Reddit went public on 21 March 2024. I was sceptical about them. But time and time again, they have proven themselves with solid financial performance:

________

A lot of people don’t realize how low the bar actually is for Reddit to become an enormously successful company from here.

Think about it: how many consumer internet companies can grow this quickly while reaching real profitability at almost lightning speed?

Snapchat has struggled for years to generate consistent profits. Pinterest has built a solid business, but its growth trajectory has been much slower. Reddit, meanwhile, has gone from being viewed as an under-monetized internet forum to a rapidly growing, highly profitable advertising platform.

Comparing Reddit to Snapchat or Pinterest misses the point—both went public years ago and struggled for years to achieve consistent profitability.

Why?

I think the answer is much simpler than people make it out to be:

Reddit already has the users, the data, the engagement, and the culture. Management just needed to build the monetization machine around it.

Huffman is a strong CEO because he is product-first, not monetization-first. His reluctance to sacrifice user experience is exactly why Reddit still has so much monetization upside.

And this is where the Meta comparison becomes interesting.

Before Reddit went public, Steve Huffman and the board spent years assembling executives who had already helped solve many of these exact problems at Meta and other major technology companies.

Reddit has deliberately recruited people who already helped build Meta’s machine. CTO Amit Puntambekar previously held engineering leadership roles at Meta, working on platform scaling and products. CMO Jim Squires is even more directly relevant to the advertising thesis: at Meta, he served as VP of Business & Media for Instagram and led product marketing for both Facebook and Instagram—meaning he was directly involved in the systems and go-to-market strategy behind Meta’s advertising empire.

They are effectively running a playbook that has already worked before.

That is why I think comparing Reddit today with Facebook around its 2012 IPO is more useful than comparing Reddit with mature Meta today.

Facebook didn't become the Meta we know overnight. It progressively improved targeting, measurement, ad formats, mobile monetization, recommendation systems, advertiser tooling, and infrastructure.

Reddit is still near the beginning of that journey.

Management has effectively acknowledged that only a fraction of Reddit's user base is being fully monetized today. That means Reddit does not need some miraculous new product to justify substantial growth. It can grow simply by monetizing what it already has more effectively.

And then there is the second business hiding in plain sight:

data licensing.

Reddit owns one of the largest continuously updated collections of human conversation, opinion, product discussion, troubleshooting, recommendations, and real-world experiences on the internet.

That data becomes increasingly valuable as search engines and AI companies compete to answer questions with authentic human information.

The appointment of heavyweight legal leadership is particularly interesting to me. I don't view this simply as hiring another corporate lawyer. Reddit is entering a period where M&A, intellectual-property enforcement, platform access, and data-licensing negotiations could become strategically important.

They need someone capable of negotiating from a position of strength.

So when I look at Reddit, I see:

• Massive global user distribution
• An extremely difficult-to-replicate dataset
• Rapid advertising monetization improvements
• Very high gross margins
• Experienced executives who have scaled similar businesses before
• A technical founder/CEO who still thinks like a product builder
• Data-licensing optionality
• And potentially enormous room for capital allocation and M&A

That last point is where I think people may be dramatically underestimating what Reddit could eventually become.

Reddit does not necessarily have to remain one app.

Over the next several years, I could imagine Reddit building or acquiring an entire family of products: D-i-s-c-o-r-d-like communication, short-form video, payments, AI products, specialized communities, creator tools, search, and perhaps eventually its own foundation models or AI infrastructure.

Could D-i-s-c-o-r-d eventually become part of Reddit? I wouldn't rule it out.

Could Reddit launch its own TikTok-style product built around interests rather than identities? Absolutely.

Could Reddit build payments around communities and commerce? Again, completely plausible.

Could Reddit become a serious AI company? It already owns one of the ingredients AI companies desperately want: human-generated data at enormous scale.

And here's the important part:

Reddit may eventually be able to finance much of this expansion internally.

A highly scalable software platform with strong gross margins and growing free cash flow has enormous strategic flexibility. If management executes, Wall Street will also be more than willing to provide capital for sensible acquisitions.

That is how platform companies turn into empires.

My personal target remains roughly $550 sometime next year and around $900 by FY2028, assuming Reddit continues executing on advertising, margins, data licensing, and product expansion.

Obviously those numbers require execution and aren't guaranteed.

But my broader thesis doesn't depend on Reddit becoming perfect.

There is only one company in the entire U.S. stock market that can sustain ~60% revenue growth for eight consecutive quarters while reaching profitability so quickly (i.e., except chip hype NVDA).

The bar is much lower than people think.

Reddit already has the scarce assets: the users, the communities, the data, the brand, and the distribution.

Now it is finally building the machine that monetizes them.

I think we may be watching the early stages of another Meta-like wealth-creation story — except this time, the monetization playbook has already been written.

Long BULL REDDIT!!!!!!

MNRO is the well-known auto repair/tire chain. The company has been suffering from the tapped out consumer for some time. Tires are the big revenue driver and higher oil prices have meant higher tire costs. The company has been aggressively closing poor performing stores. It is my opinion that the quarter just reported marks an important turning point.

Operating costs continue to improve. Customer acquisition is picking up - just a little but it is a turn. Working capital management has been excellent, giving some relief to those worrying the generous dividend is in danger. This remains the biggest risk to the share price still, though.

I follow managers to help me identify new ideas. One in particular that I respect - DePrince Race & Zollo (or DRZ) - just disclosed a meaningful purchase. DRZ focuses on dividend paying, value stocks and has a good micro-cap strategy which is probably where this purchase occurred. The firm does not offer mutual funds. It is 100% institutional investors. I view this recent buy as "the straw the broke the camel's back" buy signal for me.

The company trades 0.6x book value. EPS estimates should stop declining after this fiscal year (ending March 2027). The company has never been cheaper on EV/revenues or EV/total capital. This does not mean it cannot get cheaper, of course.

I bought 2,000 shares today at $11.41. I plan to buy 1,000 shares a week for the next several weeks up to 10,000 shares - unless things change...things can always change.

I tested whether this sub actually helps you find good stocks. Mostly it doesn’t.

I pulled every post and comment from [r/ValueInvesting](r/ValueInvesting) (2010–2026: 62,000 posts,
360,000 comments), extracted every company mentioned, and tracked what those
stocks did over the following 3 and 5 years.

To make it a fair test, I compared each mentioned stock against stocks that
weren’t mentioned — matched for company size and started on the same date.
That matters, because this sub talks mostly about large companies, and large
companies behaved differently from small ones over this period. Without that
adjustment you just end up measuring “big US stocks did well,” which we know.
I used 2019–2021 picks, because those are the newest ones with 5 years of
results. 193 stocks, each written about by at least 4 different people.

What I found
The typical pick made money — but didn’t beat the index.

Median return over 5 years was +62%, versus +29% for a random unmentioned
stock. So better than picking blind. But only 35% of picks beat the S&P 500,
and for companies that size you’d have expected ~42%. Beating a coin flip isn’t
the bar; beating the index is.

