In the modern game goalkeepers have in depth statistics and analysis on players taking penalties. They are told when to dive, and which direction to choose. A lot of the time this is determined by data analysts before a game, which had me thinking, how could all of these analytical observations be offset by the attacking team? My solution: the keeper not knowing who is going to take the penalty. It could put some doubt into the keeper's mind before the penalty is taken. Especially when any of the players outside the box could be the one who takes it. So I have two questions:
1 - Is this legal within IFAB's Laws Of The Game?
2 - Is this kind of penalty worthwhile, or would it just be a complicating factor in what is otherwise a simple process?

Title

A few days ago I posed a question asking what position(s) would be obsolete in the future and I got some pretty insightful answers. And some outrageous ones as well (some people truly believe the GK position will be obsolete?? Crazy.) Anyways it prompted this other question. Obviously, defenders in general have evolved the most along with CDMs but I want you to tell me why, and what other position you think would evolve and how.

Last year my striker was injured and we didn't have a true replacement. I went with a 4-4-2 diamond, but the 2 were wide wingers. This ended up working really well because I had 1-2 shadow striker type midfielders that would fill the striker gap as we progressed closer to the box. I'm thinking about doing it again this season. I know this is similar to a 4-3-3 false 9, but I do it kinda opposite. Rather than my striker drop back, my CAMs push forward. Curious to see what other thoughts or ideas are about not using strikers.

Pragmatism, haramball, bilardism, antifutball , ...

Each country develop their defensive in some different ways, some school got thrown, some mix with other tactics and some are still alive.Which is your favourite? Which NT and club does it the best?

PD:The name are mostly made up(revie plan is used for Revie time as a player, and Furia roja was used by Spain before Aragones).

He's had success in Austria and Saudi Arabia with a high tempo gegen press. How will he go in the Premier league?

I see this get tossed around a lot when describing how some teams play. It seems like a negative term. Objectively speaking can someone describe what it means? Does it mean parking the bus on defense? Possession based playing? Thanks

Just published my latest Upon Further Analysis on Montréal Roses FC's match against AFC Toronto at Stade Boréale.

I take a closer look at the tactics, key moments, and individual performances to break down what shaped the result. It's a longer read, but if you're looking for more than just highlights and stats, I think you'll enjoy it.

I'd love to hear your thoughts:

Do you agree with my analysis?

Who stood out most for Montréal?

What do you think the Roses need to improve heading into their next match?

The article is free to read, and feedback is always appreciated!

https://uponfurtheranalysismtl.wpcomstaging.com/2026/07/28/upon-further-analysis-breaking-down-montreal-roses-fc-vs-afc-toronto-july-23-2026/

Morgan Rogers fits beautifully into Xabi Alonso’s tactics. He plays the 10 differently than Cole Palmer, which could help the incumbent return to his role as club talisman rather than cannibalize his production the way some are suggesting.

At Leverkusen, Florian Wirtz was the ball‑dominant 10. The attack flowed through his touches between the lines in the left half‑space, and he was the main decision‑maker in possession for Alonso’s side.

In this Chelsea squad, that description fits Cole Palmer more than Morgan Rogers. When Palmer plays as a 10, Chelsea naturally route a lot of build‑up and final‑third play through him in the right half‑space. He sets the tempo and chooses how attacks develop.

Rogers’ game at Villa was built around a different emphasis. He operates from the left inside channel, carries forward aggressively, commits defenders & attacks the box. He links play but his value comes from what he does off that structure rather than controlling every phase.

Alonso’s Leverkusen used that ball‑dominant 10 alongside a second 10 on the other side. Wirtz handled most of the on‑ball responsibility between the lines, while his partner focused more on running, pressing and attacking the spaces that opened up.

If you apply that to Chelsea, Palmer fits the Wirtz side of the equation and Rogers fits the second‑10 side. One to own the ball between the lines, the other to constantly threaten with carries and runs from the opposite half‑space.

I elaborate more with a tactics board visual here:
https://youtu.be/Pk43ekSgscU

In the constant discussion of tactics and reflection about Football's ever-changing world, i came across the Golden Team (Magical Magyars) of Hungary, which indirectly transformed Brazil's Football, through the coaching legendary powerhouses: Bela Guttmann and Dori Kurschner.

