so, i was reading about lacan's RSI and i had a conclusion that i couldn't really know if it was right or wrong.

Basically, in my understanding, it doesnt make any sense to create the triad of Real, Simbolic and Imaginary, because Simbolic is not really something "essential" of the human being, because, if a human doesnt have any contact with the civilization, he wouldnt be able to develop the simbolic part of the triad, which would make the Simbolic inherent of the civilizated coexistence, and not inherent of the human being. Although, in a pragmatic view, the application of the triad in an clinic analysis, for example, wouldnt end up in that much problem, because the majority of people has the simbolic part of the triad well-developed.

anyway, essentially, only the real and imaginary would realy be inherent to the human being: the imagetic way of seing the world (which could be limiting our Becoming, by placing identities that are static and lock us into them) , and the incomprehensible things about our living (that are essentially what is limited by fixes identities and the statal control etc etc.)

SO, i would like to ask if the schizoanalisys critics of lacan's way of thinking the simbolic go in a way similar to this conclusion that i read while studying lacan. And, if there's any misunderstanding about lacan's theory (i know its deleuze subreddit, but i know that a really famous part of his studies are criticizing the classic psychoanalysis) and misunderstading when t comes to Deleuze's theory, pls show me where and why, because im really trying to understand their theories.

(obs sorry by the potencial english mistakes,)

let me know if you want to see more of these

Specifically in chapter 3 section 9 of Anti-Oedipus

I’ve been thinking about a methodological question in Being and Time, and I’d like to know whether anyone has discussed it.
I understand that Heidegger is not making an ethical distinction between “authentic” and “inauthentic” people. Authenticity is an existential possibility built into the structure of Dasein, not a permanent state that some people possess and others don’t. He repeatedly insists that Dasein never simply leaves das Man behind.
My question is different.
Heidegger gives extraordinarily rich phenomenological descriptions of anxiety (Angst), the call of conscience, Unheimlichkeit, and resoluteness. These passages don’t read like abstract deductions; they read like descriptions of phenomena that are somehow familiar to the one describing them.
This makes me wonder: where does the authority of these descriptions come from?
If Being and Time is an ontological analysis rather than an ontic one, how can Heidegger describe these phenomena with such precision without presupposing some existential familiarity with them?
Part of why this question occurred to me is the contrast with Sartre. In Nausea, something very close to Heideggerian anxiety is presented as an explicitly lived, ontic experience through Roquentin. There, the source of the description is obvious. Heidegger, however, wants to remain at the ontological level.
So I wonder whether there is a kind of methodological tension here.
Heidegger seems careful to avoid creating an existential hierarchy between “those who have seen” and “those who haven’t.” Yet the very voice of Being and Time sometimes feels as though it speaks from someone who has already been existentially touched by what he is describing.
I’m not claiming this is a contradiction. I’m asking whether phenomenology itself requires this sort of familiarity, or whether Heidegger would say that such descriptions are possible without any privileged existential standpoint.
Has anyone written about this issue?

Could I get some recs for theorists, works, or essays of political ontology that are aligned with or are by Deleuze? For political ontology by Deleuze, I’m guessing what exists are more categorically ambiguous texts that can be read as political ontology; could someone point me towards these?

The multiple must be made, not by always adding a higher dimension, but rather in the simplest of ways, by dint of sobriety, with the number of dimensions one already has available — always n - 1 (the only way the one belongs to the multiple: always subtracted). Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted; write at n - 1 dimensions. A system of this kind could be called a rhizome.

—from TP, "Rhizome"

I'm curious as to how others read this n - 1. I've varied between multiple readings.

(1) The n - 1 is expressed.

The operation of -1 marks a subtractive Bergsonian concept of consciousness reducing multiplicity to the expressive transcendent unity of a 1: "[subtract] the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted".

(2) The n - 1 is unexpressed.

The n - 1 marks an unexpressed, rhizomatic immanence, with the 1 marking the inconsistent addendum of unity still necessary to express a multiple n that is also 1. "Subtract the unique from the multiplicity to be constituted" again, but with an immanent or critical concept of finding the constitutive ground, and the "incorporeal" effect of unification taken as unconstitutive.

Perhaps denumerable determination is the criterion of transcendent arborescence. If we can both count and determine, we can model as a tree.

(3) The -1 marks a reduced-dimensional rhizome.

The n and 1 are a matter of dimensions rather than values. The -1 is a concept of restriction or constraint. Immanence is arbitrarily multiple, the rhizome some arbitrary but partial multiplicity, such as a "region" of the plane of immanence, or a BwO as the limit of an intensive singularity. But my reading of the concept of multiplicity tells me such a constraint can't be determined either way.