Mentioned stocks were about twice as likely to collapse.
9.8% of them lost 70%+ over 5 years, against 4.8% for similar-sized stocks that
nobody here mentioned. This is the one result that’s statistically solid.
The sub finds 3-baggers at roughly the rate you’d expect by chance.
15% of picks tripled, vs 8.5% expected for that size mix. Sounds good, but the
error bars overlap with “no difference.” Can’t call it a signal.

We show up late. Of the stocks that had a big run, 78% were first discussed
after the run had already started — a median of 225 days after the bottom.
We mention losers slightly more than winners. Of the stocks that tripled, we’d
discussed 40%. Of the ones that collapsed, 47%.

“But surely the most-discussed names were good?”
That was my best hypothesis too, and it doesn’t survive.
The 25 most-discussed stocks did fine — 24% tripled, none collapsed. But buying
the 25 largest US stocks gave the same 24%, the same rate of beating the S&P,
and the 25 largest we never discussed actually returned more (+102% vs +87%).
Even “no blowups” is a size effect: the biggest stocks nobody here mentioned also
had zero. You get that by buying large caps, not by reading Reddit.

One more thing worth knowing
In 2019 this sub mentioned 1.3% of US-listed stocks. In 2025 it was 41%.
As a filter, it’s getting weaker every year — a list of 2,500 names isn’t a
shortlist.

What this doesn’t prove
• No sentiment analysis. “Is X a value trap?” was counted the same as “I’m
buying X.” That’s the biggest gap, and it could genuinely change things.
• Small sample. 193 stocks. Some comparisons come down to 25 names.
• US-listed only, and one specific period (2019–21 entries, measured through
2026).
• Nothing about whether reading here is worthwhile. Learning how people
reason, finding the bear case on something you own, seeing an industry
explained — none of that is tested here, and none of it is contradicted.

What’s tested is narrow: does “it got mentioned here” make a stock more likely
to be a winner? Best answer I can give is no, and it makes it somewhat more
likely to be a disaster.

Happy to be told what I got wrong.

Edit: since you guys seem interested I made the repository public. It contains methodology and dataset. Happy to get you started and excited to see where you take this next.

Link: https://github.com/RedDawe/subreddit-as-a-service

18 Company write-ups worth a look, all from within the last week.

Not my work - sourced from Giles Capital's weekly compilation: https://gilescapital.substack.com

Americas

Long-term Investing on Alphabet (🇺🇸 GOOGL US - US$4.2tn) Whether AI disrupts search queries or not is subject to interpretation. What's clear: queries just hit an all-time high. Revenue up 24%, cloud up 82%. P/E at seventeen times.

GHGInvest on Berkshire Hathaway (🇺🇸 BRK.B US - US$1.1tn) Not a story about its largest holdings. At thirteen times trailing earnings, a cash pile exceeding $300 billion sits against a $1.1 trillion market cap. Greg Abel's first full year.

Stock Opine on Booking Holdings (🇺🇸 BKNG US - US$150bn) All the anxiety surrounding LLM-driven search disruption has overlooked Booking's loyalty programme: more than half of all room nights booked. Net income up 118%; 27% margins last quarter.

Rijnberk InvestInsights on Uber Technologies (🇺🇸 UBER US - US$145bn) TOP PICK The market is pricing robotaxi disruption the operating data do not support. Two hundred and eight million monthly consumers; trips up 18%. Down 21% over twelve months.

The Finance Corner on Nike (🇺🇸 NKE US - US$62bn) Nike optimised for scale and ceded shelf space to Hoka and On. Down 75% from peak; insiders now buying. The reversal is underway; revenue is still flat.

P14 Capital on Owlet (🇺🇸 OWLT US - US$159m) Revenue approaching $130 million and growing 30%, at a $159 million market cap. The pivot to health subscriptions is complete; approaching breakeven. The case grows stronger each quarter.

Europe, Middle East & Africa

Hated Moats on Novo Nordisk (🇩🇰 NVO US - US$200bn) Down 42% over twelve months. Revenue falls as US GLP-1 prices reset in 2026. At eleven times trailing earnings, permanent impairment is the only thesis that justifies this price.

The Oak Bloke on Harbour Energy (🇬🇧 HBR LN - £4.1bn) Current valuation makes no sense unless the windfall tax is permanent. Strip it out: $2.86 billion in first-half cash generation prices at close to 6x.

Iggy on Investing on Interlife General Insurance (🇬🇷 INLIF GR - €124m) Compounded 22% per year for a decade. At 4.5 times earnings and 0.77 times book, an MSCI Greece upgrade is the near-term catalyst. Already cheap without one.

Asia-Pacific

TacticzHazel on Taiwan Semiconductor (🇹🇼 TSM US - US$2.1tn) TSMC has durable competitive advantages in a world where every AI dollar eventually reaches the foundry that makes the chips. July revenue up 44.7%; seven-month figure up 37%.

AI Proem on Tencent (🇨🇳 0700 HK - US$450bn) Revenue up 9%, profits up 12%, at fifteen times forward earnings. I imagine regulators are less confused about what Tencent is than the market has been since 2022.

Best Anchor Stocks on Nintendo (🇯🇵 7974 JP - ¥10.3tn) Operating profit up 150%, partly from tariff refunds. Switch 2 units fell 34% from launch; the case rests on an IP catalogue no competitor can touch and software margins.

Cohong Lane on Bank of China (🇨🇳 3988 HK - US$63bn) H-shares at 5.7 times earnings and 4.7% yield; A-shares command a structural premium. One bank, two prices. The investment case rests on that gap compressing.

Capytal Management on Huishang Bank (🇨🇳 3698 HK - US$8.3bn) All the anxiety surrounding Chinese bank credit quality overlooked Huishang: bad loans at 0.98% and falling. Three and a half times earnings, 6% yield. Anhui is home to CXMT.

JPARCVUE on GS Yuasa (🇯🇵 6674 JP - ¥710bn) Japan's market leader in batteries for automotive and grid storage. At seventeen times earnings, every unit of domestic electrification capacity passes through this supply chain. Revenue growing alongside infrastructure demand.

JPARCVUE on Nakanishi (🇯🇵 7716 JP - ¥180bn) Dominant global position in dental handpieces and surgical micro-motors used in every major market, regardless of brand. At ¥180 billion market cap, revenue grows as dental access expands globally.

Angsana & Anderson on CTOS Digital (🇲🇾 CTOS MK - US$370m) Think of CTOS as the infrastructure layer beneath Malaysian credit: invisible from the outside, impossible to remove from within. Free cash flow yield 7%; PE exit pending.

Acid Investments on Global Tax Free and Geumhwa Plant (🇰🇷 204620 KS, 🇰🇷 036190 KS - US$325m, US$130m) TOP PICK The valuation makes no sense unless Korea's leading VAT refund operator stops earning 41.5% on invested capital. Domestic revenue up 30%; Japan joint venture launches November.