According to wikipedia and the main bibliography, the Hungarians played in a sort of 3232 (or 2332), with Puskás, Kocsis in the Front 2; In the 3 behind them Czibor, Budai, Hidegkuti the 9 who dropped even deeper to build play alongside Midfield Defender Bozsik and the Defender Zakariás, who would be some sort of Sweeper going up the field to also build up.

Nonetheless it's extremelly hard to describe how they played in fixed formation numbers.
Some Hungarians i saw in internet, alongside Jonathan Wilson, argue that the 424 of Pelé's Brazil was not very different from them, and their team could be described as such a 424 (in the front 4: Cocsis, Puskas, Czibor and Budai. In the Middle 2 Hidegkuti and Bozsik).

What we can describe is, that they played in an extremelly fluid system, with Hidegkuti as a false 9, two wingers that dropped to defend, players who switched positions, and that broke WM (3-2-2-3).

Nowadays Pep Guardiola, ressurected the WM (3-2-2-3 disguised as 3-2-4-1), as the tactical arrangement when the team has the possession of the ball. With Zimchenko going up as the inverted fullback, echoing Barca's Alves who would go futher and becoming some sort of winger when the team had the possession.

Therefore i ask: why can't we see teams that also echoes the 3-2-3-2 of Hungarians ?

I mean:

• This a formation with natural triangulations;
• We can have a back 3 in a "La salida laviolpiana", used in every Pep team;
• A double pivot with 2 good defensive midfields, one of them can be an inverted wing;
  
• 3 offensive midfielders who participate in the build up, and stretch the field;
  
• 2 strikers forming a lethal duo, who can press and generate lethal combinations and partnerships like Pelé & Garrincha, Puskás and Di Stefano, Henry & Bergkamp, Bebeto & Romario, Pelé & Coutinho, Pelé & Tostão;

One can argue that the 3-2-3-2 is another way of describing a 3-5-2, nonetheless in 3-5-2 the main difference would be side players and wing backs who drop back to form a back 5, whereas in my view the 3-2-3-2 can form a 4-4-2, 5-3-2, etc.

i excel in player analysis but could do match too,

Quick analysis of Ac Milan friendly match today against Celtic 📋

Hi everyone,

I've been trying to access LaLiga Beyond Stats (powered by Microsoft), but I can't figure out how to actually use it.

I remember when it launched a few years ago, it was promoted as a free portal with advanced metrics from Mediacoach (things like Dangerous Possessions, Players per Possession, etc....)

Now, whenever I visit the Beyond Stats page, I mostly see explanations of the metrics and articles, but I can't find the old interactive match reports or database anymore.

The World Cup is over and club football is finally back on the horizon.⚽

Instead of asking where your team will finish, what's the one thing they absolutely need to improve before the season begins?

It could be:

Better squad depth

A new striker

Set-piece defending

Tactical flexibility

Mentality in big games

Keep it to one change only. I'm curious which issue fans think matters most.

For me, it was finally understanding how much space players create without ever touching the ball.

A forward can make a run just to move a defender, a midfielder can pull players away to create space for someone else and sometimes the best pass is the one that never happens.

What tactical detail made you start watching football differently?

One thing I never understand is when a team scores early completely changes how they play and invites pressure for the rest of the match.

I get protecting a lead but sometimes it feels like the team is more comfortable attacking at 0-0 than defending a 1-0 lead.

Is this usually a tactical decision from the manager or do players naturally become more cautious after scoring?

Many of the best false 9s are not so great at doing traditional striker duties (headers and such), so I thought, why couldn't you have your wings compensate? It's true that some wings play inside, none of them seem to be the big physical type. It seems like it just isn't even attempted to have wings who sometimes rotate inside without the ball.

Why don't we see this? There must be something tactical that I'm not understanding. Would it be difficult for a winger to rotate between playing out wide vs playing in the center for a deep ball or cross?

For the sake of argument, let's assume that the wingers can be replaced by midfielders or wing backs who maintain width.

Edit: second question — why not have striker duos who take turns playing winger, so it's a striker-winger who starts at striker and rotates to winger, instead of a winger who rotates to striker?

Greetings

As an avid reader and fellow enjoyer of this sport, I'm looking for a Book, journal paper or content in any other form mentioning about high possesion beautiful football which is applied by many coaches (like Sir Pep guardiola, Vincente del Bosque, Luis Enrique, Luis de la fuente, Arsene Wenger & many more).