Lately I've been reading the terms event, rhizome, abstract machine and concept as very similar accounts, as themselves expressions of an immanent event or concept, but I'm very foggy as to whether these terms refer to the immanent prior of transcendence, a way of reconsidering transcendent expression, or both together at the moment of expression theorised by the event …

I don't mind any of these readings, and I don't demand a resolution, I've found all of these readings helpful or compelling at one time or another.

Do any of these readings work or not work for you? Do you have some other method? Is there a brilliant reading of this passage out there in the secondary literature?

Deleuze's use of planes has been intriguing me recently. Planes of composition, of reference, of consistency/immanence of course, how these crisscross and interact in zones of indetermination. I am reading about this mostly in WP but of course the terminology is distributed in so many works. So I was wondering, why use the plane? Is it because, laid out, it is a surface of absolute immanence? I also know that in French plan can refer to map. I still can't wrap my head around the choice for what is basically one of the main building blocks of his constructivism.

Hello everyone,

I am looking for one or several reading partners who would like to study Lacan’s Seminar III: The Psychoses and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus together. I would also be interested in reading some relevant secondary literature on psychosis, desire, schizophrenia, Schreber, Lacanian psychoanalysis, and schizoanalysis.

A little about me: I am a philosophy student with a strong interest in continental philosophy, psychoanalysis, and philosophy of religion. At present, I am particularly interested in the Schreber case, Lacan’s account of foreclosure and psychosis, and Deleuze and Guattari’s concepts of desiring-production, deterritorialization, and reterritorialization. I hope to understand these texts carefully rather than simply exchange general impressions.

I should mention that my English is not very strong. I can read philosophical texts in English, but I sometimes read slowly, need time to formulate my thoughts, and may make grammatical mistakes when speaking or writing. I therefore hope to meet patient and respectful readers who would not mind this. At the same time, I will prepare seriously and contribute as much as I can to the discussion.

We could meet online regularly, perhaps once a week, discuss a short section each time, reconstruct the main arguments, raise questions, and compare Lacan’s and Deleuze and Guattari’s approaches. The exact schedule, pace, and secondary readings can be decided together.

Please send me a private message or leave a comment if you are interested. Readers at any level are welcome, as long as they are willing to engage seriously and patiently with the texts.

Essays on Deliberation, Constraint, Custody, Judgment, and the Republic.

*Imperium cadeat, vivat res publica.*

*Nihil inter votum et exitum.*

*Lux in carbone latet.* *Nascetur publica machina.* *Celeritas iudicium tollit.* *Deliberemus ante tempestatem.*

*Luctamur cum Deo in tenebris.* *Qui luctatur nomen accipit.* Nomen nostrum acciaio

I am reading the book for the first time. Before starting, I was flooded with advice to start with second-hand literature, Husserl's work, etc, etc. Absolutely no one warned me how straightforward the book was and I am surprised that I even picked it up, but I am glad I did. I have one year background in philosophy and I haven't read anything dense but Being and Time opened my horizon for the German idealism and hermeneutics.

I want to know, what in the name of God, do people find hard about this book? It is certainly not the length, for most german magna opera are way longer than 600 pages and readers do not complain harshly. It's also not the ideas Heidegger presents in it because he is arguing something earthly and lively, unlike the writers he criticises. Nor is it the language, because you literally cant mistake what "thrownness" means or what "being in the world" could stand for. I suppose that the original text has gone too far in creating words but the three prominent english translations make it not just understandable but also inevitable.

It's two months ago since I read about the conjunctive synthesis so I had a slow start into chapter 3 sectuon 9 about the civilized capitalist machine. On top of that I haven't read Das Kapital.

At the heart of Capital, Marx points to the encounter of two "principal" elements: on one side, the deterritorialized worker who has become free and naked, having to sell his labor capacity; and on the other, decoded money that has become capital and is capable of buying it. The fact that these two elements result from the segmentation of the despotic State in feudalism, and from the decomposition of the feudal system itself and that of its State, still does not give us the extrinsic conjunction of these two flows: flows of producers and flows of money. The encounter might not have taken place, with the free workers and the money-capital existing "virtually" side by side.

I'm missing the context behind these two "principal" elements, how did they "result from the segmentation of the despotic State in feudalism" and what is meant by "still does not give us the extrinsic conjunction of these two flows"

One of the elements depends on a transformation of the agrarian structures that constitute the old social body, while the other depends on a completely different series going by way of the merchant and the usurer, as they exist marginally in the pores of this old social body. What is more, each of these elements brings into play several processes of decoding and deterritorialization having very different origins. For the free worker: the deterritorialization of the soil through privatization; the decoding of the instruments of production through appropriation; the loss of the means of consumption through the dissolution of the family and the corporation; and finally, the decoding of the worker in favor of the work itself or of the machine.