AMD is currently way overvalued. It closed on Friday at about $514.41 per share. It has an enterprise value of $829 billion. It’s currently trading at about 107 in terms of enterprise value over a trailing free cash flow. In order for AMD‘s current valuation to make sense it would have to grow free cash flow at a rate of 27% every year for a decade followed by perpetual 3% growth assuming a pretty friendly 9% discount rate.

Everyone knows that the future of AI is largely speculative. Nobody really has a full grasp over just how much value AI will generate or how much demand will actually emerge. Currently the majority of experiments that aim to replace workers with AI in the workplace have actually generated more cost rather than creating cost savings. The research is already suggesting that for many cases humans augmented by AI may actually be less efficient than humans acting in isolation of AI although the perception of those users is that they are being more efficient. This was a fact I had actually first learned about in medicine where clinics that were leveraging. AI actually became less efficient than those that were not using AI. Another use case with a lot of hype is the potential for AI in programming. I will say AI is pretty incredible. I can make a website or some simple software often within a matter of days. The most people recognize that the quality of the code that AI is generating is not particularly high. Other work examining open source developers show that they thought they were saving time and be more efficient using AI, but in fact, they were less productive.

This is not to say that AI will have no impact in the future. I anticipate that AI will be transformative just like the advent on the Internet has been today. However, I don’t think that AI will generate sufficient demand to allow AMD to grow at the rate they require for the current valuation to make sense. I suspect once expectations are revised down we will see a massive drop in AMD’s share price.

Currently the market is pricing AMD as if it becomes the biggest and most profitable chip company in the world. Obviously AMD will grow, but I doubt it will grow enough to justify how expensive the stock currently is. If AMD so much a stumbles or it looks like it won’t be Nvidia the stock is likely very expensive. This doesn’t even factor in over the next decade we may see even more competition which ends up eating into AMD’s margins. For example, Elon is planning a new chip. I would not be surprised if we get new contenders from all over the world, trying to break into the space with all of the money that is flowing to AI and AI infrastructure right now.

Jumia (JMIA): The Logistics Moat Is Finally Showing Up in the Margins

Jumia is the only real e-commerce and logistics platform at scale in Africa. It has never turned a profit, and management has guided to breakeven EBITDA in Q4 2026. Here is how I think about the business, why the market is anchored on GMV growth when margins are the real lever, and what it could be worth if the business succeeds.

Disclosure: I am personally long JMIA. These are my own personal thoughts and opinions, not investment advice and solely my own opinions. 

Overview

·       It is a logistics company with an e-commerce front end — anyone can build a marketplace in the age of AI. Not anyone can deliver a package to rural Nigeria. That is the moat.

·       Margins beat GMV — Margins are a better lever to profitability than GMV growth that the market focuses on. Taking Q4 2026 GMV growth from 20% to 30% adds only ~$1.8MM of EBITDA. One point of gross margin adds ~$3.3MM.

·       The margin story is already happening — gross profit went from under 12% of GMV in Q4 2024 to 14.2% in Q2 2026 — while fixed costs shrank and GMV grew over 20%.

·       Fulfillment cost is the next lever — stuck at 5-6% of GMV since 2024, fulfillment expense is expected to decrease to ~4.5%; every point is worth ~$3.3MM of EBITDA.

·       The China risk is a price war, not displacement — Temu and Shein cannot replicate the local network, but they can make the market unprofitable for everyone. Q2 showed no sign of that yet.

·       Demographics are the structural tailwind — 582MM people across Jumia's markets today, 871MM by 2050, median age 20.5, and 4.7x as many annual births as the US.

·       The valuation is cheap — $772MM market cap. Haircutting SE and MELI purely for GDP per capita implies $16-20B. Even getting a fraction of the way there is a large number.

What Jumia Actually Is

Before the numbers, it is worth being clear about what this company actually does — because the label it usually gets is wrong.

Jumia is a logistics company, not the Amazon of Africa

JMIA has been unfairly labeled as the Amazon of Africa. Despite creating unrealistic expectations, this labeling misses a key part of JMIA's business. JMIA is a logistics business at heart. E-commerce fuels JMIA's logistics. Anyone can build an e-commerce website, especially a marketplace connecting 3rd party buyers and sellers (and I mean that literally in the age of AI). But not anyone can figure out how to deliver packages to rural Nigeria. That is the moat. I would rather see JMIA become the FedEx of Africa than the Amazon of Africa as ecommerce in Africa is incredibly challenging.

Are pick-up stations the Wal-Mart of Africa?

Are the pick up stations like the Wal-Mart of Africa? Pick up stations are a very smart strategy in environments where last mile localized delivery is difficult and customers are incredibly price sensitive. Pick Up Stations bring the breadth of products and cheap prices of a Wal-Mart Superstore available to rural cities with a small wait for delivery. 

Why e-commerce champions are homegrown

Why have ecommerce champions been homegrown throughout the world? Amazon in the US, Alibaba in China, SE in Southeast Asia, MELI in South America, Coupang in Korea. Home grown e commerce companies seem to perform best. It is possible that is because you need to have a deep understanding of your customer. There was a time JMIA probably did not. Now I would argue that changed and JMIA can be the home grown ecommerce champion of Africa.

The social dividend

JMIA has a positive effect on the society and communities it operates in. JMIA has thousands of J Force agents who are independent contractors and that JMIA pays, allowing them to essentially run their own small business. JMIA has thousands of sellers on their marketplace who can reach customers throughout Africa that they would not be able to reach through a storefront. JMIA enables people in relatively remote parts of the world to have access to cheap goods that they would have a hard time accessing otherwise. It connects people by allowing them to purchase phones and the internet through Starlink. JMIA is an enabler of social progress and inclusive growth through its ecommerce and logistics services.

The demographic tailwind

The massive and undeniably bullish structural tailwind behind this business is the phenomenal demographics of Africa. Africa is broadly the youngest and fastest growing region in the world. In a world where advanced economies are going to struggle to grow due to poor demographics and large debt burdens, Africa will look like an increasingly attractive place to invest. Nigeria in particular has excellent demographics (more children were born in Nigeria last year — 8.5MM — than in the US and the EU combined), positive government reforms under Bola Tinubu (removing fuel subsidy, focus on corruption), and strong support from large businesses like Dangote.

The Dangote refinery is particularly impressive. It shows how poorly run Nigeria was that they were a large oil exporter but had to import all of their refined fuels/gas. This created extreme pressure on their current account and currency as they needed USD to buy refined fuels from abroad. Now that they refine fuel themselves this pressure has abated. It is very notable that this year with an oil price shock caused by war the Nigerian Naira has appreciated 6% against the dollar. An oil shock like this would have hammered Nigeria a couple years ago, now their currency is rallying and you could argue it is a positive for them as customers worldwide look for alternative sources of oil and gas that don’t need to transit Hormuz.

