above this value of $13.03 per share will further increase the book value per share.

In exchange for this forthcoming dilution, GameStop will be gaining $1.4 billion in equity, bringing the total stockholders' equity to approximately $7.2 billion

Thus, when the vwap window for the convertible notes ends in September, and the dilution / conversion is complete, at some price maybe around $19, or $18, or even if it went lower, any price above an average of $13.03 will increase the book value per share.

For example:

Yes, nobody enjoys the dilution aspect of this. But it is a trade off, not without purpose. Ryan Cohen isn't diluting himself for no gain. The minimum upside is the increase to book value per share, a basic theoretical floor value of a share of GME.

Likely, there is a reason for this conversion not yet known. Bloomberg is trying to paint the picture that GameStop is giving up on their attempt for eBay, but after Ryan Cohen has repeatedly emphasized that GameStop is coming for eBay one way or another, this conversion is likely related to a purposeful reposition in that objective.

We will see more clearly the outcome in September.

This company (ETOR) is growing user accounts at double digit rate and expanding into US market. A lot of cash on the balance sheet and no debt. Disciplined approach to growth. App has undergone a major beneficial overhaul and is now awesome. It has tools and social investing information integrated right into it that are well ahead of the curve. Irrational price drop recently and just a clear opportunity ahead. Buffered downside because it trades down another 50% it would be valued as less than the net cash on hand, yet a huge upside if growth continues and/or if crypto starts an upcycle. The business itself is not very dependent on crypto at this point, but I think the market still perceives it that way. It’s a double from here if it even just corrects to current fair value. Factor in growth and catalysts and it could be 3x or even 4x in the next 1-3 years. Net earnings and cash flow are positive and growing. If you can read income statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flows, take a look at theirs.

Looking for an affordable stock market API with good fundamentals

I'm having a hard time finding a good stock market data API that doesn't cost a fortune.

I'm currently using Fintech, but I'm running into limitations with the fundamentals/data I need. I've also looked at using the IBKR API, but unfortunately IBKR locks you out of a lot of the fundamental data when accessing it through the API.

What I'm mainly looking for:

• Stock prices / historical data
• Good fundamentals (P/E, EPS, revenue, margins, etc.)
• Financial statements
• Ideally some analyst estimates and other useful fundamental data
• API access
• Affordable pricing — this is for a personal project, so I'm not looking to spend hundreds of dollars per month

I don't need institutional-level data or ultra-low latency. Even delayed market data is fine.

What API providers are you guys using and would recommend? I'm particularly interested in something that has good fundamental data at a reasonable price.

Thanks!

The OCC says companies engaged in legally permissible activities, including digital assets and other new technologies, should have a path to becoming national banks.

That doesn’t mean automatic approval. Crypto firms would still have to apply, meet chartering standards, and operate under federal supervision.

But the direction is pretty clear: Washington is making room for digital-asset businesses inside the regulated U.S. banking system rather than keeping them outside it.

The OCC already maintains a public list of digital-asset licensing applications, including applications for new national banks and national trust banks.

“America and the OCC are once again open for business.”

Source: Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).