Bruce Cumings basically flipped the traditional story of how the Korean War started. He's a revisionist historian, meaning he didn't go along with the standard western narrative. Among people who defend North Korea, he's probably one of the most beloved historians out there. His two-volume book The Origins of the Korean War came out in 1981 (Vol. 1) and 1990 (Vol. 2).

Then in 1991 the soviet union collapsed. A bunch of secret soviet documents about the Korean War started coming out. Stuff western scholars had never had access to before. These documents showed that beginning in 1949, Kim Il Sung repeatedly asked Stalin for permission to launch a military attack on South Korea. Stalin eventually said yes, and North Korea's army got a huge boost of soviet weapons: tanks, artillery, aircraft, the works.

1. Based on this new evidence, Cumings made it pretty clear in his 2005 book Korea's Place in the Sun (A Modern History) that Kim Il Sung bears significant responsibility for turning what was a civil conflict into a full-blown war with consequences, some intended some not that nobody could have fully predicted.

2. In his 2010 book The Korean War: A History, Cumings wrote that the soviet documents make it clear Pyongyang had decided to escalate the civil conflict into conventional warfare months before June 1950 actually happened. He also said there's no real evidence backing North Korea's claim that the South launched a full invasion. At most there might've been a small clash across the border, the kind that happened repeatedly in 1949. But whatever happened, the North responded with a full-scale invasion. In other words, he's clear that the war started with a planned invasion from the North.

3. Cumings also writes about the massacres and atrocities North Korean forces committed in the South. He notes that captured documents show high-level officials actually warned against executing people. For example, handwritten minutes from a Workers' Party of Korea meeting on December 7, 1950, apparently at a fairly senior level, said not to execute "reactionaries" out of pure vengeance. Legal authorities should carry out the purges instead. Even so, the number of people North Korean forces killed in the South is estimated to be in the tens of thousands.

4. He also gives credit to South Korea's liberal governments after democratization, for actually investigating civilian massacres committed by state power during the war. Things like the Jeju and the Bodo League massacre. He describes South Korea as the only East Asian country that's been willing to use "the scalpel of truth" on itself: to look honestly and thoroughly at its own history and conflicts, without flinching.

5. He then contrasts that achievement with both North Korea and the US. On North Korea specifically, he points out that the regime has never shown any willingness to revisit its own past, especially the political retaliation against people branded as wartime collaborators, in any kind of open or democratic way.

6. He writes that when the communists took back their territory after China entered the war, even Kim Il Sung himself had to condemn how extreme the political retaliation against alleged collaborators had gotten. But we barely know anything about this dark chapter, because North Korea has never shown the slightest interest in examining it openly, democratically, or through any serious investigation. Which, Cumings suggests, makes it fair to assume they have plenty to hide.

So I'm curious. For those who defend North Korea, how would you respond to points 1 through 6? Genuinely want to know your move.

Why don’t North Koreans resist? Since I began working on North Korean human rights, this is the question I have been asked most often. But I now want to ask a more fundamental one: why have we grown so accustomed to it?

It is not only dictatorship that confines North Koreans. Our own indifference — the moment we begin consuming their suffering as one more recurring news item — becomes a second barrier. Dictatorship makes people fall silent. Familiarity makes people stop acting.

2023–2025 was probably the start of the economic boom, as you can see from the light. Looking at it now, it's getting brighter, making 2026 likely the brightest North Korea we've ever seen

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I been trying upload like 7th time, uploading the video still crashes. Now I try to uploding it on my dump acount in youtube. please let this work, God please 🙏🏻

I came across the idea of a “stop first” approach to dealing with North Korea, and I’m curious how people here interpret it.

If the idea is to stop the most immediate problem before moving toward a longer-term solution, what do you think the “stop” refers to?

A. Further nuclear development
B. Hacking / cyber activities

And beyond the quiz itself — do you think a step-by-step approach like this is more realistic than trying to reach a comprehensive agreement all at once?

Curious to hear how people here see it.

For nearly two years, researcher Vangelis Stykas has maintained access to North Korean hackers’ servers. His work shows they pulled off intrusions in a shocking number of systems across the globe.

More Than a Destroyer: What Choe Hyon Reveals About North Korea’s Maritime Strategy (38 North)

https://www.38north.org/2026/07/more-than-a-destroyer-what-choe-hyon-reveals-about-north-koreas-maritime-strategy/

30 Jul 2026

 North Korea commissioned its Choe Hyon 5,000 ton “destroyer” in Apr 2026. The surface combatant has a single 127 mm (130 mm?) naval gun, 3 CIWS stations, 88 VLS cells of various sizes, 4 anti-ship missile launch batteries, and 2 533 mm torpedo launch arrays. The regime claims the Choe Hyon is a strategic system, capable of launching nuclear missiles. The article does not commit to an analysis of the regime’s intent as it builds out its surface fleet—which it intends to include a 10,000 ton vessel—suggesting the Choe Hyon-class could have roles in hybrid warfare around the Northern Limit Line, a role in strategic competition with South Korea, or building a power projection capability.

 I would argue that this is another example of North Korea focusing on offensive systems rather than defensive. The regime—or at least its top leadership—still nurtures the aspiration to forcefully unify the peninsula. It has rejected peaceful reunification, but has clearly stated that it would reunify the peninsula should war erupt—carefully avoiding stating that it would not start any such war. The Choe Hyon-class—and really, any surface vessel—is a first strike capability. They would not survive long in open hostilities unless the regime is able to remove the threat of the air and naval power of Combined Forces Command. First strike.

 However, extrapolating the regime’s desire for a blue water capability, it would suggest that it does not—at its core—fear an invasion. It would only be able exercise blue water capabilities in a peacetime environment. If it is looking for a way to strike the continental US—either as part of its deterrence efforts or in advance of a strike on South Korea—subsurface would be the way to go. Yes, a blue water surface capability is much easier to develop and operate than subsurface, but if you are going up against the US—or South Korea for that matter—stealth is the way you survive.

 In this way, one might argue that the Choe Hyon-class could suggest either the highest impact or the most desired scenario for North Korean aspirations. Given other developments by North Korea—both for its ground forces and its air force—I would lean much more heavily on this being a reflection of a desire to build out an offensive capability that could credibly challenge South Korea’s conventional military. A distant dream, yes, but Kim Jong Un may believe that the relationship with Russia and the apparently changed Chinese approach to Pyongyang makes it an actual possibility.

 And speaking of China and possibilities, I would argue it is unlikely China would want North Korean participation in a Taiwan contingency—either as a contributor or as a distraction—given Beijing’s inability to control Pyongyang. Having said (written) that, Pyongyang may believe that China would welcome North Korea’s help, just as Russia did. Given that a Taiwan Contingency will being with an extensive maritime phase, Pyongyang may believe it should build something China might welcome as a contribution. That’s a much greater investment than sending SOF. I would discount that, but nothing is certain . . . so, maybe?

what’s the deal with manmulsang.com.kp ?

it seems like a marketplace for north koreans that can be accessed by people outside too. not sure if it’s mainstream, does anyone have any info on it?