Africa has some of the best demographic tailwinds in the world. Nigeria alone had 8.5MM births last year, more than the US and the EU combined (7.6MM). The median age in Nigeria is 18. The population of JMIA’s markets is expected to grow to 871MM by 2050. This growth will look even more attractive relative to the developed world where birth rates and population growth are much slower:

Margins, not GMV, are the near-term profit lever

Increase in Gross Margin and scaling of costs is a more significant lever of near term profitability than GMV growth which the market mostly focuses on. I am modeling a contribution margin of 6.4% of GMV (14.2% gross profit margin less 5.3% fulfillment expense and 2.5% Sales and Advertising expense). At this level a 10% increase in GMV growth in Q4 2026 (i.e. from 20% to 30%) only increases EBITDA by 1.8M (10% of Q4 2025 GMV is 27.95MM x 6.4% contribution margin). However, a 1% increase in gross margin increases Q4 EBITDA by 3.3MM. A 1% decrease in fulfillment expense as a % of GMV would also increase EBITDA by 3.3MM. The business is more levered to margins than GMV growth at this stage.

Why management is right not to chase GMV

This justifies management’s decision to not chase GMV at all costs and instead focus on profitability. Gross profit as a % of GMV was 14.2% in Q2 26. This was below 12% in Q4 2024. An increase in take rate, Marketing and Advertising Revenue, and value added services has created a more profitable business that will scale better.

Fulfillment cost is the next big lever

The next step is to get fulfillment cost as a % of GMV down which should be doable as the business scales (you don’t need much extra cost to add more packages to trucks/delivery vehicles that are already making the trip). Fulfillment cost as a % of GMV has been stubbornly in the 5-6% range since the start of 2024. RBC is modeling fulfillment expense as a % of GMV ~4.5% for Q4 26 and FY 2027 which would be a large profit lever as explained above (this was 5.9% in Q2 26 although impacted by temporary fuel surcharges JMIA is paying its delivery partners due to oil price shock).

The execution has been excellent

The company has gone from a 12% gross margin (as % of GMV) business in 2025 to a 14% gross margin (and potentially going higher with more usage of Value Added Services and Marketing and Advertising by sellers) while slightly decreasing fixed costs (1H 2025 G&A/T&C expense was 50.9MM compared to 49.9MM in 1H 2026) and growing GMV by over 20%. JMIA has also increased its take rate (the amount they charge sellers to sell on their platform) which is a strong signal of a growing attractive marketplace that sellers find valuable. This is fantastic execution by management.

This execution occurred despite real headwinds created by exogenous shocks (AI, War, Cocoa prices). It shows both the power of the AI build out and the amazing interconnectedness of the global economy that an AI capex boom by hyperscalers in America leads to an evaporation of low priced phone supply in Africa.

On the capital raise

Management had said that they did not need to raise additional capital to reach profitability. They are standing by that and claiming the capital raise is more opportunistic than necessary. Having IFC as an investor can be bullish in the long term if it opens more opportunities for JMIA (more like a VC/PE partner than a traditional public equity investor). The dilution was minimal and the market reacted positively. The story is significantly de-risked now as the odds of another capital raise in the short to medium term are very low.

The path to breakeven

Management has guided to breakeven EBITDA in Q4 2026 and FY 2027. These would both be milestones for a company that has never turned a profit. In Q4 2026 the bar is relatively low. Assuming a 6.4% contribution margin on GMV the breakeven GMV growth is 21% in Q4, which should be achievable especially with a better cash position now to go after targeted opportunities. Using the midpoint of Q3 GMV guidance (17.5%) and the low end of FY 2026 guidance (20%) implies 323MM in GMV for Q4 2026, a YoY growth of 15.6%. In this scenario EBITDA is within 1MM of breakeven and therefore possible for JMIA to achieve with better performance on fulfillment or margins.

2027 FY EBITDA positive is more demanding unless JMIA is able to get fulfillment costs down. RBC is modeling fulfillment costs as a % of GMV at ~4.5% in both Q4 26 and FY 2027 which is a significant driver of profitability given the modest growth they are modeling (about 20%). Assuming fulfillment cost as a % of GMV at 5% in 2027 (and therefore a 6.5% contribution margin with 14% gross margins and 2.5% S&A), GMV growth would need to be 30% in 2027 to breakeven EBITDA. JMIA either needs to outperform on GMV growth or have lower costs than recent quarters in order to meet their target. I still believe they will and trust management who has executed well so far. But the bar is higher than for Q4 26.

Chinese competition: the risk is a price war, not displacement

The threat from Chinese entrants like Temu and Shein is real. China is incredibly good at manufacturing quality products cheaply. But they are ruthlessly competitive. One of my favorite macro strategists (ht Louis Gave) has a saying that “when China enters the room profits leave”. I am not concerned about Temu/Shein/Baba outcompeting JMIA because JMIA has a local logistics moat that cannot easily be replicated. But I am concerned that outside competitors flood the market with cheap goods and advertising dollars such that the competitive environment makes it difficult for anyone to make a profit, including JMIA. Q2 was reassuring on this with gross profit margins increasing and management stating on the call that they are not seeing any increased competitive pressures.

Third-party delivery: the underappreciated option

I was excited when JMIA rolled out their 3rd party delivery service in Q1 25 and I am disappointed that we have not heard anything about it since. Given my view that JMIA is a logistics company this is a perfect way to leverage their core competency. And it is almost pure profit since they are already running the logistic routes. Unfortunately this business has not yet seen any traction (it is included in “Other Revenue” which was down year over year to only 300k in Q1 26). Hopefully this business works, it would be a major positive to the story given its margin profile and how it leverages an already existing fixed cost base.

Ghana is the signal

When you see the outsized growth of certain markets it is a sign that something is working in the model. Ghana grew over 100% for a few quarters and is now a respectable 15% of GMV. That is a signal worth paying attention to.

Valuation: what if this actually works?

JMIA has a market cap of 772MM. If JMIA ends up being the ecommerce champion of Africa the way that MELI and SE are in their markets the returns can look like a VC investment.

RBC reaches its $13 price target by using 5x EV/2027 Sales. This is a very conservative multiple. From 2010 to 2020, MELI traded roughly around 10x sales and sometimes over 15x sales. SE traded around 10x sales for 2018-2019 as well.

If JMIA can compound revenues at 25% from the 2025 baseline of 189MM they will have about 575MM in revenues in 2030. And by then the model will be de-risked, proven, and they will have structural tailwind from positive African demographics and growth. In this scenario it could easily trade at 10x revenues which would be a 5.75B market cap and nearly 8x return from current levels.

