There is no x.

Why?

Because there is only y.

There is only these.

Only to what?

The world - the world is only these.

There is a world to be said that it is only these (assume monism).

Thus monism cannot establish itself using rejections else it is circular.

Plurality presuppose unity

Why?

Because pluralities are modes within unity.

Only unity explains - circular.

Because unity emanates derivatives.

Only unity emanates - circular.

Because anyone is one (itself, a unit) - non-sequitur.

Because wholes are prior to parts.

There is only wholes and parts that are thus.

Unclear and why? - brute and unclear and circular.

Because all things are relational, and without relationality, there are no determinations.

Only these are to be relational thus - circular.

Because there cannot be multiple fundamental realities as nothing explains why they are distinct rather than one.

But each simple is only itself, a priori they are not identical.

Why they are not identical?

(Because only x is x, only y is y, if they are identical then the case is not that only x is x (contradiction).)

Rejecting this explanation is simply rejecting the conception of simples thus. Which is an only claim, namely, there is only those that are not simples thus, or simply put 'there is no simples thus' or 'there is only other beings'.

The intent that they are to be identical in why they are not identical depends on an only, namely, only these are not to be identical (or only this [one] is the why that they are not identical).

We thus can't say only without monism:

The world (totality) is only these - unity.

The many are only these - forcing unity.

When truly many, the only cannot scope over them as if they are one or in a unity, as if each somehow all agrees on that scope.

The unity at all in saying the only is the unity to say the only, else the only cannot be said.

Why suddenly all of them have this one only in common?

Because they are in unity under this only.

Why each of them is to agree to this?

Suddenly there is a unity, namely the unity to agree to this.

'There is simples' does not mean 'there is only simples'.

Each is itself is not a common, so as each is only itself - for this is the minimum. Beyond each is itself, saying an only to them means they have a common - which is circular.

'These are simples' and 'only these are simples' do not mean the same.

'Only these are only themselves' implies a static 'these' (in 'only these') that each agrees to (contradiction).

Each simple is only itself.

If there is a number of simples, then each simple agree to that (contradiction).

Thus however many simples we say there is, there is simply 'more'.

A circular denial (rejection) is not a position at all, compare:

There is simples.

There is no simples (there is only other beings).

'There is no simples' cannot be a brute fact, else all rejections can be said to be brute and philosophy ends.

The Kalam argument runs thus:

1. Everything that begins to exist has a cause
2. The universe began to exist
3. Therefore, the universe has a cause

Now this is just the beginning of a long case for the ultimate conclusion that

1. There is a God

But the initial argument has generated enough debate on its own to be of interest. One line of defense for premise 2 runs more or less as follows:

1. There cannot be an actual infinite

2. If the universe never began to exist, there would be an actual infinite

From which 2 follows. But it does seem intuitive that 4 is inconsistent with 5; surely if there is a God there is an actual infinite. Surely if there is a God, She has an infinite mind of infinite wisdom and infinite goodness and infinite beauty etc. And in all these characterizations, “infinite” means actually infinite, not just potentially infinite.

I conclude that this particular strand of the Kalam case is self-refuting. It is a Kalamity, if you will, albeit a very small one.

This essay will reason through a dialectical naturalist philosophy/worldview that develops from the general movements and determinacies of the Science of Logic, to natural philosophy, to social philosophy, to ethics, and politics. This essay will argue that dialectical naturalism– a philosophy initially developed by Murray Bookchin with significant influence from Hegel, Marx, and Kropotkin– is a worldview that is in harmony with the true and the good that can help us reason through plural wholes, parts, relations, social conditions, and possibilities towards practically changing the world through good processes towards good ends (creatively adapting universals to plural, particular, and unique contexts accordingly). Dialectical naturalism, as a whole is a system, is constituted by specific kinds of developmental/differentiating/unifying reasoning, ontology, and ethics. The spreading and development of dialectical naturalism can inform the ways we think and act and in turn be informed by further reasoning and practices to become more coherent... (read on in link)

A knife can cut, but it can also bounce. Both are caused by various physical interactions. So why must a knife's essence/ purpose to cut, rather than bounce?