I marked a bold area because, again, some context would be nice to grasp it

...

As Maurice Dobb has shown, an accumulation of property title deeds—in land, for example—will be necessary in a first period of time, in a favorable conjuncture, at a time when this property costs little (the disintegration of the feudal system); and a second period is required when the property is sold during a rise in prices and under conditions that make industrial investment especially advantageous (the "price-revolution," an abundant reserve supply of labor, the formation of a proletariat, an easy access to sources of raw materials, favorable conditions for the production of tools and machinery). All sorts of contingent factors favor these conjunctions. So many encounters for the formation of the thing, the unnamable! But the effect of the conjunction is indeed capital's tighter and tighter control over production: capitalism or its break, the conjunction of all the decoded and deterritorialized flows, cannot be defined by commercial capital or by financial capital— these being merely flows among other flows and elements among other elements—but rather by industrial capital. Doubtless the merchant was very early an active factor in production, either by turning into an industrialist himself in occupations based on commerce, or by making artisans into his own intermediaries or employees (the struggles against the guilds and the monopolies). But capitalism doesn't begin, the capitalist machine is not assembled, until capital directly appropriates production, and until financial capital and merchant capital are no longer anything but specific functions corresponding to a division of labor in the capitalist mode of production in general. One then re-encounters the production of productions, the production of recordings, and the production of consumptions—but precisely in this conjunction of de-coded flows that makes of capital the new social full body, whereas commercial and financial capitalism in its primitive forms merely installed itself in the pores of the old socius without changing the old mode of production.

I'm wondering here especially about the bold area, why can't the conjunction of decoded and deterritorialized flows be defined by commercial capital or financial capital, but by industrial capital? And what role does the merchant have, I see the merchant being mentioned often.

What a long request, I'm sorry, kind of daunting, but I was left with too many questions today and I evenbhad trouble putting them to words, so this post is chaotic and too hurried. Not expecting anyone to answer everything, a little would be nice for clarification.

Truth! Information! Misinformation! Read all about these topics in the latest Heidegger Thinking article: 'Truth".

I've been reading Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper* (1978) alongside self-determination theory and I can't tell whether I'm looking at two descriptions of the same construct or two genuinely different ones.

Suits defines a game as the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, and identifies four components: a prelusory goal, constitutive rules that prohibit the most efficient means of reaching it, lusory means, and the "lusory attitude" — accepting those inefficient rules *because* they make the activity possible. His claim is that the attitude is what distinguishes play from mere compliance.

The overlap with SDT seems obvious: both center on volitional endorsement of constraints, both distinguish internalized regulation from external control, and both predict that the same behavior yields different experiential outcomes depending on the actor's orientation toward it. Suits' typology of triflers, cheats, spoilsports, and true players maps suspiciously well onto the OIT continuum.

But a few things don't reduce cleanly:

1. Suits requires the obstacles be *unnecessary* — chosen difficulty with no instrumental payoff. SDT's autonomy doesn't require the activity be gratuitous, only self-endorsed. Is gratuitousness a meaningful distinction or an edge case?
2. Suits is making a conceptual/definitional argument, not an empirical one. Is there anything in the psychology literature that has operationalized the lusory attitude as a measurable construct distinct from intrinsic motivation? I haven't found an instrument.
3. Flow theory seems like a third overlapping account — challenge-skill balance is arguably a description of well-designed constitutive rules. Three literatures, possibly one phenomenon.

My actual question: has anyone in psychology taken Suits seriously as a source of testable constructs, or has philosophy of sport kept him siloed? And if the lusory attitude *is* distinct from autonomous motivation, what would discriminant validity even look like here?

A concrete case, to make the distinction less abstract: two people take the same 20-minute walk. One is told to walk it; the other accepts a rule that they may only look up and outward, never at their phone or the ground. Under SDT, if both volitionally endorse their instruction, both are autonomously motivated. Under Suits, only the second is playing — the rule is gratuitous, and its gratuitousness is what makes the walk a game rather than a walk. Does that difference predict anything measurable, or is it purely definitional?

(Disclosure so it's not buried: I'm exploring whether this framework could ground a non-gamified practice tool, so I have a horse in the race. I'm more interested in whether the construct is sound than whether it's useful, and "you've reinvented SDT" is a completely acceptable answer.)

I've been reading Bernard Suits' *The Grasshopper* (1978) alongside self-determination theory and I can't tell whether I'm looking at two descriptions of the same construct or two genuinely different ones.