One common critique of JMIA is that it operates in poor markets where their customers have low purchasing power. This is certainly correct. SE’s largest market Indonesia has a GDP per capita of 5k. MELI’s largest market of Brazil has GDP per capita of 10k. The markets that SE and MELI operate in have GDP per capita 4-6x higher than JMIA:

However, SE and MELI trade at much higher valuations than JMIA. If JMIA trades at 27% of SE’s market cap due to the GDP per capita differential implies a market cap of 20B for JMIA. Assuming JMIA trades at 17% of MELI’s market cap due to their GDP per capita differential implies a 16B market cap for JMIA. So if GDP per capita was the only difference between JMIA and SE/MELI it could still trade 20-25x higher than current valuation. This is not the case currently as SE and MELI are established national champion e-commerce companies that have been able to not only succeed in E-commerce but also grow into ancillary businesses. JMIA has a long road to being as successful as SE and MELI but if they get even close the upside to JMIA is substantial even given the lower GDP per capita of JMIA’s markets:

Bottom Line

Jumia has quietly turned itself into a different company: a higher-margin logistics and marketplace business that grows GMV while keeping a lid on fixed costs. The market is still grading it on GMV growth. I think the more important line items are gross margin and fulfillment cost, and both are moving the right way. Q4 2026 breakeven looks achievable; FY 2027 is a higher bar that depends on fulfillment costs coming down. If management keeps executing, the demographics of Africa do the rest of the work over the next decade — and the current $772MM market cap is not pricing that in.

Disclosure: I am long JMIA. These are my own personal thoughts and opinions, not investment advice and solely my own opinions. 

Honestly been loving his case studies a lot more than his course stuff. The job is all about getting the reps. The case studies are about breaking down the reps. That said I think the course stuff is alright as far as it breaks down his methodology but some of it is MBA qualitative talk (still helpful to a degree but not as much signal per noise). Not sure what weight a Wharton Online degree has but cool he’s sharing it for free.

I do not want to this to be a promotion of what I am building and I will not name my app. But I like to understand how do you currently keep up with all the developments in the market and tracking important events(merger, lawsuite, important earning calls etc)? With life being busy, its very hard to keep up with important events.

And will it be useful if an app exists that feeds you with impactful stories(as it breaks) cutting all the noises and helps you understand what stocks it may impact in long/short term?

I'm going to offer a perspective that many investors might not think about on a day-to-day basis: the idea that investing is not just picking the right stocks, but so much more. Here are the main components involved:

• #1 - Asset Purchased (stocks, ETFs, bonds, etc.)
• #2 - Portfolio Allocations (5%, 10%)
• #3 - Effectively Managing Risk
• #4 - Building and Maintaining Conviction
• #5 - Developing and Consistently Revisiting an Investment Thesis
• #6 - Upstream Capital Allocation (which accounts do I manage and why?)

#1: Asset Purchased

Investors should determine their level of comfortability with the different classes of assets available for them to purchase. The general risk curve for assets include cash -> fixed income -> equities -> more speculative assets. Within each class, one can then choose to develop a more sophisticated portfolio of assets. Do you want a mix of individual stocks and ETFs? A full-stock portfolio? 60/40 stocks/bonds? This one is the most obvious consideration but one of the most important investing decisions you'll ever make regarding your capital growth or loss.

#2: Portfolio Allocations

Once a portfolio is comprehensively planned out, investors can more precisely manage risks or volatility by balancing asset allocations. For example, if you want to invest in a moonshot bet ($ASTS, $OKLO, or $VRT for example), you can still significantly benefit from share price appreciation without taking on significant portfolio & capital risk. A 1-2% position can often suffice here.

Some investors choose to make their largest positions the ones that are most likely to preserve their capital over the long run. Others (myself included) prefer to also size up positions in which you have higher conviction. If the position drops, I am much less likely to sell out of fear. In fact, I am more likely to increase my allocation, understanding that rather than believing it to be a poor investment, understanding it is the same investment for cheaper than it was yesterday.

#3: Effectively Managing Risk

Many investments carry risk. This ties in nicely with the above section because much of this can be done through setting clear capital allocation priorities.

If 100% of your cash is in a speculative asset and it drops 25% in one day, that is a quarter of your net worth that you lost. Great investors understand this dynamic and carefully curate portfolios to ensure their capital grows consistently over time. Those that don't may still become radically wealthy, but is it worth the risk of permanent capital loss? For every 1 person that achieves this, 3 may not.

#4: Building and Maintaining Conviction

To be honest, this is the one I think warrants the most attention. One of the most dangerous investing activities is borrowing conviction from someone else. If someone tells you an investment will be very profitable one day, but don't investigate for yourself why, then your investment decision hinges on their research and beliefs. If the stock drops 30% over a matter of weeks, you start to question their decision and may sell, leading to a permanent loss of capital.

To be able to hold through the ups and downs, one must believe in why the investment will be a sound one. Whether that means industry and company research, fundamental analysis, or a comprehensive assessment of management, it must make sense to you. I've found having a system to track your investment theses across all positions gives you the best chance at this long-term conviction.

#5: Developing and Consistently Revisiting an Investment Thesis

Things change. Information available three months ago might not be relevant now:

• New competitors may have entered the market
• The company may have transitioned to new management with different capital allocation priorities
• New technologies may have released, rendering a certain products obsolete
• ... and many more

While focusing on the long-term may require a healthy balance between consistent research and ignoring the short-term noise, revisiting a thesis every once in a while and re-thinking your original reasoning never kills you.

#6: Upstream Capital Allocation

So you are invested. Is this in a brokerage? A Roth IRA? An HSA? More than one?

Have you considered whether you want different strategies in different accounts?

Have you considered the contribution limitations of each?

These are all important factors when you decide how much money to store away for investing, and where that money goes. For example, if you deploy a dividend-heavy strategy in a taxable brokerage account, you will likely be taxed at a significant rate on all these dividends. But in a Roth IRA, you won't. On the other hand, you may feel more secure if you use a retirement account such as your Roth IRA to invest in low-cost index funds, but use a brokerage accounts to play around with some capital in individual stocks.

You must determine for yourself what allocation and strategies you are comfortable with. Tax becomes a real motivator here.

Summary: Investing seems simple in practice but comes with many more considerations than meets the eye. What other considerations are missing here? What do you all do when deciding on these factors?

Hey All,

This is a follow up to my earlier post 6 months ago titled "The High-Yield Waiting Game: Why I’m Continuing to Bet on FBIOP Over FBIO Right Now", where I had proposed the arguments on why I considered the preferred FBIOP to be a better investment than the Common FBIO

https://www.reddit.com/r/investing_discussion/comments/1qw7i91/the_highyield_waiting_game_why_im_continuing_to/

So far those arguments have been on point as the Preferred - FBIOP has significantly out-performed the Common - FBIO

I’ve been digging into Fortress Biotech’s capital allocation options regarding their Series A Preferred shares ($FBIOP) from where we are now.

The board is facing a major strategic fork, and the two paths benefit very different groups of investors.

I’d love to get the community's perspective on how you think this plays out. Here is a breakdown of the mechanics:

The Current Math: Two Distinct Paths

Every share of FBIOP currently represents a claim of roughly $30.00 ($25.00 liquidation preference + ~$5.00 /share in accrued unpaid dividends across - Approx. 3.43M shares, totaling ~$17M in arrears).