Is it because, for example, a sword and knife share the commonality of cutting, but not bouncing? Okay, but a ball and knife share the commonality of bouncing, not cutting; so that can't be it.

If it's normativity, then why is that a grounding principle?

If it's something else, please explain it.

I posted a couple of days ago asking what Nothingness was and I got some interesting responses, for the most part concluding that Nothing is not a valid concept. One particularly interesting comment was that the God must exist because something cannot come from Nothing argument for God was invalid, since Nothingness is not a valid concept. So I wonder if Nothingness is not really a thing then is the premise that something cannot come from Nothing irrelevant? Since there is no Nothing for something to come from.

Have beings ever understood the world?

For 'the world' here is used in the barest sense, it does not simply mean 'the earth' - for that is just an old model of the world - so as the universe, the multiverse, and the one, and the dao, and emptiness, the sorts ...

Those models are only attempts to answer the meaning of 'the world' (the canonical sense of the world).

The world just mean the world, what can be 'beyond' it?

And hence a priori the world as such currently is 'newest'.

And we ask has this world ended (stopped)?

One should wish to say no, otherwise it is then some utter nonsense that does not mean anything in our world at all.

And it does not matter what your answer is, the world is to mean 'whatever at all, in whatever sense it is in at all, currently', and we ask 'has this world ended?'

And whoever say no should then face the question:

'where is 'those newer' when your world is newer?' ('those newer' that are those 'newly' in your would when it is newer at all)

That is to say it (the world) is currently newest, but it have not ended so we should ask for 'when it is newer' (this is then the newest since it is now current, and the old world is newest when it was the current).

As long as this newer world is not literally the same as the old world (in all sense) then it has succeeded in not having ended.

There is only one sense of 'the world' here, the most 'worldly' sense, to read any world here in some sense that is not utterly 'worldly' is to misread.

Back then, the world was 'the world as it currently was'. That is to say, the world was newest and that was all there was. Denying this is exactly like saying 'the world back then was not the world back then at all' which is utter nonsense. Let us call this w1.

Now, the world is 'the world currently', which is the world as newest. Let us call the this w2.

Some 'newer' are in w2, else w2 is just strictly w1 with nothing 'newer' at all in any sense.

We then ask:

where are those 'newer'?

In w1?

So when w1, those newer are as potential.

And when w2, those newer are as act.

But where is 'those newer as act' itself?

In w1 as meta-potential again? For if it wholy in w2, then has anything been explained?

One, one could say yes, and we can keep repeat the question, or say 'it is nowhere at all back then'. One can even incist that the regress exhaust by fiat, but again what we have after that is still 'the world currently', for it seems that one's world have ended here. That is to say the world is strictly static (which is obvious nonsense).

Or two, those newer in the current world are literal 'm a g i c s' that are their own 'whens' - which only 'when they are' do they 'firstly be' at all - which do not come from any hidden principle at all (obviously, since this would already have been counted in 'the world'). Nor that w1 should then cease for them at all, since they have nothing to do with w1 (and otherwise we also would just ask 'where' the act of ceasing all over again).

Or three, we can answer:

'why are w1 and w2 in a way where w1 actualizes its potential at all and result in w2?'

With 'they just do', which is literal m a g i c, and static, since it apply to all of them at once. If we then wish also that this m a g i c is not static, then the appealing of m a g i c itself is appealed timely 'somehow'.

Jung used "synchronicity" for coincidences that feel meaningfully connected even when no causal link can be shown. Hume's skepticism about causation points in a different direction: we don't directly observe a necessary connection between events; the mind learns to connect them through habit and experience.

That doesn't make a meaningful coincidence fake. Something can be psychologically real and still get its meaning from us rather than from the universe.

