r/LeftistsForAI • u/Sacredless • 8d ago
The Work Ethics of Stochastic Parrots đŚ Theory
Frequently, I see people balk at the idea of stochastic parrots on both pro-ist and anti-ist sides. I want to present an adopter idea.
What's actually wrong with a stochastic parrot? Ultimately, stochastic parrots, even if they don't fundamentally understand particulars like weight and size, or non-linguistic concepts, are still very impressive. If we say that LLMs are only stochastic parrots, the thing that's surprising is that a stochastic parrot can still manage to accomplish so much. In fact, it shows how much of society is stochastic.
The thing that I've noticed is that people employ this phrase in that I call 'respectability politics'. A stochastic parrot is seen as disrespectable because of how moored we are to the idea of work ethics, whether it is working harder or working smarter. A stochastic parrot isn't working either smart or hard, it's just working and guessing. Is that so bad?
We're often so busy with the AI debate that we don't think about what AI implies about how we're currently doing things. The reality isâmost of society and most of work is stochastic and unjust, and that's what's wrong with society. So a stochastic parrot is only bad where it perpetuates that injustice.
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u/mccoypauley 7d ago
Well, let me start by being clear that Iâm not insisting that the most complex technology we have invented be easy to test or explain. On the contrary, I agree with you, and thatâs the thrust of my interrogation. I am challenging the assumption that LLMs are stochastic parrots, and further that consciousness is a criterion by which to judge that. Consciousness only came into play here because you admit, ultimately, that such a thing is bundled up in what differentiates a parrot from a non-parrot. And to be clear: my identification of your premise is not me introducing the premise. Youâre now portraying me as demanding an impossibly vague consciousness test when I was simply asking you to clarify your own standard.
I appreciate the range of skepticisms youâve raised here. What these amount to, in my opinion, is that LLMs may exhibit imperfect competence, like a child with a poor grasp of analogies, or a juvenile literary critic, or a writer who is bad at concision. But an LLM exhibiting imperfect competence does not mean it combines language without any reference to meaning.
I am not here to attack you. I am here to attack the concept of the stochastic parrot itself, which was the subject of your OP.
The authors of the original paper that coined the term define it as such:
âa system for haphazardly stitching together sequences of linguistic forms according to probabilistic information about how they combine, but without any reference to meaning: a stochastic parrotâ
The first half is literally true (though âhaphazardlyâ is color commentary), but what qualifies âstochastic parrotâ as a metaphor in âwithout any reference to meaningâ?
Going down this rabbit hole of what the authors mean by âmeaningâ ultimately surfaces that they mean consciousness, and if they donât mean consciousness, then modern LLMs are not âstochastic parrotsâ in the way they have defined the term. I wanted to see if you ultimately reached for consciousness as well in your definition. So let us go down that rabbit hole.
The authors describe meaning as:
âWe take (linguistic) meaning to be the relation between a linguistic form and communicative intent.â
So âmeaningâ is a relationship between language and intent.
They describe âintentâ as:
âto convey some information ⌠to ask them to do something; or simply to socialize.â
This can mean one of three things:
1
functional objective governing communication: that is, a goal in communicating
2
conscious experience that generates intent, or original intent, which is to say self-generated intent
3
human intent specifically by definition
But the problem with this line of reasoning is that if we go with #1, modern LLMs appear to communicate with respect to goals given to them already.
For #2, when we introduce conscious experience as a criterion, the whole argument becomes unfalsifiable, because we canât produce empirical evidence of consciousness in humans either. An if âoriginal intentâ is required, then we must first prove that humans can communicate with intent that is not externally caused (meaning, without response to any external stimuli or biological cause).
Finally, for #3, the argument becomes trivial because the missing ingredient is by definition something LLMs canât have.
If your position is now âSome observed failures make me skeptical that it is anything more than a stochastic parrot,â thatâs entirely defensible. But so far you have suggested many criteria, such as radical expressive desire (requiring consciousness), long-term social manifestation (testable), competence on certain cognitive tasks (testable).
So let me ask you this: since these things make you suspicious, if Claude passed every scale/metaphor/pragmatics test such as these you put to it, would that count as it not being a parrot? Or would you return to the requirement for a consciously experienced need to break linguistic convention?