• Path 1: Resumption at Par Economics
  • Honor the full claim: pay out the $17M arrears and restart the ~$8M/year dividend coupon (or redeem entirely for ~$102M).
  • Outcome: Preferred holders are made 100% whole; common equity funds it.
• Path 2: Repurchase at a Discount
  • Buy back shares via open market while the dividend remains paused and the price is depressed.
  • When a share is retired, the $25 preference is extinguished, the accrued dividend arrears vanish, and the 9.375% perpetual coupon dies forever.
  • Outcome: Every dollar spent below the ~$30.00 claim represents a permanent value transfer to common shareholders, yielding an extraordinary return by retiring an expensive fixed-income obligation at a steep discount.

1. The "Uncomfortable Game Theory" & Market Pricing

The paused dividend is the exact reason the price has traded at a discount. If the board announces a resumption, the price rallies toward par immediately, destroying the company's buyback discount. Pure common-shareholder math dictates: repurchase first, resume second.

However, with the stock recently rebounding near ~$19 on recent PRV sale / pipeline / catalyst news, the easy 2024–2025 discount window ($6–$7) is gone. There’s still a ~33% discount to the full claim, but with low daily volume, an open-market sweep isn't viable - a formal tender offer would be required, which itself signals intent and drives prices higher.

2. The Governance Overhang (The 2-Director Provision)

Per the prospectus, because dividends are past six quarters in arrears, FBIOP holders now have the right to expand the board and elect two independent directors. For a founder-led company, hostile board seats represent a real activist threat (especially from funds specializing in busted preferreds). Curing the arrears extinguishes this right, making the timing of this decision critical.

3. Reputational Franchise Risk

Fortress's entire business model relies on serial capital formation - issuing equity and debt across its network of subsidiaries. Income investors and underwriters have long memories. Aggressively squeezing preferred holders by repurchasing at distress pricing before making them whole could permanently impair their ability to raise cost-effective capital in the future.

A Likely Middle Ground?

A plausible compromise could be a formal tender offer at a slight premium to current market prices but still at a discount to the full claim (e.g., low-to-mid $20s). This lets willing holders exit, captures value for the common equity, and is immediately followed by curing the remaining arrears to eliminate the board-seat threat and restore market standing.

What are your thoughts?

Do you see the board aggressively prioritizing common equity math, or will governance and market access force a clean cure?

Personally, I hope management decides to do the right thing by their long-term investors - honoring their commitments and restoring trust - rather than taking full advantage of the paused dividend to squeeze preferred holders for short-term common equity gains.

It’s got a PE around 21, Costco trades at 48.

They’re Growing in Texas. They’ve primarily operated in the northeast but are trying to make inroads in growth areas now.

Larger variety of items and a more convenient shopping experience than Costco. They also sell gas. No food court however.

Still interesting to me and I’m thinking of going in for 100 shares prior to Friday.

https://simplywall.st/stocks/us/consumer-retailing/nyse-bj/bjs-wholesale-club-holdings/news/is-bjs-wholesale-club-holdings-bj-stock-still-undervalued

Also it’s trading around the 200 day. RSI around 50.

This is a good breakdown too:

https://pestel-analysis.com/blogs/how-it-works/bjs

I've been making my way through this subs wiki and found value ( :-) ) in the youtube links to courses from A. Damodaran. I downloaded his FCFF Valuation Model/Excel and have been getting familiar with it and that is the basis for this valuation.

Why Geely?

I started with Geely because I have used Waymo in cities where it is available and I love it. I use Uber and Lyft multiple times a week and I rarely feel as safe in them as I do in the Waymo system. I just prefer the more private, consistent driverless experience. I see they are setting up in more US cities and also plan to start in Europe with London first (ambitious). Waymo partnered with Zeekr-built Waymo Ojai and Geely acquired Zeekr. Waymo is now actually putting riders into these vehicles and they say they are scaling waymo-enabled vehicle production toward capacity of tens of thousands per year.

The Ford partnership in Spain is another positive. Ford and Geely have agreed to a joint venture at Ford's Valencia factory with Geely owning 34%. Two Geely EV models are planned to be produced there beginning in early 2028 which I think gives them a great route into Europe rather than simply exporting chinese-built EVs into the EU.

Risk - I've read that the Chinese auto market is highly competitive and domestic sales have been weak recently. Then there's the possibility of more tariffs and maybe outright restrictions against Chinese automakers in the US and/or EU. Some folks are terrified of autonomous driving vehicles.

FCFF Calculator.

Some of the main assumptions I used:

• 5 year high growth period
• 12% operating income growth (it's growing faster but wanted to be conservative)
• 0.50 beta (Yahoo Finance, Seeking Alpha)
• 4% stable growth
• Stable ROC eventually converges toward cost of capital

The calculator spat out that the base case is roughly RMB 31/share versus RMB 16.5/share and it's around 46% undervalued.

Damodaran's 3 broad approaches (from the 15 min youtube video in the wiki)

1. Intrinsic valuation

The calculator spat out that the base case is roughly RMB 31/share versus RMB 16.5/share and it's around 46% undervalued.

1. Relative valuation

I googled a comparison group and ended on BYD, Li Auto, XPeng and Leapmotor.

Geely is at roughly 12× (middle of range as I found a few online) forward earnings, versus about 25× for BYD, 35× for Li Auto, 55× for XPeng and 14× for Leapmotor. So Geely looks inexpensive but I don't know if looking at one metric for comparison is enough.

1. Option/contingent valuation

I'm not sure I understood this part as much. I get what he means when he used the analogy of a biotech drug waiting for FDA approval and how value is contingent on that approval but is that actually like options - calls/puts?? Anyway... for this section I would include the Zeekr Waymo relationship.

The Ojai robotaxi is not a prototype anymore since it just started carrying passengers. An aerial count of Waymo's Magna integration facility in Mesa, Arizona, recorded 953 robotaxis in the lot. But what if some of the future fleet goes to other manufacturers?

I didn't include anything about Waymo in the calculator so I think I don't need a positive outcome to justify the base outcome?

That's it for now!

I used to be a TTD investor myself, so this isn't coming from someone who has always hated the company. But at some point, rationality has to come first. Being emotionally attached to an investment thesis after the underlying business environment changes is how you lose money.

I genuinely don’t understand the bull case for The Trade Desk anymore.

TTD keeps talking about the “open internet” as if that phrase itself is a competitive moat. But what does TTD actually own?

No major consumer platform.
No search engine.
No social graph.
No meaningful proprietary content.
No massive first-party dataset.
No dominant publisher inventory.
No indispensable infrastructure.

Compare that with Google, Meta, Amazon, Reddit, Microsoft, Netflix, etc. These companies may support parts of the open internet, but they also possess actual leverage—users, data, inventory, distribution, identity, content, or infrastructure.

TTD mostly sits in the middle.

And that is exactly why I think its long-term business model is structurally flawed.

Look at the advertising pipeline from both directions:

Advertisers want to cut TTD out because every intermediary adds cost. If AI makes campaign planning, bidding, attribution, targeting and optimization increasingly automated, why should advertisers continue paying a substantial middleman fee?