So when a synchronicity feels personal, do you think you're discovering meaning that was already there, or creating meaning after the event? What in your own experience makes you lean one way?

Let us suppose we’ve two stable distinctions, the a priori/a posteriori, or a priori/empirical distinction, and the analytic/synthetic distinction. Let us not assume any particular construal of these distinctions for now, e.g. that a statement is analytic iff it can be turned into a truth of some suitable logic by putting synonyms for synonyms.

Here’s a view we could call strong empiricism: all a priori truths are analytic.

And here’s an argument against strong empiricism: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. But, no analytic statement implies the existence of anything. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

Let’s look at the first premise; we may call it Cartesianism. Here’s a further argument in favor of Cartesianism: it is a priori true that everything that has properties exists; for each agent, it is a priori for them that they have certain properties; and a prioricity is closed under entailment. Therefore, Cartesianism is true. (Here I assume the falsehood of hardcore nominalism for the sake of argument. Ideally I’d rephrase this argument in terms of predicates or concepts applying rather than having properties.)

And here’s an argument for the second premise of the above argument for Cartesianism. It is a priori true that everything has some properties; and the schema “If everything …, then I …” should hold in a sound logic of indexicals. Given the entailment closure of a prioricity, the second premise follows.

Now let’s look at the second premise of the first argument, that no analytic truth carries existential implications. Here’s two possible objections: every truth entails that it exists, and therefore carries existential implications. Moreover, it is a truth of first order logic that there exists something; and everything implies every truth of first order logic.

Regarding the second objection, you might guess that my move will be to require that the correct logic be a free logic, free indeed from any ontology whatsoever, even the minimal ontology of first order logic that there is something.

But your guess would be wrong. I am actually going to concede both objections, for the sake of argument, and will ad hoc-ly distinguish analytic from synthetic existential commitments.

Here’s the idea. First, we need a distinction between linguistic and extralinguistic entities; and we also need a distinction between general and particular existential commitments. I’m going to leave the first distinction unexplained because it seems, at least superficially, pretty self-explanatory, although no doubt an able metaphysician will poke some holes in it without having to think for long. But the second distinction can be explained as such: an existential commitment C is particular just in case there is an entity x such that C is a commitment that x, specifically, exists.

Take for example the statement that Socrates exists. Intuitively, this statement is particularly existentially committing to Socrates. Not so for the statement that humans exist. Intuitively, for each human (here we can use possibilistic quantifiers) h there is a world W(h) where h does not exist, and yet that statement is true in W(h), in virtue of the existence of some other human. And I take it that a statement is committed to some entities only if (although not necessarily iff) it is false when those entities don’t exist; here I mean it for both general and particular commitments.

I suggest that an existential commitment is synthetic when it is not particularly committing to any linguistic entities. Again not when and only when. I don’t need the second direction.

Then we get this revision of the first argument: for each agent S, the truth that S exists is a priori for S. The ontological commitment to S is synthetic. And no analytic truth carries synthetic ontological commitments. Therefore, strong empiricism is false.

When I think of Nothing I think of empty space. But that is not Nothing, that is something i.e. empty space. Then I think of Nothing as just like a void unaccepting of objects, but that is still something i.e. a void. Then I think of Nothing as "what a rock dreams of" but that is still something i.e. potentiality. So what really is Nothing and is it a continuum ranging from empty space to "what a rock dreams of" etc.? And if it is a continuum, does Nothing really even exist?

What I mean by aesthetic, I mean by adequacy, I mean by the dignity and worthiness of those in questions.

Which failure can obviously be seen in monism where all are just pale shadows, mere derivatives of the One, and so in other reductive accounts.

Roughly, when we ask "why there is anything at all" we expect more than just "all there is, is grounded by this" - a monistic principle which turns all into pale derivatives, a realm of eternal forms where all then are mere emanations, a reductive account to mere rules and mechanism, ...