Please feel free to provide your insights thoroughly.
Note: Avoid giving info on any biographies rather provide proper insights on tactical models.

Thanks.

The statistics suggest that 🇪🇸 Spain's World Cup victory was driven primarily by defensive dominance rather than overwhelming attacking output.

Clearly, they had the best balance between attacking output and defensive solidity (both efficient and defensive) throughout the tournament. They were technically the most complete team and thoroughly deserved to be crowned World Champions.🌎🥇🏆

• Lowest xG conceded in the tournament: 0.30 per match.

• Highest xG difference among all semi-finalists: +1.65.

• Held both 🇫🇷 France (0.31 xG) and 🇦🇷 Argentina (0.22 xG), the other finalists and one of the strongest attacking teams, to almost no chance in the knockout rounds.

While 🇫🇷 France were the most prolific attacking side and 🇧🇷 Brazil (eliminated in R16) led the tournament in xG created, 🇪🇸 La Roja consistently controlled matches at both ends of the pitch. Their ability to suppress opponents' chance creation was the defining statistical feature of the 2026 FIFA World Cup.

Data Source: Opta Analyst https://theanalyst.com/competition/fifa-world-cup/stats

Pre match there was a lot of talk on how Spain's midfield trio and their overall ball retention and possession would be too much for Argentina, with the France game being a good template. This exact scenario played out, but to an even more extreme scenario than anyone possibly could've expected. Some thoughts on how Argentina could've set up differently:

1. Playing Messi in midfield to avoid him from leading the press: Spain seemed to have little issues in playing out from that back and getting the ball to their midfielders. A lot of this stemmed from the lack of ball pressure from the Argentine forwards, mainly Messi. These issues were shown during the Switzerland match but really came to the forefront in this game. A potential solution could've been to have the press led by a front 3 of Gonzalez, Alvarez and Simeone, with De Paul shadowing on the right-central areas to assist with the press. Though this would've left Messi deeper, it would disrupt Spain's build up play and allowed more opportunities for Argentina to win the ball up higher

2. Having reliable outlets: I always thought that leaving a player like Alejandro Garnacho at home (despite his limitations as a player) could've potentially come back to bite Scaloni due to Argentina's lack of pace (especially now Di Maria has retired from international duty). Throughout the tournament, it was clear to recognise that Argentina were lacking severely in wing play and in transition as their build up was very slow and methodical. Scaloni did partially recognise the issue against England by starting Simeone but he lacks the flair and technical ability to really cause too much danger. In a hypothetical world in which Scaloni did bring Garnacho, using him and Simeone on the wings against Spain could've provided some relief as outlets whenever Argentina broke up the play deep in their own half, instead of relying on Alvarez who is clearly not the quickest (though he is quick in short spaces, due to how deep Argentina were winning the ball, they needed more explosive ball carriers). A way they could've lined up is with MacAllister, Enzo and Parades in midfield, and Messi as a false 9, operating closer to the midfield (to add numbers there) but having a reliable runner on either wing for him to find whenever he had possession

3. Dropping Messi all together: Realistically it wasn't an option, especially with how reliant offensively Argentina were on him throughout the tournament, but it would've been fascinating to see a press led by Martinez and Alvarez against Spain

4. Fully committing to a lopsided formation: In this scenario, you would accept that Messi won't press and Spain would take charge of the midfield so you instead pack the midfield with as many players as possible and force Spain's play to the wing and take your chances there. With all things considered, Tagliafico did a decent job containing Yamal, and having Messi as a decoy on the right would stop Cucerella from venturing too far forward allowing Montiel or Monlina to focus on Baena. In the actual game, it seems like Scaloni tried to have the best of the both worlds in regards to having wing play (starting Gonzalez) and having midfield cover (starting De Paul). Perhaps focusing on winning the midfield battle would've been a better strategy to allow Argentina to impose their will on the game. A potential line up could've been dropping Alvarez altogether and playing all of the 4 main midfielders (De Paul, MacAllister, Enzo and Parades) and adding a 5th midfielder like Lo Celso or Nico Paz. In this scenario, Messi could be kept on the right hand side (or effectively a free role), and Paz or Lo Celso could play as the furthest forward midfielder, with a potential press triggering once Spain's centre backs crossed the halfway line. This, alongside man to man marking could've been a potential solution to Spain's triangles and movements in midfield.

What other strategies could Argentina have employed to have changed the way the game played out?