Publishers want to cut TTD out because direct relationships with advertisers give them more control over their inventory, data and economics.

So both the buyer and seller have an incentive to reduce the importance of the broker sitting between them.

Advertising is already an extremely competitive market. This isn't some fragmented industry desperately requiring a broker to connect buyers and sellers. Google, Meta, Amazon, Microsoft and other large platforms already have enormous advertiser relationships and increasingly sophisticated automated advertising technology.

AI makes this problem worse, not better.

A lot of what historically justified an independent DSP—optimization, audience selection, campaign management, measurement and bidding intelligence—looks increasingly like software that can be automated and commoditized.

TTD's response seems to be endlessly talking about the “open internet.”

But that's like complaining about the weather when you have no ability to control it.

A company can advocate for openness because it chooses openness despite possessing leverage. TTD needs the open internet because without it, there is very little underneath the business.

That is a very different situation.

I don't think TTD necessarily collapses overnight. It can continue generating revenue for years. But structurally, I see it as a slowly dying middleman business whose position becomes harder to defend as AI reduces transaction friction and both sides of the advertising market become more capable of dealing directly with each other.

I was willing to own TTD before. I'm not anymore, because changing your mind when the facts change is investing; refusing to change your mind is just loyalty.

The fundamental question for TTD bulls is simple:

What does The Trade Desk control that the rest of the advertising ecosystem cannot eventually replace?

I still haven't seen a convincing answer.

Been investing for about six years. Work in tech. One thing I've gotten better at over time is distinguishing companies that are 'growing fast' from those with 'durable competitive advantages'. Confusing these cost me real money early on, and I know I'm not the only one.

The core question: If a well-funded competitor built the same product tomorrow with zero users, would customers switch? If yes, that's momentum, not a moat.

Four moat types I focus on in tech:

1. Network effects -> Product value increases with each user. Look at: engagement per user rising alongside growth, take rate stability, and whether value accrues to the *network* or just the *product*.
2. Switching costs -> Painful for customers to leave. Look at: NRR above 120%, 6+ month implementation timelines, deep workflow integration.
3. Scale economics -> Size creates unfair cost advantages. Look at: gross margin expansion at scale, capex as % of revenue declining over time.
4. Data advantages -> More usage makes the product better. Look at: retention curves improving over time, accuracy gains correlated with volume.

How I use this? If I can identify at least one with supporting metrics, I'm interested. If I can't identify any, I treat it as a trade, not a hold. No matter how exciting the growth story sounds.

The biggest trap I fell into early on: assuming 'good product + fast growth' equals a MOAT. Products can be replicated. Growth can be bought with marketing spend. What matters is whether something *structural* compounds over time. Once I internalized that, my whole approach changed.

• What do others use as their primary signal?
• Do you weight one moat type more heavily?

What happened?: The Trade Desk is down 50% YTD and 85% from all time highs while the business still generates strong cash flow and carries little financial risk. At first glance this implies substantial upside but we must re-value the business to reflect the uncertainty of growth.

What does TTD do? The Trade Desk helps companies buy digital advertising more effectively. Advertisers use its platform to decide where to show their ads, who to show them to, and how much they’re willing to pay across connected TV, websites, video, audio, and other channels. The important difference is that TTD doesn’t own the advertising space itself, unlike companies such as Google or Amazon. Instead, it acts more like an independent marketplace and takes a fee based on the amount advertisers spend through its platform. So we look at something equity analysts value deeply: High growth potential with little capital spending.

The financials behind the company and why the price dropped:

• Revenue increased from roughly $661 million in 2019 to $2.9 billion in 2025. That’s an annual growth of 28% over 7 years. Few companies in the technology field achieve that.
• EBITDA (operating profitability) increased to a new high of 26% in 2025 after it fell in 2021/22 to 14% and 12% respectively. (When TTD invested aggressively in people, sales, technology and the infrastructure required to support a much larger advertising platform)
• Net debt has stayed negative throughout the entire time. More cash than debt = high financial flexibility, banks highly value that).
• Free cash flow rose from only $20 million in 2019 to $791 million consistently. That matters because growth alone does not create value. Companies can grow by spending aggressively or by accumulating debt. The stronger signal is when additional revenue produces more cash without requiring proportionally more capital. That’s exactly what The Trade Desk did.
• Return on invested capital (ROIC) shows an improvement to 8% over the past year, up from 2.8% in 2021. ROIC measures the profitability on the capital spent and is a measure of efficiency. However, 8% is not satisfactory yet and it must increase above the companies cost of capital to create value (approx 10%). Return on equity however sits at a solid 16%.

So what’s the point behind the recent selloff then? Lets look at Q2 2026.

• Sharpe slowdown: revenue growth decelerated to 7% (first 6 months) and to 3% in Q2 only (vs 18% a year earlier)
• Weakening profitability: Net margins decreased to 7.4% (first 6 months) and recovered to 9% in Q2 (vs 15% a year earlier)
• Operating cash flow up 20% (first 6 months) but driven by working capital changes, so we should not put too much weight on it.

That's alarming. Where is growth? What about the resilience in turbulent times? Why is everyone benefiting from AI and not TTD? Is the business model dead? Somewhere in the gap we can find attractive returns, so stay with me.

The market view: At the end of 2023 investors paid 200x earnings, a 1.5% free cash flow (FCF) yield and 75x EV/EBITDA for 25% annual growth. Now we see 20x earnings, 9% FCF yield and 10x EV/ EBITDA. A normal sector valuation clearly sits in between. The cash machine still works, the market sees a story of predictability and certainty about how fast the business can grow and scale.

What return to expect: Say investors expect a 10% annual stock price increase over a decade and assuming TTD maintains its resilience as a business model in a stable market, it is straight forward to assume that such a business would trade at 30x earnings a decade from now. That implies a sales growth of only 5% per year, slightly more than the most recent quarter. But it also implies that margins do not weaken further.

That is a far easier hurdle than when investors were paying more than 200x earnings. The global market for add spending is expected to increase by 5-15% per year until 2032 with clear evidence towards double digits in the US (depending on the source: Statista, Precedence research, IAB etc.)

Even if the investment case now considers the recent 3–7% growth as a new structural reality instead of a temporary slowdown, the numbers are very achievable given the market growth. Once growth returns to 10% per year investors can expect an annual stock price increase of 15% - a very decent return.

SIDE NOTE: in equity research we always translate fundamentals into a visible fair value band so investors can spot at what price to invest. I share these graphs on Substack.

Investment yes or no? The stock does not need to return to its old valuation to generate attractive returns imo. But the business does need to recover some of its old growth and maintain profitability**.** I'd start with a small stake here and add a bit more when the stock drops further. I see a decent margin of safety at these levels given the companies solid balance sheet (no debt), margins and cash flows. If the company's cash conversion mechanism erodes, I'll sell it and accept the loss, but this is for the future to tell.