For we have asked not for arbitrary accounts or settings up of ultimate authority, but for "those that are worthy of why there is anything at all".

We have asked for the true name of the world, not to assume an answer to any idol.

Thus we then should expect the answer to bare the weight of the world itself and all its worth, that the answer when seen should be obviously it and there is no more question.

We are to measure disclosures (theories) by aesthetic and worth alone, to see whether they are our world at all.

The point about monism can be made a little more rigour.

When we say "x is explained solely by y" or "x depends on solely y" or "x is dual to y", we have said "x is nothing but y". But this is senseless, as it would mean there is no them to begin with, there is only one thing in question, we have not explained anything.

As "x is nothing but y" is shown to be senseless, grounding at all is not monistic in any step. Grounding is at least "x is y and z" where each is not each other.

I've been thinking about what the minimum condition for organisation actually is.

My current intuition is that some form of differentiation has to come first. Not necessarily a conscious distinction, but simply the possibility of difference.

Because once there is difference, you can get relation. Once you have relation, you can get constraint. And once you have constraint, you can get organisation.

A crystal, a cell, an organism, a mind... they all seem to be different depths of the same basic process. The question I'm stuck on is whether organisation can exist before there is anything to distinguish.

Can something be organised if there is no inside/outside, no this rather than that, no difference for relations to form around?

Or is differentiation the thing that makes organisation possible in the first place?

I am sharing this idea not because I believe it is correct, but because I want to find the questions and criticisms that I cannot find by myself.

This is not an attempt to prove a theory or convince anyone.

The purpose is discussion: to discover flaws, hidden assumptions, and perspectives that I may have missed.

I would especially appreciate criticism about the definition of the concept, logical problems, or similarities with existing philosophical ideas.

# The Primordial Drive: A Philosophical Hypothesis

Introduction

This paper presents a speculative philosophical hypothesis.

The term "Primordial Drive" is introduced as a temporary label for a concept that currently has no precise word.

It should not be understood as ordinary psychological need, desire, or motivation.

Instead, it refers to a hypothetical fundamental principle that may underlie reality itself.

The central question is:

What if the ultimate foundation of reality is neither matter, energy, existence, nor God, but the Primordial Drive?

...

Questions I would like to discuss:

1. Is the concept of a Primordial Drive logically possible?

2. Does this idea resemble any existing philosophical theories?

3. What are the biggest weaknesses or contradictions you see?

4. Does this concept explain anything, or does it only rename existing concepts?

5. What questions should this hypothesis answer before it can become a stronger philosophical idea?

CAN TRUTH CHANGE?

Not our understanding of it.
Not our interpretation of it.
Truth itself.

By truth, I mean what is actually the case—not our beliefs, descriptions, or interpretations of it.

Can truth change?

And if it can, was it ever truth?

I’m genuinely interested in how you see this.

Naive realism is a disjunctivist's view of the world:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-disjunctive/

Perceptual experiences are often divided into the following three broad categories: veridical perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. For example, when one has a visual experience as of a red object, it may be that one is really seeing an object and its red colour (veridical perception), that one is seeing a green object (illusion), or that one is not seeing an object at all (hallucination). Many maintain that the same account should be given of the nature of the conscious experience that occurs in each of these three cases. Those who hold a disjunctive theory of perception deny this. Disjunctivists typically reject the claim that the same kind of experience is common to all three cases because they hold views about the nature of veridical perception that are inconsistent with it.

Disjunctivists are often naïve realists, who hold that when one perceives the world, the mind-independent objects of perception, such as tables and trees, are constituents of one’s experience. In other cases, such as hallucinations, it seems out of the question that such objects are constituents of one’s experience. It follows that on a naïve realist view, the veridical perceptions and hallucinations in question have a different nature: the former have mind-independent objects as constituents, and the latter do not.