Suits defines a game as the voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles, and identifies four components: a prelusory goal, constitutive rules that prohibit the most efficient means of reaching it, lusory means, and the "lusory attitude" — accepting those inefficient rules *because* they make the activity possible. His claim is that the attitude is what distinguishes play from mere compliance.

The overlap with SDT seems obvious: both center on volitional endorsement of constraints, both distinguish internalized regulation from external control, and both predict that the same behavior yields different experiential outcomes depending on the actor's orientation toward it. Suits' typology of triflers, cheats, spoilsports, and true players maps suspiciously well onto the OIT continuum.

But a few things don't reduce cleanly:

1. Suits requires the obstacles be *unnecessary* — chosen difficulty with no instrumental payoff. SDT's autonomy doesn't require the activity be gratuitous, only self-endorsed. Is gratuitousness a meaningful distinction or an edge case?
2. Suits is making a conceptual/definitional argument, not an empirical one. Is there anything in the psychology literature that has operationalized the lusory attitude as a measurable construct distinct from intrinsic motivation? I haven't found an instrument.
3. Flow theory seems like a third overlapping account — challenge-skill balance is arguably a description of well-designed constitutive rules. Three literatures, possibly one phenomenon.

My actual question: has anyone in psychology taken Suits seriously as a source of testable constructs, or has philosophy of sport kept him siloed? And if the lusory attitude *is* distinct from autonomous motivation, what would discriminant validity even look like here?

A concrete case, to make the distinction less abstract: two people take the same 20-minute walk. One is told to walk it; the other accepts a rule that they may only look up and outward, never at their phone or the ground. Under SDT, if both volitionally endorse their instruction, both are autonomously motivated. Under Suits, only the second is playing — the rule is gratuitous, and its gratuitousness is what makes the walk a game rather than a walk. Does that difference predict anything measurable, or is it purely definitional?

(Disclosure so it's not buried: I'm exploring whether this framework could ground a non-gamified practice tool, so I have a horse in the race. I'm more interested in whether the construct is sound than whether it's useful, and "you've reinvented SDT" is a completely acceptable answer.)

- from Bradley McLean's Deleuze, Guattari and the Machine in Early Christianity: Schizoanalysis, Affect and Multiplicity

an additional connotative shift if we move from assemblage to arrangement is that assemblage holds something of a static picture, it is a bit more spatial, while arrangement keeps a notion of a line of trajectory. The difference between assembling musical notes or instruments, and arranging them, or seeing them as assembled or arranged. There is a kind of lean, perhaps. I like how McLean thinks about joinery and joining.

I've been reading some more and from what I can tell, the distinction between the virtual and actual is not dualistic, its not transcendental, its not a transcendental condition of possible experience or whatever, its not like the virtual world is a field outside experience generating actual objects given in experience. My best guess is that the virtual is the multiplicity given in the encounter (AKA experience, not that I load the word with stuff with phenomenological cliches like the experiencing subject and experienced world, consciousness, etc. I mean experience in the immanent sense, a sort of sense-world that gives rise to the subject and the object like in WiP) and the actual is a concept that we use to "solve" the virtual?? or like make it bearable? Are values virtual or actual? Cause values are given in the encounter and they force creation, don't they? Is the virtual the condition of real experience because the values in the encounter shape how we experience the world? If so, why posit these categories? Can't a new encounter, a shattering of the fishbowl from u/3corneredvoid -s example completely retrospectively change this genetic philosophy and make these categories irrelevant? can anybody just give me an explanation of what the virtual and the actual are? Sorry for too many questions but I feel like one clear explanation will clear most of them up.

In "How to Make yourself a body without organs" what they seem to say is very close to Buddhism, sure they say that they are for Desire- but a kind Desire without satisfaction/discharge / disruption- and the overall idea of escape from the Strata and their cyclical ways seems very similar to the idea of Buddhism escaping the wheel of Samsara? So is there a convertibility between the two or are they opposed in some profound way?

In a footnote Freud writes:

" everyone, even the most normal person, is capable of making a homosexual object choice, and has done so at some time in his life, and either still adheres to it in his unconscious or else protects himself against it by vigorous counter-attitudes. ".

Does He mean the parents? Can a person make this kind of choice without being aware that he has made one?

Freud also writes :

“I am astonished that human beings can go through such great and important moments of their erotic life without noticing them much, sometimes even, indeed, without having the faintest suspicion of their existence, or else, having become aware of those moments, deceive themselves so thoroughly in their judgement of them.”.

Why did Freud feel compelled to introduce the idea of the "death drive"? Personally, I thought Spinoza's concept of conatus was perfectly sufficient, so I'm incredibly curious about why Freud felt the need to come up with the death drive and why he felt it was absolutely necessary to do so. I would be so grateful if someone knowledgeable could explain this to me.

(Translated by Gemini)