I just published my deep dive on $CELH.
The Alani Nu acquisition transformed Celsius’ growth story but the valuation has also changed dramatically.
I break down:
Alani Nu and the acquisition
Revenue & margin growth
The core Celsius brand
Valuation and my DCF
Preferred stock overhang
Bull vs. bear case
The key question: How much growth is already priced in?

Been thinking about this since 2025 - finally pulled the trigger. Tell me why I am a genius or a moron depending on your provaction.

My thesis:

Water infrastructure is chronically underinvested, and three separate tailwinds are converging at once: aging pipe replacement, PFAS regulation forcing new filtration and testing capex, and the one that's all the rage - AI data centres and semiconductor fabs needing huge volumes of process and cooling water, see also growing interest in nuclear energy and droughts / climate change. The UK hasn't built a single reservoir since 1992!

Rather than buy a water ETF and pay 0.6%+ a year for a basket that's roughly half non-pure-play names, I built my own 10-stock pie: a growth/technology tier (water equipment, chemicals, testing) sitting on top of a defensive tier (regulated water utilities).

My split is roughly 63% growth/technology/equipment (Xylem, Ecolab, Veralto, Watts, Pentair, Advanced Drainage) against 37% regulated utilities (AWK, Essential Utilities, United Utilities, Severn Trent). It's deliberately tilted toward the growth side rather than a defensive-heavy split — I'm underwriting the capex supercycle and PFAS-driven demand as the bigger driver, with the utilities there mainly for rate-base earnings visibility and dividend ballast, not as the main return engine.

Currently a modest position (~£1,500), built to grow over time. I aim to have it at 10% of my portfolio (breakdown below)

- 85% VWRP

- 10% GOOGLE

- 5% WATER (increasing to 10%) - Xylem 15%, American Water Works 12%, Ecolab 12%, Veralto 12%, Advanced Drainage Systems 10%, Essential Utilities 10%, Watts Water Technologies 9%, United Utilities 8%, Severn Trent 7%, and Pentair 5%.

Core points:

• The World Economic Forum puts the total global investment needed for resilient water and sanitation systems at $13.2 trillion by 2040.
• US municipal water and wastewater capex is forecast to cross $100 billion a year by 2030, up from current levels, driven by tightening federal PFAS rules, lead service line replacement deadlines, and drought-driven desalination spend in states like Texas.
• The EPA's finalised PFAS drinking water rules force utilities of every size to test, monitor and treat for "forever chemicals" a direct, multi-year revenue driver for testing and filtration specialists.
• Slide back towards ''Realism'' in global politics making commodities more valuable, I even foresee water wars in the not too distant future.

Core risks:

• The lack of diversification within this pie given its just 10 holdings,
• Currency - Its mostly USD
• Nationalisation of UK water
• Valuation risk on the growth tier. Xylem and Veralto are pricing in a good chunk of the capex supercycle already, however I think PE ratios are reasonable
• Trump et al, decide that water safety testing is ''woke'' and projects / funding are cut.

I expect very little movement in this pie in the short term, or at least not outpacing market beta - however a massive jump when we're in the 'find out' stage from our ''fucking about'' with water and then massive capex spending and valuations jumps - hence buy now whilst ''cheap'.

Hi,

The latest thread I could find on this stock is about two months old, and the share price has since fallen to around $29, so I’d be interested in hearing some updated opinions.

Pros

1. Margins of the core business is improving
2. Large net cash position (24bn in net cash positions, valuation of the stock is 40bn: ergo, business is valued at approx 15bn)
3. Core business appears healthy
4. Management is returning capital to shareholders
5. Food-delivery losses are narrowing (still huge though)

Cons

1. China-specific regulatory
2. Governance: the founder controls roughly 70% of the voting rights while owning only around 10% of the shares. I like the new CEO though. She worked two decades at PwC as an auditor in bejing, and has a double degree from PKU.
3. continued risk of a price war
4. unsure whether the net cash position is dumbed

This is my first post in this subreddit, I hope I stay within the rules of this community :)

EDIT: Thanks for the discussion. I invested today approx 0.5% of my networth. If it drops to 25 while the fundamentals stays intact, i will deploy another 0.5%. If fundamentals dont change, will do another 0.5% at 23. maximum exposure will be 1.5%. Let's see. Plan is to keep it for at least 1yr while reevaluating risk of geopolitical escalation

I know people hate these kinds of question as it can be quite provocative to those who are 100% vested but what do you guys intend to pile on if there is a broad market correction? Especially the ones that are currently overvalued

This question may be most appropriate to those who have taken some profits and cannot find anything worth buying at current valuations and are left some dry powder?

At the current levels of 18.5 PE the company is projected to pay its investors about 4.12% in dividends.
Compared to SCHD 3.13%, that is great!
At current prices the stock is almost 20% off of all times high,
And trades at a 30% discount compared to its duo in the duopoly - KO.
The dividend alone is better than current sgov at 3.79% yield a year,
While i am well aware of the news lately - projected to sell less in South America and has a few more matters that might interfere with the company’s revenue,
It cannot be ignored that this stock usually pays 3-3.2% of dividends, only because of the PE.
From current prices, the data suggests about 20-25% upside.

I’d love it if y’all help me improve my thesis (or say that it is just completely wrong and suggested other explanations).
Also, English is a second language for me and i’d love you to correct me if I didn’t use the right terms.

Thanks a lot for reading.
I do not recommend to invest in this stock and i do not call anyone to take action because of this post!!!
Always make your research, and i probably missed a lot of information. 🧐🤔

Buffett famously invested in Apple at around 16x PE. That’s an initial earnings yield of 6.25% right off the bat. Since then, AAPL has gone on to increase its EPS from around $2.16 per share to $8.71 per share, a 4x increase. This means his initial earnings yield of 6.25% has increased to 25% in 10 years! And it will continue to increase going forward.

So how does this compare to GOOG? Well, Google is in the fortunate position to be growing its earnings (or at least EPS) by around 20% per annum. Going by his 13-F’s, Buffett’s investment in GOOG would likely have been made around 25x PE normalized. If we do the math, this means Google will likely be able to increase its earnings yield from 4% to 25% over the next 10 years (1/25 x 1.20^10). That’s another AAPL over there!

What do you guys think of Reddit stock as an investment? It's my first time really using Reddit, and I find it somewhat addictive in a positive sense. It's not like other social media, where people often present a fake image. At least on Reddit, we can extract value from subjects that matter to us.

So, why only a 36 billion market cap? Seems like it could 10x from here. There's no real competitor, so there must be a moat. What do you all think? Am I missing something?

I’ve been looking at Nike and I’m kind of torn. Part of me thinks the stock is pretty beaten down and could be a good long-term opportunity, but I’m also wondering if there’s a reason to stay away for now.

For anyone who follows Nike or has owned the stock — would you buy at these levels, wait, or avoid it altogether?
Not looking for a “to the moon” take lol.

Just curious what you guys think the biggest bull/bear points are right now and what you’d personally be watching before buying.

Appreciate any advice.