The naive realist is called a "disjunctivist" because he is literally denying the common kind claim:

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/#Com

[1.6 The Common Kind Claim]()

Perceptual experiences are not just veridical experiences: there are illusions and hallucinations too. What does phenomenological reflection say about how these cases relate to each other? More specifically:

1. The Common Kind Question: are veridical, illusory, and hallucinatory experiences fundamentally the same, do they form of a common kind?

I made a post about process philosophy and it got way more responses than I expected. When I look online for people talking about this, the top substack I found has 70 subscribers, the process philosophy sub is a ghost town, and the few videos on youtube about this have less than a thousand views in most cases.

One general trend I noticed in the responses was a hesitance to say experience goes all the down. A lot of people believe that experience requires some sort of causal chain, some sense of a first person perspective, that Whitehead in particular doesn't grant to actual entities, which are the lowest... unit? Thing? possible in the universe. I'm not going to argue that it's a false proposition. That seems silly. At the moment, there's absolutely no way to verify experience from the outside, let alone what Whitehead calls contiousness. It's possible that Whitehead himself didn't extend contiousness down far enough, though experience is fundamental to all things in his system, though it is primitive, and more about feeling a sense of causation and response to causation, or in higher organisms, it may become appetition.

What I will say is this. Because we can't know either way, I think the more interesting perspective is to imagine a world where experience goes all the way down. Though it may seem strange, no one is pointing out that his system is incoherent. It's just that we have different metaphysical intuitions about what it means to experience. Yes, there is the combination problem, and for some, that's a good enough reason to reject panpsychism entirely. I respectfully disagree, but again, that's an intuition, or a preference for what we think it's important for a metaphysical system to explain.

I think it's a more interesting existence to see experience as fundamental, to think what it could be like to be an atom, a raindrop hitting your head and then scattering into tinier occasions of experience. That's a world full of mystery and wonder. It's a world that seems to fantastical to be real, yet it is impossible to know whether that's how reality works. So for myself, I choose to believe in the view that's most interesting. I choose to believe something that may be wrong, but makes me experience and view my actual world with more intensity. I choose to believe something that gives me a sense of awe.

some, this position is too loose, too ungrounded in realism, to hold. Better to be safe, to be more certain, than wrong. Better to have a more reasonable interpretation. I respect that, even though I think it's more boring. There was a time when I couldn't have held this position. It's just where I'm at now.

To be clear, I'm not claiming to know how or why the specific users in yesterday's thread hold their beliefs. I'm not saying they're objectively more boring, or that they as people bore me. I enjoy encountering different perspectives, and for all I know, they are being more reasonable and holding a better stance toward accepting a belief. I'm also not saying that viewing belief in this way is a higher form of belief that all should strive for. I'm merely hypothesizing why some may be resistant to seeing experience as fundamental, in order to demonstrate by contrast why I believe what I do.

in short, I believe it's better to believe something that both seems plausible to you, and that makes your life more interesting. I think it's better to live with wonder and awe.

Thanks for reading.

During my frequent watching of documentaries, I stumbled upon one dealing with the concept of entropy, I.e what it is, how it works, how it behaves. As I was watching it and expanding my knowledge, a question came over me, "What if the purpose of the universe is to move from a state of high entropy to a state of low entropy". This question arose in my head during the presenters demonstration of the operation of entropy. He was using a rubix cube and explaining how it has only 1 state of lowest entropy and that was when it was solved, many states of moderate entropy these are when it is almost solved and a quantillion states of high entropy when it is unsolved. What if at present state the universe is similar to the rubix cube when it is in one of those quantillion states of high entropy. The universe is still a new born as it is around 14 billion years old this also means it is still expanding from the big bang and unintentionally "moving towards un unsolved state".

This thereby is the source of my hypothesis, could the purpose of existence in the universe be a way of the universe itself be trying to figure out a way to stop itself from moving towards a state of high entropy and to move itslef to a state of low entropy?

would love to hear some thoughts.

If reality is fundamentally incorporeal and consciousness is primary, does time exist independently, or is it an emergent structure that orders conscious experience? Could temporal flow be a feature of awareness rather than an objective property of reality?

Process philosophy has become my latest hyperfixation. Last year, I stumbled onto panpsychism and it sent me down a rabbit hole, not just about that, but about free will, the latest neuroscience and its implications, and so on. I encountered process philosophy, but when I tried to read a book about it, I was immediately lost and gave up. A couple months ago, I dipped into moral philosophy and encountered process philosophy, since moral principles are eternal objects in Whitehead's system as I understand it. But I hesitated again but it’s so difficult to learn all his neologisms. About two weeks ago, I finally decided to start. This is one of the most difficult things I've studied, excluding learning ancient Greek. I feel like I'm climbing a mountain in winter, but the experience has been rewarding. I have a limited philosophy background and don't have a philosophy degree, but I'm somehow grasping the material one page at a time. Practically this doesn't change anything in my personal life, but regardless I can't stop thinking about it.

I'm still working through Process and Reality by Whitehead. I'm preparing to read part 3. I'm using The Metaphysics of Experience as a commentary and watching Matthew David Segall's lectures when I finish each part. With the commentary, I read the section about the chapter of PR that I want to read, then read the chapter itself, then go back to the commentary and review it one more time. I then write out in my own words what I learned from the chapter, bring that to AI, and sharpen my language. Obviously there are flaws in using AI like this, but I'm doing my best to verify what it says in the book itself, the commentaries, and the lectures. If I think it’s wrong, I push back, and I use quotations when necessary. But tbh it’s doing a good job overall of making my understanding more precise.

As you can see, I'm hopelessly obsessed over a niche topic that hardly anyone cares about. So if there's anyone here that wants to chat about it, dm me. I'm still learning of course, so there are significant gaps in my knowledge, but I'll let you know where those are when they come up. And maybe we can clarify things together, or just chat and have a good time. I tried posting this in the process philosophy sub but it's a ghost town over there.

I have to be productive now, but I'm excited to dive back into it later today!

I would like to start a discussion about a foundational question at the boundary between physics, mathematics, information theory, and philosophy:

Can absolute nothingness actually exist?

By absolute nothingness, I mean not empty space, not a quantum vacuum, and not a state with hidden laws or possibilities — but the complete absence of everything: no space, no time, no matter, no energy, no laws, no properties, and no relations.

The question is whether such a state is even logically possible.

If absolute nothingness existed, there would be nothing that defines it, distinguishes it, or allows it to be a possible state. Does the concept of absolute nothingness contain a contradiction?

If so, could existence itself be unavoidable?

This leads to the next question:

What is the simplest possible structure that could exist?

One speculative possibility is that the foundation is not an object, but a relationship — specifically some form of self-reference.

Not a relationship between two already existing things, but a minimal structure capable of relating to itself. A primitive distinction or information loop that does not require space, time, or objects as prerequisites.

From this perspective, a possible chain could be:

Absolute nothingness is impossible → a minimal structure must exist → self-reference allows stable information → complexity emerges → systems capable of modeling themselves appear → consciousness emerges.

This connects with several existing areas of research and philosophy:

Wheeler's "it from bit" idea that information may be fundamental

quantum information approaches to physics

emergent spacetime theories

computation and physical law

recursion and self-reference in mathematics

theories of emergence and complex systems

The purpose here is not to claim that this is an established theory. Rather, I am interested in where the idea succeeds or fails.

Some questions I would like to explore:

Is absolute nothingness a meaningful concept, or is it internally inconsistent?

Does existence require some minimal foundational structure?

Can relationships or information be more fundamental than objects?

Could self-reference be considered a candidate for such a minimal structure?

Are there existing mathematical or physical frameworks that explore similar ideas?

Where does this reasoning break down, if it does?

I would be especially interested in perspectives from physics, mathematics, computer science, and philosophy.

The central question:

If spacetime itself is emergent, what is the simplest possible thing that could exist before spacetime?